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ABSTRACT
THE ANISA MODEL: A SCIENTIFIC
PARADIGM FOR EDUCATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR A THEORY OF EVALUATION
George Bondra, B.A.
,
Clark University
Graduate Study, Columbia University
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Daniel C. Jordan
The purpose of the dissertation is three-fold: (1) to establish
criteria for assessing scientific theories, (2) to demonstrate how the
Anisa Model as a scientific theory represents a new paradigm for ed-
ucation, and (3) to develop the implications of the paradigm for a
theory of evaluation. The dissertation is part of a larger effort
undertaken by the Anisa Project to help establish the Anisa Model as
a discipline in education that unites the discoveries of a wide range
of physical, biological, and behavioral sciences. In the growth of
scientific knowledge, it will be demonstrated how Anisa represents
a new paradigm for education providing a disciplinary matrix, dis-
tinctive methods, body of theory, accumulating bodies of data, and
implications for practical use. The study, therefore, aspires to
establish Anisa as a scientific paradigm for education by giving it
a local habitation and a name.
This study determines criteria for evaluating empirically based
scientific theories. These criteria, e.g., units of study, precise
VI
data language, explicit assumptions, and ability to generate testable
hypotheses, are applied establishing the Anisa Model as an empirically
based theory of education.
Thomas S. Kuhn's structure of scientific revolutions is then used
to show the growth of scientific knowledge in contrast to the Popper
et al. view which holds to the building-block or growth by accumulation.
Illustrations from the mature physical sciences demonstrate Kuhn's
structure of scientific revolutions. The pattern of growth moves
from the philosophical, pre-scientific stage - current status of
education — to a mature paradigm, which has the following stages:
normal science, puzzle-solving, discovery of anomalies, extraordinary
science, and paradigm shift. The mechanistic paradigm is illustrated
demonstrating the paradigm shift from Newtonian physics to Einstein's
general theory of relativity. The Anisa (organismic) paradigm is
presented demonstrating how Anisa fulfills Kuhn's criteria of a
scientific paradigm. It shows how the Anisa Model is able to assimi-
late theoretically the anomalies of the mechanistic paradigm resulting
in a major paradigm shift. The Anisa Model, therefore, moves education
out of its philosophical, pre-scientific stage to the status of a new
paradigm for education.
The implications of the new paradigm for further articulation of
the Anisa theory of evaluation are explored. The following issues
of
"normal science" are addressed: conceptual, instrumental, and
method-
ological. The conceptual problems deal with the significant
facts of
the paradigm related to its presuppositions concerning
the nature of
vii
reality. Some of these problems, which involve change, causation, hier-
archic organization, emergent phenomena, discontinuity and time, are
converted into puzzle-form for which Jordan, Bateson, et al. provide
tentative solutions.
Implications for new instrumentation focus on a critical review
of norm-referenced tests - their development, uses, and abuses. Key
measurement problems are converted into puzzle form. The dynamic
assessment techniques and methods of Feuerstein's Learning Potential
Assessment Device are presented as a radical modification of convention-
al psychometrics. This approach solves a major assessment problem for
Anisa. Criterion-referenced tests, which are appropriate for Anisa
practices, are discussed as a constructive alternative to norm-refer-
enced tests. Other areas of needed instrumentation are identified.
Methodological problems and their implications for the develop-
ment of the Anisa paradigm are addressed and viewed within the para-
digm perspective. The research methods used in seven years of field-
testing the Anisa Model are reviewed. New methods — new rules and
procedures for puzzle solution — identified by the Anisa paradigm are
explored. Promising new methods, e.g., Bronfenbrenner ' s experimental
ecology of human development, Bateson's concept of change based on the
theory of groups and logical typing, and nomothetic-idiographic designs
are presented.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
F. Raymond McKenna raises a signficant question in the February,
1976 issue of Phi Delta Kappan:
Notwithstanding advances in psychology and sociology,
there is no science of education. IVhy not? There is
a science of medicine furnishing doctors with reliable
theory and autonomy; but instead of a science of educa-
tion providing teachers with the theory and autonomy
they need, we have government officials and school
administrators telling teachers how and what to do (p. 405).
He then cites thirteen reasons why we have no science of educa-
tion, e.g., nature of pedagogy precludes theory, policy control by
politicians, testing educational theory too complicated, tyranny of
how-to-do-itry, etc. Daniel Jordan (1979) observes that the main
reason is not on the list for he notes that science is more than
knowledge; it is more than a method. Science, for Jordan, means
organized knowledge. To put knowledge in usable form, we need an organ-
izing principle. He concludes that the primary reason we have no
science of education is the lack of such a principle.
If we equate such an organizing principle and concomitant con-
ceptual model with what Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) has called a ' scientific
paradigm", the field of education may, nevertheless, still be at the
prescientific and philosophical state of affairs or, at best, multiple-
paradigm science. A paradigm comprises "universally recognized
scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and
solutions to a community of practitioners ..." (Kuhn, 1962). A
paradigm
prevails until anomalies, that is, phenomena that cannot
be explained
1
2by the paradigm emerge. If such anomalies cannot be explained, alter-
native paradigms may emerge. An alternative paradigm will ultimately
replace the old paradigm if it can better handle the fundamental
anomalies. Thus, major scientific advances in a field are likely to
emerge "only after a prounounced failure in the normal puzzle-solving
activity" within the field, that is, only after a crisis. Real sci-
ences advance through crisis. To experience the latter, we must first
have a paradigm. But no theory or methodology in education has ever
attained the general acceptance nor status accorded the physical sci-
ence paradigms cited by Kuhn. Education is experiencing a crisis of
confidence related to its multiple theories, most of which are implicit-
ly or explicitly subsumed under the Lockean-Newtonian, mechanistic view
of the world.
This writer believes that the Anisa Model deals with the education-
al crisis of confidence by moving education out of its pre-scientific
and philosophical state of affairs to a dual -paradigm science. The
Anisa Model, it will be shown, serves as a comprehensive and coherent
scientific theory of education. While the Model draws heavily on the
physical, biological, and behavioral sciences based on the 19th cent-
ury Newtonian, mechanistic paradigm, it also represents a shift to a
new paradigm with an organismic view by introducing subjective aim
and final cause. It represents more than paradigm shift, however,
for
it represents a totally new scientific paradigm in education.
It can
be considered analogous to the Newtonian-Einstein theories,
i.e..
3Einstein's general theory of relativity did not disprove Newton's
terrestial and celestial laws but made them a special case within
a larger framework. The new paradigm, therefore, not only handles
many of the anomalies created by the mechanistic paradigm but repre-
sents an innovation that could be characterized as a scientific re-
volution.
The focus of this study is twofold: (1) to establish the basis
of the Anisa Model as a new paradigm representing a major paradigm
shift and (2j to develop the implications of the paradigm for a theory
of evaluation. It has significance, therefore, not only for the
broader scientific community for the theoretical elegance of the
Anisa Model but a potentially great impact on education. It offers
a substantive body of organized knowledge about human growth, develop-
ment, learning, and behavior that can serve as the basis for pro-
fessional practice with the ultimate scientific criterion of being
capable of empirical testing. Thus, we not only have a scientific
model as a basis for educational practice but a major new paradigm
which satisfactorily incorporates the old paradigm with the new.
The Anisa Model represents a new scientific paradigm with an
explicit theory, i.e., it has data language, assumptions, and can
generate new and testable hypotheses. It is concern for the ability
of the Model to be empirically tested that is the second major focus
of this study. An attempt will be made to develop a theory of eval-
uation and organizational development as integral systems. As
one
4moves from theoretical statements into the verification of hypotheses
^®sting)
,
it will be argued that research and evaluation
methodologies are integral parts of organizational structures and
processes.
Since the Anisa Model has only been field tested at two sites,
the empirical data base is limited. My seven year and continuing
involvement as Director of Research for Project Anisa-Suffield and
Principal Investigator for Project Inspire provided first-hand ex-
periences in implementing the Model. These experiences in conduct-
ing research and evaluation in the field have been helpful in pin-
pointing problems at both the theoretical and applied levels.
It became abundantly clear that the kind of research methodology
to be used is directly related to the theoretical paradigm. Thus,
using the Newtonian mechanistic paradigm called for such research
designs. These "hard research methodologies" call for control group
designs using reliable and valid normative testing instruments.
These designs permitted the evaluation of very narrow spectrum of the
Model - essentially the content curriculum in reading and mathematics.
While this provided valuabe information, the primary goals of the
Model - the process curriculum, organizational processes, etc. -
did not lend themselves to the use of the "hard methodologies."
Since the Anisa Model represents a major paradigm shift with primary
focus on process, new research methodologies are required to evaluate
these. The state of the art in evaluation of process over time
has
5developed with the use of some of the so-called "soft methodolgies."
is in this area that this study will place great emphasis in
clarifying significant problems and possible solutions - the rules
and puzzle-solving requirements of a new paradigm.
Method of Inquiry
The method of inquiry will involve a search of the literature
concerning scientific model building. The Anisa Model will then be
reviewed and evaluated against established criteria used in judging
empirically based scientific theories. Since the dominant scientific
theories prevailing today are based upon the mechanistic deterministic
paradigm, the Anisa Model will be first evaluated within this frame-
work. The study will show how it fulfills accepted criteria of an
empirically based scientific model. The inquiry will then use
Thomas S. Kuhn’s framework to develop the thesis that the Anisa Model
represents a major paradigm shift from a mechanistic to an organismic
paradigm. The implications of this paradigm shift will be explored
as the basis for the Anisa theories of evaluation and administration.
A review of the literature from existing theoretical and empirical
studies that appear to be consistent with the new paradigm will be
conducted.
The inquiry is essentially a conceptual undertaking and largely
speculative. The analysis and synthesis of current theories with
their empirical data base that lend support to the new paradigm
will
6be the basic means for moving from the context of discovery (hunch)
to empirical verification. My seven years of first-hand experience
in field testing the Anisa Model in public school systems will also
be used to lessen the gap between the purely speculative nature of
the inquiry and an empirical data base.
Delimitations of the Inquiry
The study is concerned with the analysis of the structure of
science. Essentially, scientific models lead to theories which can
be empirically tested by observations. The study will examine this
process of assessment.
IVhile a number of criteria for assessing scientific theories
will be used, the most important is the number of supporting exper-
imental observations. A theory is judged valid if it precisely ac-
counts for known observations and can make predictions for future
measurements. This empirical assessment emphasizes the objectivity
of science by maintaining that: (1) observable data can be described
in pure observation language and be verified or falsified by experi-
mental data; and (2) deciding between rival theories is a rational
process
.
Major attacks on the empirical approach, particularly by Thomas
Kuhn, questioned this assessment process. Others hold that all data
are theory-laden: theories are not verified or falsified; and
there
are no criteria for chosing between theories of great generality
7(Balbour, 1974). Kuhn holds that scientific activities are governed
by paradigms, which are determined by an exemplar of scientific
work. Observational data and criteria for assessing theories are
paradigm-dependent. When a paradigm shift occurs, it is not a ration-
al, objective process of choosing between paradigms but essentially
a subjective conversion.
Kuhn obviously disputes the conception of science as being erect-
ed from observed and experimentally demonstrated facts. He does not
present a theory that can be verified by checking deductions against
the facts of nature. Nevertheless, this study will use his framework
to assess the Anisa Model and its implications for growth and develop-
ment of Anisa. Many philosophers of science have credited Kuhn for
illuminating the history of science but have disagreed with him on
a number of issues (Lakatos and Musgrove, 1970). While some of
these issues will be taken into account, this study will focus pri-
marily on Kuhn's structure of the growth of science.
^^^lile the Anisa Model may be assessed as fulfilling the criteria
of being a scientific theory as well as representing a new paradigm,
the verification of the latter can only be determined by events over
time. It may also prove to be a false lead; it may not have the
necessary and sufficient conditions for a viable paradigm. This
study is restricted to implications.
Use of examples from current theories and empirical studies as
support suffer from all of the limitations of possibly being
8incommensurable because of paradigm determiners. Most of this study,
by analogy, is conducted in theoretical "hunch land." It attempts
to build some bridges to the empirical "land of verification" with
its emphasis on implications. Clearly, it is not empirically based.
No attempt is made to be exhaustive; the findings are suggestive
of both theoretical areas of needed development as well as new method-
ologies for empirical research.
The purpose of the study is not an eclectic amalgam for the
Anisa Model has a logic and structure of its own. What will be
attempted is the clarification of the Anisa Model as a new paradigm,
a disciplinary matrix, having distinctive methods, its own history,
body of theory, gradually accumulating bodies of data, and implica-
tions for practical use. What is missing in the work of my fellow-
laborers in this vineyard is a well-articulated theory of evaluation
with necessary feedback loops between theory and empirical data. The
key to being an empirical scientist is appropriate research method-
ologies that provide means to alter theory in response to data.
The entire Anisa structure is based on its theory of evaluation;
thus, there is a built in tension in this conception of science. Ac-
knowledgement is made of the idea that a scientific paradigm is shaped
by its data and in turn shapes them. No simple Baconian program for
data accumulation nor hypothetical deductive program for disconfirm-
ation of hypotheses is involved in this process let alone current
statistical approaches of factor analysis, multiple discriminant
9analysis, or computer searches. This results in a corresponding ten-
sion in the Anisa conception of man including the Anisa trained re-
search-practitioners.
This dissertation, then, aspires to help establish the Anisa
Model as a discipline in education that unites the discoveries of a
wide range of physical, biological, and behavioral sciences, and
that will have to have its own research methods and spheres of
application. The study is meant to help articulate a paradigm by
giving it a local habitation and a name.
CHAPTER I
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING SCIENTIFIC THEORIES
The Anisa Model will be presented as a comprehensive and coherent
scientific theory of education. First, issues concerning its status
as a scientific theory will be considered; second, it will then be
argued that the Anisa Model also represents a major paradigm shift
from a mechanistic to an organismic paradigm. Since most scientists
usually communicate within a disciplinary matrix, to facilitate
communication, focus will be placed on viewing the Anisa Model as
a scientific theory subsumed under the concept of the mechanistic
paradigm. In order to accomplish this, the following framework will
be used as a process for establishing criteria for any empirically
based scientific theory.
There are essentially three major steps in the process of
constructing a scientific theory: (1) observation, (2) model building,
and (3) testing in the real world. This can be schematized as shown
in Figure 1.
Real
World^ ^
Observation
^
Units of Study
Hypotheses: If...
then. . . statements
Model Building
Real Data language
World^ > Assumptions
Testable hypotheses
Figure 1. Scheme of Scientific Process
10
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Observation
The first step begins with observations of the "real world." It
is assumed that the real world exists or, as Einstein states, there is
the "belief" that an external world exists. Observation involves an
abstracting process that selects aspects of the "real world" for study.
For our purposes, these can be referred to as units of study. The
units of study for the physical sciences, for example, have been
matter, space, time, energy, or, more generally, thing-thing inter-
action.
As psychology emerged as an empirical science, the basic units
of study were organism-thing interaction as illustrated by Pavlov’s
theory of conditioning based upon the interaction of dogs and sounds;
Skinner's respondent and operant conditioning theories were based
upon examples of reinforcement schedules and rats pressing bars.
Social psychology based its theories on organism-organism interaction,
e.g., Harry Stack Sullivan's interpersonal theory of psychiatry.
Sociological theories are based on organizational and institutional
interactions as basic units of study. Arnold Toynbee, as an historian,
held the field of historical study to be civilizations, which he used
as the unit of study in developing his cyclincal theory of history.
In the observation process of abstracting units of study, a high
degree of reduct ionism may be involved. The mechanistic paradigm for
physics epitomizes this reductionism where the problem is decomposed
into independent and dependent variables in search of linear causal
12
effects. The classical prototype involves a probe, target, and neutral
observer — cloud chamber. The degree of abstracting is so specialized
that more than two atomic particles as units of study may be too
difficult to handle experimentally. This degree of reduction may offer
greater control and prediction which can be empirically verified;
however, the level of explanation and understanding suffer. Thus,
the view of the real world that results is somewhat analogous to the
proverbial elephant and the five blind men.
What are the units of study upon which the Anisa Model is based?
At the highest level of abstracting, the basic unit of study is change
— the process of translating potentiality into actuality. This is
the basic first principle underlying the Anisa theories. These
energy transformations range from micro to macro units, i.e., the in-
animate physical world to the biological, psychological, social, and
spiritual units of study. Thus, it involves the physical, human and
unknown environments including the self as both an object and subject.
By analogy, it encompasses the totality of the proverbial elephant.
Metaphorically speaking, it covers the forest, the trees, and the
bushes. It handles the reductionist problem within a general theory of
organization involving evolution and total cosmology. The terms
comprehensive and coherent are, therefore, applicable to the Model.
Coherence means internal consistency, interconnectedness between
conceptual units and the reduction of arbitrariness and fragmentation.
Comprehension means scope, generality and ability to integrate and
13
order diverse types of experience. The power and scope are so great
as to qualify not only as a scientific but a metaphysical model as
well. Metaphysical systems can be evaluated by criteria not unlike
those used in judging scientific theories (Ferre, 1968). On the
criterion of prediciton, however, metaphysical systems can not pre-
dict with the same degree of precision as scientific models because
their categories are very general. It will be argued, nevertheless,
that the Anisa theory can be empirically tested given the appropriate
research methodology. The Anisa Model has been largely influenced by
Whitehead and, in general, could be considered as a system of process
metaphysics
.
Model Building
Having established the unit(s) of study in the observation stage,
the second step in assessing scientific theories is model building.
There are a number of different kinds of models which serve diverse
purposes (Barbour, 1974). First, experimental models which are con-
structed for laboratory use, e.g., scale models representing spatial
relationships, wind-tunnel models for airplane design, analogue models,
etc. They solve practical problems when experimentation with the
primary system is impractical.
Logical models, which start from axioms and theorems of a formal
deductive system, represent the second type of model. This model
deals entirely in the realm of ideas; the formal system nor the
14
model of it represent physical systems. Mathematical models, which
are symbolic representations of quantitative variables in the physical
or social systems, are a third type between the first two extremes.
It is notable that the mathematical model resembles the primary system
only in formal structure with no necessary material or physical sim-
ilarities.
The focus of this chapter is the fourth kind, theoretical models.
These models are imagined mental constructs invented to explain
observed phenomena. Their primary function is to help understand the
world, not necessarily to make preditions. Like a mathematical model,
it is a symbolic representation but its intent is to represent the
underlying structure of the real world. It is notable, as Korzybski
pointed out, that the "word" is not the "thing" nor the "map" the
"territory." A variety of symbol systems may be used, e.g., language,
mathematics, or the arts.
In the process of theoretical model building, the following three
components are necessary: (1) data language (precise definitional
terms), (2) assumptions (implicit or explicit), and (3) the ability to
generate new and testable hypotheses.
As early as the 1950’ s, the logical positivists (Bridgeman et
al.) maintained that empirical science started with publicly observable
data which could be described in pure, observation language. More
recently, Kuhn (1970), PolanyL (1958) , Hanson and others aruged
that
there is no neutral observation- language; and that all data
are
15
theory- laden. Kuhn particularly maintains that observational data and
criteria for assessing theories are paradigm-dependent. A major
paradigm shift, therefore, makes paradigms "incommensurable." Nagel
(1961), Popper (1970) and others acknowledged two levels in science;
a lower level of objective data describable in observation language
upon which all observers can agree; and an upper level of theoretical
constructs the result of man's creative imagination. Thus, the ex-
perimental empirical data provide the basis for testing predictions —
a data base that would be common to all observers. A distinction was
made between theory and observation.
As noted above, model building is a creative mental invention
involving metaphorical, analogical and other cognitive processes.
It is not merely inductively inferred from data. Even in modern
physics, many theoretical entities are only very indirectly related
to observations.
All theorists, nevertheless, in the process of theory building
develop a data language defined as precisely as possible with con-
crete referents to the "real world." Feyerahend (1970) states. Every
theory has its own observation language. Consequently, comprehensive
theories are incommensurable." Thus, in classical physics, the
definitional terms of mass, motion, and time have a given meaning
consistent with Newtonian theory. There was more than a semantic
change in meaning of the definitional terms when viewed
through
Einstein’s theory of relativity. Matter was an inherent
and unchang-
16
ing property of a body. The hyphenated term of matter-energy showing
the equivalence of mass and energy in Einstein's famous equation of
E = me indicates that terms do have different meanings according to
a particular theoretical framework. The meaning of the term "atom"
as conceived by Democritus was quite different from Dalton's use and
most certainly from current meanings.
In the behavioral sciences, we frequently find similar units of
study but the manner in which they are conceptualized differ, creating
a seeming Tower of Babel. Psychology is characterized as representing
a mult iple paradigm science. For example, does the term ego as part of
the data language of psychoanalytic theory refer to the same underlying
process as H. S. Sullivan's interpersonal theory term of self-esteem
or Carl Roger's term of self-concept? The data language used may
differ but the underlying process may be the same.
Learning theorists use of the terms "stimulus" and "response"
also pose similar problems. While terms such as stimulus may sound
precise, it becomes very ambiguous when defined with concrete re-
ferents. A major problem in learning models is the need for a theory
of the "stimulus." As will be discussed in Chapter II, the meaning
of terms needs to be considered within the paradigm that is being used.
Kuhn demonstrates the incommensurability of terms from one paradigm
to another. Since the Anisa Model represents a paradigm shift, this
issue should be confronted. Thus, the meaning of "time" as conceived
in a process view of reality will significantly differ from the class-
ical mechanistic concept of time. Time is not a Platonic entity where
17
motion is a meausre of time but a process where time is a measure of
motion. In reviewing the Anisa Model, or any scientific theory, it
will be desirable to use the criterion of clear data language which
is internally consistent with its respective paradigm.
The second step in model building is concerned with the assumptions
underlying the theory. Are they made explicit? What are the implicit
assumptions? As an example, again from physical theories, the shift
in assumption by Einstein that the natural state of matter was in
motion rather than at rest as Newton assumed resulted in a major
paradigm shift. It required a new mathematical system to conceptualize
the change and gave us a very different view of physical reality one
that was able to handle the anomolies of Newton's system and yet in-
corporate his terrestial and celestial laws as special cases.
A more recent shift involved the Second Law of Thermodynamics
which essentially states that in closed systems there is a degradation
of energy, i.e., the system develops toward a randomization of mole-
cules or a state of entropy. Information, communication, general
systems, and cybernetic theories developed on the basis that aspects
of the universe were not closed systems governed by entropy but open
systems where negative entropy operates, i.e., a process that involves
an organized complexity. This shift in assumption, it will be shown,
may also contribute to a major paradigm shift.
Another example from the behavior sciences is the implicit assump-
tion underlying the Skinnerian model that man is reactive to
environ-
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mental influences. In contrast, other behavior theories assume that
man is basically proactive, i.e., inherently active.
It will be shown that the Anisa Model fulfills this criterion of
a scientific theory by making explicit its underlying assumptions.
This is the keystone to the Model for it makes explicit its first
principles. The change in assumption from the mechanistic efficient
cause to an organismic assumption involving subjective aim and final
cause is the basis for a major paradigm shift.
Testable Hypotheses
Vrtiile data language and assumptions characterize most conceptual
schemes including theological and philosophical systems, a good
scientific theory fulfills the additional criterion of being able to
generate new and testable hypotheses. This is the third step in model
building. To qualify as a scientific theory, a model must have
the capability of empirical testing in the real world. Up to this
point, we were in theoretical "hunch land"; the bridge to the "land
of verification" is accomplished by the generation of testable
hypotheses. The theoretical model now permits us to view the "real
world" through a new set of lens. It is open-ended and the cycle can
repeat itself.
IVhether science is cumulative as Popper claims or follows a
revolutionary structure as Kuhn suggests, is not the issue here. The
empirical testing of hypotheses in "if . . . then, .
." form with appropriate
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research designs is the crucial criterion for scientific respectability.
It is the last step — testing hypotheses in the real world — that
requires further clarification. Implicit in this step is the assump-
tion that the growth of scientific knowledge follows a logical and
rational process. Thus, the scientist moves from theoretical hunch
land to the land of verification by designing experiments that can be
empirically tested. If they are not verified, the theory is either
abandoned, modified, or a new theory developed. Differences between
competing theories are ultimately to be resolved by empirical testing.
In simplified terms, this states the building-block or accretion
concept of the growth of scientific knowledge. This view is consistent
with the Newtonian mechanistic conception of science. While this
chapter attempted to establish criteria for evaluating a scientific
theory, there is serious question that the growth of the mature sciences
actually follows this process of growth by accumulation. The Kuhnian
framework will, therefore, be used in Chapter II as another perspective
in evaluating scientific theories.
CHAPTER II
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Kuhnian Perspective
The history of scientific growth as developed by Thomas Kuhn will
be the framework that will be used to review scientific theories includ-
ing the Anisa Model as representing a major paradigm. A brief overview
of his structure of scientific revolutions with historical illustrations
from the physical sciences will be the figure against which the Anisa
development will be viewed. It is hoped that this procedure will not
only place in clear figure- ground Anisa as the possible beginning of a
paradigm for education, but the intelligent use of the insights of
Kuhn's (1970) process cited in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions
will prove helpful for those who may wish to toil within the Anisa
paradigm.
One historical approach to the study of scientific development
viewed it as a process of accretion. Science was the constellation of
facts, theories, and methods described in textbooks from which each new
scientific generation learns to practice its profession. Thus, scien-
tific development was viewed as the piecemeal process of scientists con-
tributing various elements to the constellation of scientific technique
and knowledge. The historian, therefore, must determine what person at
what time discovered or invented each scientific fact, law or theory.
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Currently, historians of science question the concept of develop-
ment-by- accumulation since it has become more difficult to answer such
questions as: When was oxygen discovered? Who first conceived of
energy conservation? In addition, the difficulty of differentiating the
"scientific" component from what their predecessors had labeled "error"
and "superstition" posed significant problems. The study of Aristote-
lian dynamics or phlogistic chemistry suggested, therefore, that those
once current views of nature were neither less scientific nor more the
invention of man than those current today. If the earlier beliefs were
called myths, then myths can be created by the same methods that now
lead to scientific knowledge. But if they are called science, then
science has involved beliefs that are inconsistent with the ones held
today. Therefore, out-of-date theories are not unscientific because
they have been discarded. It raises a serious question that scientific
growth is a process of accretion. Significant scientists from Francis
Bacon to Karl Popper, nevertheless, hold the view of science as essen-
tially a process of accretion.
A significantly different approach to the study of science has
emerged. Kuhn makes explicit this changing image of science. Histo-
rians have now raised different questions concerning the developmental
lines for the sciences. Instead of relating the contributions of an
older science to the present, the historical integrity of the science
in its own time was to be understood. Galileo’s views were, for example,
to be understood in relationship to his teachers, colleagues, and
followers regarding their views and its fit to nature rather than the
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view held by current science. A pattern of development that character-
izes the early stages of most sciences shows competition between a num-
ber of views of nature, all deduced and congenial to the rules of scien-
tific observation and method. The schools did not differ in method
but, in Kuhn's terms, "their incommensurable ways of seeing the world
and practicing science in it." But there is an apparently arbitrary
element, involving both personal and historical accident, that is found
in the scientific beliefs held by the scientific community at a given
time
.
IVhile the arbitrary factor is present, scientific groups practice
their professions with sets of transmitted beliefs. Only after a
scientific group believes it has clear answers to basic questions does
significant research begin. Questions such as "What are the fundamental
entities of which the universe is composed? '.Vhat questions may legiti-
mately be asked about such entities and what techniques should be em-
ployed in seeking solutions?" (Kuhn, 1970). The mature sciences have
answers to such questions which serve as the basis for preparing stu-
dents for practice. Training is rigorous and has a controlling effect
on the scientific mind. Kuhn refers to this process as the basis of
normal science wherein research is an attempt to fit nature into the
framework provided by professional education. Scientific research
probably could not continue without such conceptual frameworks.
Normal science proceeds on the assumption that the scientific
group knows what the world is like. It defends this assumption and will
suppress significant novelties because of its threat to the community s
basic commitment. However, the arbitrary factor operating in normal
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research prevents the continued suppression of the novelty. Either a
problem resists solution by known rules and procedures by the most
competent members or new instrumentation fails to provide anticipated
data emphasizing an anomaly that cannot be reconciled with scientific
expectation. Normal science then faces a crisis which leads to extra-
ordinary science. The anomaly which cannot be evaded threatens the
existing scientific practice and forces the group to a new basis for
scientific practice. Kuhn refers to these extraordinary episodes in
which a paradigm shift occurs as scientific revolutions.
Illustrations of such episodes from the history of the physical
sciences which represent major paradigm shifts are associated with
Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, and Einstein. Each of these revolutions
involved the rejection of an existing scientific theory for one incom-
patible with it. Each shift changed the standards by which the scien-
tific community judged a legitimate problem or problem solution. There
also resulted a change in world view within which science was practiced.
Broadly these are the defining characteristics of scientific revolutions.
Kuhn’s perspective representing the second historical approach to
understanding the growth of scientific knowledge will be elaborated
further with illustrations from both the physical and behavioral
sciences as the background for determining whether the Anisa Model ful-
fills Kuhn’s criteria of a scientific revolution and the implications
for the growth of Anisa as a new paradigm.
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Normal Science
Kuhn maintains that "normal science" means research rooted in
scientific achievement that a scientific group recognizes as the founda-
tion for its further practice. Scientific text books serve to communi-
cate the accepted theory showing successful applications with exemplary
observations and experiments. For example, Aristotle's Physica
,
New-
ton's Principia
,
Lavoisier's Chemistry served for a time to define legit-
imate problems and methods of research for a particular field for future
practitioners to follow.
A scientific achievement that demonstrates the ability to (1)
attract a group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific
practice and (2) also be open-ended in defining puzzles for the new co-
hort of practitioners to solve are the two characteristics of what Kuhn
refers to as a "paradigm". This is the basis for normal science. The
accepted examples of scientific practice involving law, theory, appli-
cation and instrumentation serve as the basis for a coherent research
tradition. Copemican and Ptolemaic astronony, Aristotelian and New-
tonian dynamics are examples Kuhn uses of such practices. For Kuhn,
The study of paradigms ... is what mainly prepares the
student for membership in the particular scientific
community with which he will later practice. Because
he joins men who learned the bases of their field from
the same concrete models, his subsequent practice will
seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals. Men
whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed
to the same rules and standards of scientific practice.
That commitment and apparent consensus it produces are
prerequisite for normal science, i.e., for the genesis
and continuation of a particular research tradition . (p . 11).
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The concrete scientific achievement, which is the basis of pro-
fessional commitment, precedes the laws, theories, and points of view
that can be deduced from it. A discussion of normal science with exam-
ples of paradigms in operation is necessary for a better understanding
of a paradigm.
Prior to the development of a paradigm there can exist a kind of
scientific research. In the absence of a paradigm, the facts that may
be relevant to the development of a science may all appear to be equal-
ly relevant. Early fact-gathering is focused on data that are readily
available to casual observation. This kind of situation creates schools
which characterize the early stages of the development of a science.
Some implicit body of theoretical and methodological belief is necessary
that determines selection, evaluation, and criticism in the collection
of facts. Thus, in the early stages of scientific development, differ-
ent men view the same range of phenomena and describe and interpret them
in different ways. Such initial divergences disappear in the process of
a developing science. This full disappearance is usually the result of
one of the pre-paradigm schools whose beliefs and presuppositions then
focuses on a particular aspect of a broad body of information. A new
theory must appear better than its competitors to be accepted as a para-
digm. The paradigm never necessarily explains all the facts with which
it is confronted. It suggests experiments that would be worth perform-
ing. Both fact collection and theory clarification become highly di-
rected operations. This kind of focus characterizes Francis Bacon's
observation: "Truth emerges more readily from error than from confu-
sion. "
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The current status of American education is characterized by these
pre-paradigm processes. While some data gathering and research are con-
ducted, they are more random operations resulting in theoretical schools.
It is still at the philosophical and pre-paradigm stage.
The acknowledgement of the need for a comprehensive theory, never-
theless, is readily documented (Carney, 1977). Harold Rugg (1952) in
the 1940 's, commenting on the failure to use available new knowledge for
teacher training observed, "It is a conception of wisdom, organized and
focused, that we must now command. The cue is in the building of great
theory .. .Only then can we organize our wisdom and provide the mature
power to put it to work." In the absence of "great theory", we have
theories whose units of study are development, learning, curriculum,
etc. Theory within each of these domains, however, is considered to be
inadequate. For example, in the area of human development, Mussen,
Conger, and Kagan (1969) comment:
There is no single comprehensive theory encompassing the
vast body of accumulated data in the field of developmental
psychology. A complete theory would have to include explan-
atory concepts accounting for the origins, as well as the
mechanisms of development and change, of all aspects of
psychological functioning — motor, cognitive, emotional,
and social. It may be impossible to construct such an ideal
theory; certainly no one has accomplished it yet(p. 16).
The field of curriculum appears to be at a comparable level. Good-
lad (1958) makes the following observation:
Nowhere in education is there greater need for a conceptual
system to guide decision-making than in the field of curric-
ulum. By conceptual I mean a carefully engineered framework
that performs the following functions : identifies the major
questions to be answered in developing any instructional pro-
gram; reveals the elements that tie these questions together
in a system and the elements that separate questions from one
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another; identifies them properly in relation to major
questions; reveals the data-sources to be used in answer-
ing the questions posed by the system; and suggests the
relevance of data extracted from these sources. The sys-
tem must be an evolving one; new research findings should
suggest orderly changes in the system itself .. .This is a
tremendous burden of demands to be borne by a theoretical
structure. But the burden is no greater than that carried
by a scientific system. An education, like other sciences,
must become scientific if it is to provide for the system-
atic solution of its own problems (pp. 391-92).
In the domain of learning, there is also the absence of a unified
theory. In fact, the field could be characterized as consisting of
learning theories almost identified by personal names, e.g., Hull,
Miller, Skinner, Spence, etc. While there is a long history of research
with a vast literature, markedly little theory has been available for
application at the classroom level. Spence (1959), a learning theorist,
states
:
...those of us engaged in this endeavor have been under no
illusions as to the applicability at the present time of
our theoretical formulations to the practical problems of
education. The fact of the matter is that we so-called
learning theorists particularly those of us whose research
has been conducted mostly with animal subjects have not been
interested in the practical aspects of learning for many
years (P- 85).
B. F. Skinner, who built his learning theory on organism- thing
interaction using laboratory rats and pigeons, nevertheless, has become
concerned with generalizing his findings to the classroom. The appli-
cation of "laws of learning" derived from infrahuman subjects at the
human level merely underscores the narrow range of theory development.
In the desire to base educational practice on a scientific foundation,
behavior modifiers apply operant and respondent conditioning techniques
with children whether it fits reality or not. The limitations
of this
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mechanistic science are addressed in Chapter III. Educational research
and practices have relied heavily on the mechanistic paradigm primarily
for educational evaluation purposes. But no science of education has
emerged. The Anisa Model, with its presupposition as developed in the
first principles, may prove to be a significant development in moving
education to a new scientific paradigm status.
To illustrate this process, Kuhn traces the development of the
science of physical optics. Current textbooks teach that light is pho-
tons, i.e., quantum-mechanical entities that demonstrate characteristics
of both waves and particles. Research is conducted on this basis. This
half century old concept of light developed by Planck, Einstein et al
.
was preceded by a paradigm that held that light was transverse wave mo-
tion. The eighteenth century paradigm was related to Newton’s view that
light was material corpuscles. These paradigm changes in physical op-
tics are scientific revolutions, according to Kuhn. This is the pattern
of development of mature science — transition from one paradigm by rev-
olution.
The pattern before Newton, however, was quite different. In this
early period, there was no generally accepted single concept about the
nature of light. There was a number of competing schools based upon
different metaphysical systems (e.g., Aristotle, Plato). Some held
light to be particles emanating from material bodies or a modification
of the medium between the material body and the eye, or an interaction
of the medium with an emanation from the eye. Each school contributed
concepts or techniques upon which Newton developed the first uniformly
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accepted paradigm for physical optics. The creative men of the various
schools were, nevertheless, scientists. However, practitioners of phys-
ical optics before Newton were scientists but the effects of their
studies were something less than science. Kuhn further states:
Being able to take no common body of belief for granted,
each writer on physical optics felt forced to build his
field anew from its foundations. In doing so, his choice
of supporting observation and experiment was relatively
free, for there was no standard set of methods or of phen-
omena that every optical writer felt forced to employ and
explain. Under these circumstances, the dialogue of the
resulting books was often directed as much to the members
of other schools as it was to nature (p. 13).
This pattern is analogous to a number of creative fields in the
behavioral sciences and it exemplifies the field of education in partic-
ular. There appears to be a direct parallel between Newton's contribu-
tion for creating a paradigm for the field of physical optics and Jor-
dan's contribution for creating a paradigm for the field of education.
Jordan's first principle underlying the Anisa theory serves that func-
tion. It can serve as the unifying belief that is the basis of a new
paradigm for education. In Kuhn's historical perspective, therefore,
the Anisa Model moves education out of its pre-scientific stage to a
paradigm status. This is the first and necessary step in the route to
normal science.
Paradigms and Normal Science
Normal science, according to Kuhn, consists of work conducted with-
in a paradigm which determines the legitimate research approaches to be
used. Some accepted examples of actual scientific practice
— examples
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which include law, theory, application and instrumentation together —
provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of
scientific research. A paradigm is not usually replicated; it is more
analogous to a judicial decision in common law which calls for further
articulation and specification under more stringent conditions. Para-
digms become accepted because they solve some problems that a group be-
lieves to be important better than previous paradigms. The success of
a paradigm at its beginnings is essentially a hope of success discover-
able in selected and still incomplete examples. Normal science consists
of the actualization of that hope and expectation. This is actualized
by dealing with three problems — determining what are the significant
facts, matching fact with theory, and further articulation of theory.
The acceptance of a new paradigm leaves a great deal of mopping-up
work. These mopping-up operations engage scientists throughout their
careers. Normal science consists of solving those legitimate problems
posed by the paradigm by essentially forcing nature into the new boxes
that the new paradigm supplies. Normal science does not focus on new
phenomena; those that don't fit the existing boxes are usually ignored.
The goal is not the invention of new theories; in fact, there is a high
intolerance of those who do.
The outcome of this process of normal science is the solution to
problems which usually prove to be permanent achievements. Normal
sciences focus the attention of scientists on a small range of problems
determined by the paradigm through investigation of some part of nature
in great detail and length. Without commitment to the paradigm, these
problems would not have been imagined nor work undertaken. This heavy
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coiranitment and focus change when the paradigm from which they were de-
rived does not function effectively. Science then faces a crisis and
moves into what Kuhn refers to as extraordinary science.
What are the parallels of this normal science development to the
Anisa paradigm? The mechanistic paradigm has dominated both the physi-
cal and the behavioral sciences and particularly educational research by
determining the kinds of problems that could be solved and forcing them
into its conceptual boxes. Significant achievements have been document-
ed. Newton’s contribution to the physical sciences, which essentially
established the mechanistic paradigm, epitomizes its lasting and signif-
icant achievements.
The behavioral sciences, particularly psychology which has greatly
influenced educational practices, have largely modeled their ’’science"
on the mechanistic paradigm. The research methodology generally accept-
ed in the educational field relies on the demonstrative strategy. We
deal methodologically with operationally defined givens and the theories
accept only validated facts which are removed by a step from the data
under study. The design purposely removes us from the experimental pro-
cedure. This extraspective theory formulation is written from the van-
tage point of an observer with the ideal of being able to do so without
any contact with the items (students) under study. This traditional,
"natural science" approach is based on the Lockean-Newtonian paradigm.
The classic experimental designs, as presented by Campbell and Stanley
( 1966), serve as the legitimate procedures for acceptable research in
the professional journals and texts.
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The influence of the mechanistic paradigm has dominated research
and evaluation in educational practice. This has been its primary im-
pact wherein education could lay claim to being a science functioning
under a paradigm. It is quite different, however, from a science of ed-
ucation that is the basis for all educational practices not merely eval-
uation. Efforts in this direction have been undertaken. For example,
the learning theory of B. F. Skinner has been systematically applied,
particularly in special education, with some degree of success. It is
notable that Skinner based his theory on the mechanistic paradigm and its
general acceptance within the behavioral science community is based on
their commitment to this paradigm. V/hile it is being used as the sub-
stantive body of knowledge for applied educational practice, it covers a
relatively narrow range of educational practice. This is comparable to
the narrow range of legitimate problems that were solved in his research
efforts with infrahuman subjects. Skinner's significant scientific con-
tribution is his exemplar of the "Skinner box" used in his experiment
with rats learning to respond to different reinforcement schedules (in-
dependent variable) contingent on pressing a bar (dependent variable)
.
Generalization of this very productive scientific achievement (exemplar)
to the human level in education has, however, created awareness of a
number of anomalies.
It is notable that the field of educational practice, in general,
can still be considered to be at the philosophical or pre-paradigm
stage according to Kuhn. Some small islands of practice can be found
that can be considered scientific and based on the mechanistic para-
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digm. If the Anisa theory qualifies as a new paradigm, therefore, it
would move these small educational islands of practice to a dual para-
digm science.
There are three areas of overlapping concern for scientific inves-
tigation. The first concerns the category of facts that the paradigm
illuminates as revealing of the nature of things. These are used in
puzzle-solving which the paradigm has determined as important to study
with greater precision. Kuhn illustrates this with examples from
physics specific gravities of materials, wave lengths and spectral
intensities, electrical conductivities and contact potentials. Great
effort is expended to increase the accuracy and scope with which such
facts occupy the literature of experimental and observational science.
Much of the best scientific talent is devoted to designing special ap-
paratus for these purposes. Synchrotrons and radiotelescopes are ex-
amples of the extent of funds and effort that scientists will expend if
a paradigm assures them that the facts they seek are important. Great
reputations have been made from the accuracy, reliability and scope of
the methods developed concerning some facts and not from new discover-
ies. The fleshing out of the Anisa paradigm, therefore, suggests a
similar process. The study of the patterned use of energy in the re-
lease of both the biological and psychological potentialities are areas
of factual concern. The development of instrumentation and methods to
accomplish this will entail much effort and occupy many creative work-
ers .
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The second area of factual determinations is related to facts
that can be compared directly with predictions from the paradigm theory.
Kuhn notes that there are few areas in which a scientific theory
particularly developed in mathematical form — can be compared directly
with nature. For Einstein's general theory of relativity there still
are only five areas that are currently verifiable. These check points
are related to the precision of Mercury's perihelian, the red shift in
the spectrum of light from distant stars, and the bending of light a-
round the sun. However, measurements on the latter are considered
equivocal. In addition, Joseph H. Taylor et al, (1979) of the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts at Amherst provided the first test of Einstein's
general theory of gravitation to be made on objects outside the solar
system. This test was made possible by the discovery in 1974 of a
radio pulsar that is a member of a binary pair. Since the pulsar
emissions can be timed with high precision, it provided another oppor-
tunity for testing theory predictions never before accessible.
Even where application of theory is possible, theoretical and in-
strumental approximations frequently limit the degree of agreement
expected. Improving or finding new areas of agreement that can be dem-
onstrated occupies some of the best talents. Telescopes were necessary
to demonstrate some of the Copemican predictions. The great scintil-
lation counter was designed to show the existence of a neutrino. These
merely illustrate the effort and talent that are required to bring na-
ture and theory into agreement. The paradigm sets the problems to be
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solved, and it is the type of experimental work to demonstrate agree-
ment between theory and nature that characterizes this phase of normal
science.
As the Anisa paradigm develops, we can anticipate that the ingen-
uity of its workers will deal with similar problems. For example, con-
siderable talent will be required to develop the instrumentation nec-
essary to demonstrate agreement between the Anisa theory concerning
cognitive structures (hypothetical constructs) and their referents in
the brain or brain functioning. Some work with rats mapping cognitive
spatial relationships have been already demonstrated using electrodes
implanted within nerve cells. The instrumentation that will need to be
designed to demonstrate agreement of theory with these mental processes
in nature will require both talent and effort. The theory, neverthe-
less, has posed the problem. While it may prove to be more complex and
difficult to solve, it can be compared to Dr. Harvey having to wait for
the microscope as the needed instrumentation to demonstrate the exist-
ence of capillaries to provide the empirical evidence for his theory of
the circulation of blood in the body.
The third set of experiments and observations that are concerned
with the fact- gathering activities of normal science are those under-
taken to articulate the paradigm theory. These focus on resolving
problems where there are ambiguities. Much of this work in the physi-
cal sciences is concerned with experimentation directed at determining
physical constants. In Newton's work, the universal gravitational
constant that the force between two unit masses at unit
distance would
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be the same for all types of matter in the universe is an example. Par-
allel issues will occupy the normal science phase for Anisa. For ex-
ample, the first principle underlying the theory is the universal con-
stant of "change" itself. Another problem of concern deals with the
invariance of the stages of human development.
Universal constants are only one area of further articulating the
paradigm. The development of quantitative laws is another important
activity. Kuhn cites Boyle's Law regulating gas pressure to volume and
Joule's formula relating heat generated to electrical resistance and
current. It is significant that a paradigm was a prerequisite to the
discovery of these laws for they were not merely found by examining
measurements without a theoretical commitment. There appears to be a
close relationship between qualitative paradigm and quantitative law
such that some laws have been correctly deduced with the aid of a para-
digm long before apparatus was designed for their experimental determin-
ation.
Statistical laws, particularly those related to Fisher's Unit
Normal Curve and the assumption of random distribution of a trait in
the population, have dominated the mechanistic paradigm of some behav-
ioral sciences. While these are subsumed under the Anisa framework,
the need to develop quantitiative laws for measuring change (develop-
ment) over time is articulated by the theory and provides the focus for
needed work.
Theoretical problems of normal science are concerned with using
existing theory to predict facts of intrinsic value. Computation of
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lens characteristics or the production of radio propagation curves are
examples Kuhn cites. These are regarded as hack work conducted by en-
gineers. Their purpose is to show new applications of the paradigm and
increase the precision of applications
This work is very needed for it is difficult to find points of con-
tact between a theory and nature — bridges from theoretical hunch land
to the land of verification are difficult to build. Kuhn illustrates
this by examining the history of dynamics after Newton. The paradigm
found in his Principia
,
for the first time, permitted a great increase
in scope and precision of research. Newton derived Kepler's Law of
planetary motion and made observations on pendulums and tides. These
were impressive considering the state of science then. Given the gener-
ality of Newton's laws, however, the number of applications were limit-
ed and had only limited precision. Most were for celestial mechanics
with problems adapting them to terrestial applications. The degree of
precision achieved left much to be desired. Large approximations exist-
ed between Newton's predictions and actual experiments. Quantitative
telescopic observations indicated that planets did not obey Kepler's
Laws as Newton predicted. However, Newton derived them by neglecting
all gravitational attraction except that between individual planets and
the sun. Because planets attract each other, only approximate agreement
between theory and telescopic observation could be expected. The
theory was generally satisfactory and few questioned the validity of
Newton's theory because of the limited agreement with observation.
These limitations in agreement left many theoretical problems for New-
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ton's successors to solve. Problems of dealing with the motions of
more than two simultaneously attracting bodies occupied the best mathe-
maticians for two centuries, e.g., Laplace, Ealer, Gaus
,
and others.
This is an example of the post-paradigm period where fundamental laws
became fully quantitative with most of the theoretical work having a
mathematical base. These examples from the mature physical sciences are
suggestive of the kinds of problems one can anticipate as a consequence
of developing a new paradigm.
Normal Science and Puzzle-solving
The aim of normal science is not to produce major novelties; the
goal is paradigm articulation. The results of normal research are sig-
nificant because they add to the scope and precision of the paradigm.
The enthusiasm that scientists show in bringing a normal research prob-
•
lem to a conclusion is in achieving the anticipated in a new way which
requires the solution to complex instrumental, conceptual and mathemati-
cal puzzles. The scientist who succeeds in responding to the challenge
of the puzzle proves himself an expert puzzle-solver and this is a prime
source of motivation.
Kuhn uses the term "puzzle" and "puzzle-solver" to mean problems
that can serve to test ingenuity or skill in solution by the "puzzle-
solver". Puzzles share the same characteristics of problems in normal
science. A paradigm sets the criterion for a scientific community in
selecting problems (puzzles) that are assumed to have solutions. In
fact, these are the basic problems that are admitted as scientific and
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encouraged to be undertaken. The paradigm can even serve to isolate
members from important problems that are not reducible to puzzle form
if they cannot be formulated within the conceptual and instrumental
tools that the paradigm provides.
It is evident why the puzzles of normal science are attacked with
great commitments. Many of the greatest scientific minds have devoted
their lives to demanding puzzles. If a problem of normal science is to
qualify as a puzzle, it must be assured of a solution according to rules
delimiting the steps used in obtaining the solution. The scientist who
builds an instrument to determine optical wave lengths must show that
the numbers on his instrument are the ones that enter theory as wave
lengths; otherwise, he is merely an explorer or measurer.
Other examples of restriction on acceptable solutions to theoreti-
cal problems concerned difficulties scientists had in deriving the ob-
served motion of the moon from Newton's laws of motion and gravitation
which consistently failed. Suggestions for replacing the inverse
square law were made but that would have changed the paradigm requiring
a new puzzle without solving the old. The rules were preserved and a
solution was finally discovered. Newton's laws helped set puzzles and
to limit acceptable solutions. Quantity-of-matter was fundamental and
the forces that act between units of matter dominated research. In
chemistry, the laws of definite proportions and, currently, laws of
statistical thermodynamics serve the same function.
Kuhn also notes that to be a scientist, there is a commitment to
understand the world and extend the precision and scope with which it
has been ordered. A network of commitments — conceptual, instrumental.
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and methodological — is the metaphor that relates normal science to
puzzle-solving. It provides the rules that tell the practitioner what
both the world and his science are like. IVhile normal science is a
highly determined activity largely governed by rules, it is notable that
the rules are derived from paradigms and paradigms can determine re-
search in the absence of rules.
The following are illustrations of puzzle-solving that face Anisa
scientists in its normal science phase. As a new paradigm, it will be
necessary to deal with measurement of longitudinal change in the devel-
opment of the individual and social systems. Under the mechanistic par-
adigm, educational measurement — highly influenced by psychology —
solved the problem of individual measurement by developing normative
tests. The solution to the puzzle form was based on the assumption that
given traits, e.g., intelligence, achievement, etc. were randomly dis-
tributed in the population. Using Fisher’s statistics of the Unit Norm-
al Curve, psychometric procedures were developed for measuring a given
characteristic in the population. Binet developed items that he con-
sidered as constituting a constellation of intelligence and administer-
ed these to a random sample of children at various age levels. In sim-
plified terms, these data were then handled statistically using the
normal distribution. Intelligence was then operationally defined using
objective procedures somewhat analogous to the development of the ther-
mometer for objectively measuring temperature. Psychometric procedures
have since been refined for reliability, validity, test construction,
etc. The problem of measurement of individual growth was a puzzle that
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was solved with a highly sophisticated set of rules that has occupied
many creative behavioral scientists for the last three quarters of a
century.
The organismic view held by the Anisa theory is not only concerned
with cross-sectional studies based on the assumption of random distri-
bution but concerned with longitudinal studies of the individual based
on the assumption of an organized complexity. This problem needs to be
solved — the paradigm sets the problem. This is a major problem posed
by the Anisa theory of development in its ontological and phylogentic
form. New mathematical systems with related measuring technology are
necessary components for puzzle-solving. It will be one criterion of
determining the viability of Anisa as a new paradigm. Qiapter III will
elaborate this problem when dealing with the implication for the Anisa
theory of evaluation.
Since the Anisa Model is concerned with the capacity for perpetual
ontological and phylogenetic emergence, the problem of how to measure
the emergence of organized complexities needs to be solved. Stated in
simpler form, we need to understand the "more" in the concept of the
whole being equal to "more” than the sum of its parts. The mechanistic
paradigm had its major focus understanding nature by the reductionist
position of analyzing the cause and effect relationship of component
parts. The crisis in biology is related to the best talents devoting
their efforts to studying DNA and RNA as basis for understanding evolu-
tionary processes without a concomitant focus on a general theory of
organization related to variation and natural selection. As Jordan
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states, it tends to be governed by Western thought of also looking at
the past — the rear view mirror analogy. When looking at the future —
through the windshield — and creating new social structures, the prob-
lems posed are even more complex. However, research programs at the
physical level have demonstrated conceptual and technical approaches to
solving this puzzle. The concept of synergy, as developed by Buckmin-
ster Fuller (1975), concerns behavior of whole systems unpredicted by
the behavior of their parts taken separately.
Fuller demonstrates this by metals increasing their strength by
a synergetic process. For example, in chrome-nickel-steel alloys, the
constituents are iron, chromium, and nickel with minor components of
carbon and manganese. The tensile strength of iron is about 60,000
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.); chromium is about 70,000 p.s.i.;
nickel is about 80,000 p.s.i.; carbon and the other minor constituents
are another 50,000 p.s.i. These all add up to 260,000 p.s.i. However,
the tensile strength of chrome-nickel-steel is about 350,000 p.s.i.
Here, the behavior of the whole is totally unpredicted by the behavior
of the parts. This high cohesive strength and stability at great tem-
peratures of this alloy made possible the jet engine.
This is an empirical physical example of the whole being equal to
more than the sum of the parts . The synergistic concept has been demon-
strated in biological medicine and was used early by Ruth Benedict in
anthropology.
Anisa, if it is to develop as a new paradigm, will pose the
legit-
imate research problems that can be converted into puzzle
form that per
mit a solution governed by a set of rules.
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Anomalies. Basis for Scientific Discoveries and Inventions
Kuhn holds that the puzzle-solving activities of normal science
provide for the expansion of scope and precision of scientific know-
ledge. These activities do not seek novelty j the successful science
finds none. New discoveries of fact by routine scientific research,
nevertheless, give rise to new inventions of theory to deal with the
novelties. Research under a paradigm, therefore, has a built-in pro-
cess for effectively creating a paradigm change. Discovery begins with
the awareness of anomaly which comes when it is acknowledged that na-
ture is violating a paradigm- induced expectation. The anomaly is fur-
ther explored and closure results when the paradigm theory has been ad-
justed so that the anomaly becomes the expected. Kuhn maintains, how-
ever, that this assimilation process is not additive and the new fact
is not a scientific fact until science is able to see nature in a
different way. Anomalies are set to one side or accomodations are made
by ad hoc modifications. For example, phlogistan theory requires a
postulation of negative chemical weights in order to maintain the para-
digm; astronon^ under Ptolemy kept adding epicycles to remove discrep-
ancies. A growing list of anomalies creates a sense of crisis causing
the scientific community to examine its assumptions and seek alterna-
tives. When the dominant presuppositions are challenged by an alterna-
tive view, a new paradigm may then be invented.
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Kuhn illustrates the process of how factual and theoretical novelty
are interrelated in the discovery of oxygen. Two men, Lavoisier
and Joseph Priestly, have some claim to it. Priestly, in 1774 , collected
gas released from heated red oxide of mercury. He identified the gas as
nitrous oxide, and in 1775, following additional tests, called it common
air with less than the usual quantity of phlogistan. Lavoisier's work
followed closely after and in 1775, the gas he obtained by heating red
oxide of mercury was "air itself entire without alteration except that.,
it comes out more pure, more respirable.’’ By 1777, Lavoisier believed
that the gas was a separate species, something that Priestly could not
accept
.
It is very difficult to credit either Lavoisier or Priestly with
the discovery of oxygen. The pattern of scientific discovery is neces-
sarily complex which requires the recognition both that something exists
and what it is. Thus, if oxygen were dephlogisticated air. Priestly
would be given credit, but it was Lavoisier who identified the gas as
"air itself entire" suggesting that he saw not only the gas but what it
was. The discovery process of observation and conceptualization are
intertwined and take time.
This process may involve a change in paradigm. Lavoisier's work
was not only the discovery of oxygen but the "oxygen theory of combus-
tion". This theory was the basis for the reformulation of chemistry
taking on the significance of the "chemical revolution". Lavoisier
believed that something was also wrong with the phlogistan theory and
that burning matter absorbed part of the atmosphere. Thus, he had the
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awareness that something was amiss and was readied to discover the na-
ture of the substance that combustion removes from the atomosphere. This
preceeded his discovery of the new gas. It played a significant part in
the emergence of a new paradigm for chemistry. A major paradigm revi-
sion was required in order to see what Lavoisier saw; Priestly was unable
to see it at all.
Another example of discovery is Roentgen's normal investigation
with cathode rays wherein he noticed a glow on a barium platinocyanide
screen some distance from the shielded apparatus. The discovery was
through accident. He saw that the glow came in straight lines, could be
deflected by a magnet, etc., and that it was not due to cathode rays.
This process is similar to the discovery of oxygen for Lavoisier had
performed experiments that did not give the results expected under the
phlogistan paradigm. Roentgen recognized that the screen glowed, when
according to the prevailing theory, it should not. He saw a phenomenon
which his paradigm had not readied him to see. The perceived fact that
something had gone wrong set the stage for discovery. Thus, the discov-
ery of X-rays emerged which followed a similar process of experimenta-
tion and theoretical assimilation as did oxygen.
In general, Kuhn believes the development of any science proceeds
on the basis that the first received paradigm successfully accounts for
most of the observations and experiments easily available to its prac-
titioners. Continued development involves the construction of elaborate
equipment, creation of a precise data language, techniques, and further
conceptual clarity. This professionalization restricts the scientists
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views resulting in considerable resistance to change. However, the
paradigm directs the attention of the group and results in precise data
from matching observation and theory. The special apparatus helps to
focus on the anticipated functions, and when novelty does occur, it
happens when the scientist knows with precision what to expect by know-
ing what went wrong. Thus, anomaly develops against the framework pro-
vided by the paradigm.
Since education is at the pre-paradigm stage, this process of the
growth of the mature sciences does not appear to apply. In the absence
of a paradigm, how does one recognize an "anomaly" from a difference in
theoretical school? Where education has, however, been influenced by
empirical science, e.g., educational research, it has been dominated by
the Lockian-Newtonian mechanistic paradigm. This study will identify
a number of anomalies, e.g., unidirectional vs. reciprocal causality,
holism vs. elementarism, etc. These anomalies appear against the back-
ground of the mechanistic paradigm as applied to education. These dis-
coveries contribute to paradigm change leading to a crisis. Discovery
of anomalies tend not only to be destructive of a paradigm, but set the
stage for the construction of a new paradigm which can assimilate the
anomalies and account for a wider range of phenomena.
The continued presence of anomalies poses a crisis for the science
and is the source of both the destruction of the paradigm and the con-
struction of a new one. The single discoveries of Roentgen and Lavois-
ier, noted above, are not the only pattern for paradigm shifts. Dis-
covery of anomalies and their final theoretical assimilation into a new
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paradigm may involve a long period of time. For example, the Ptolemaic
system developed before Christ was very successful in predicting the
changing positions of stars and planets and is still useful today. A
number of discrepancies were noted through the centuries but it was not
until the sixteenth century that Copernicus rejected Ptolemy’s paradigm
as he searched for a new one. It was not only the breakdown of the tech-
nical puzzle-solving activities of astronomers, but social pressures for
calendar reform and other historical events. The Copemican revolution
in astronomy, i.e., the change from a geocentric to a heliocentric
view, is a classic example of Kuhn's concept of a paradigm shift. The
change in perspective is dramatic. Other notable examples are the New-
tonian and the Einsteinian revolutions.
Kuhn raises the question of how scientists respond to prolonged
confrontation to anomalies. The evidence suggests that while there may
be a loss of faith in consideration of an alternative, scientists do not
renounce the paradigm that led to the crisis. The anomalies are not
seen as counterinstances of falsification by direct comparison with
nature. The historical study of scientific development does not support
the Baconian or Popperian view. While there is rejection of scientific
theory by observation and experiment, the process of judgment is based
not only on the comparison of theory with nature but also with the con-
current decision to accept another paradigm. Thus, it involves a com-
parison of the competing paradigms with nature as well as between the
paradigms themselves.
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Counterinstances have, historical evidence suggests, been handled
by scientists by creating ad hoc modifications of theory to eliminate
conflict. All research involves some degree of counterinstances but the
paradigm determines the way in which these are perceived. What Copern-
icus perceived as counterinstances were seen as puzzles solved under
Ptolemy's system. Some give up science because the crisis becomes so
great. Kuhn states:
Once a first paradigm through which to view nature has
been found, there is no such thing as research in the
absence of any prardigm. To reject one paradigm without
simultaneously submitting another is to reject science
itself. That act reflects not on the paradigm but on
the man. Inevitably, he will be seen by his colleagues
as the carpenter who blames his tools (p. 79).
Dealing with anomalies leads to crisis and this transition begins
what Kuhn calls extraordinary science — outside of the ordinary. More
attention by the most competent scientists is given to its resolution.
The problems are attacked but remain resistant to the existing paradigm
rules. Einstein's observation of this process is characterized by his
statement, "It was as if the ground has been pulled out from under one,
with no firm foundation to be seen anywhere, upon which one could have
built."
The crisis leads to a breakdown which is resolved in one of three
ways. First, there is a blurring of the paradigm and the loosening of
the rules of normal research. Research in this stage parallels research
in the pre-paradigm period. This is quite characteristic of current
educational research under the mechanistic paradigm. Second, if no
solution seems possible, the problem is identified for solution by fu-
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ture generations. Third, the crisis may have closure with the emer-
gence of a new paradigm with the concomitant battle over its acceptance.
Anisa appears to represent this third resolution to a crisis. The
transition from a crisis of a paradigm to a new one with a new transi-
tion of normal science is not a cumulative process. It involves a re-
construction of a field from new fundamentals that changes the field's
primary theoretical generalizations. Jordan's reconstruction of the
field based upon his first principle of change constituting process as
reality sets the new fundamentals for an organismic paradigm.
Just how this process of invention unfolds is not clear. However,
the shape of a new paradigm may be "seen" before the new paradigm
emerges. Einstein observed that before he had a substitute for New-
tonian mechanics he was aware of the relationships between a number of
anomalies and his final solution. New paradigms may also emerge in the
middle of the night by a scientist who is involved in the crisis. Us-
ually, the men who do invent a new paradigm are either very young or new
to the field. Kuhn notes that these men are not fully committed to the
traditional rules and are freer to conceive of another set. This trans-
ition to a new paradigm is a scientific revolution.
Daniel Jordan appears to follow this latter pattern. He entered
the scientific field following a career in the arts — music. His
formal training also assumed an interdisciplinary approach involving
both the physical and the behavioral sciences. This is what C. P. Snow
referred to as two cultures. This perspective and his relative youth
parallel the usual pattern of men who have been at the forefront of
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creating a new paradigm. Thus, it is not only a new scientific paradigm
but unique in its application to education by moving the field out of
its pre-scientific philosophical stage.
Kuhn's framework was used for explaining the growth of scientific
knowledge with illustrations from the physical sciences to demonstrate
parallels with my claim that the Anisa theories represent a new para-
digm when judged within the Kuhnian perspective. Anisa, as a paradigm,
offers a general theoretical system capable of incorporating a wide
range of phenomena including the essential nature of reality, including
man. This moves education out of its pre-paradigm stage. As noted
above, education as a science was primarily influenced — particularly
educational research — by the Newtonian mechanistic paradigm. This
paradigm will be elaborated further to illustrate not only its signifi-
cant contributions but a number of anomalies that have been discovered
in both the physical and behavioral sciences. This process will serve
to clarify the role that the Anisa theories play in theoretically
assimilating these anomalies which has led Daniel Jordan to invent, in
essence, a new paradigm. His dealing with these anomalies, it is my
thesis, results in a shift from a mechanistic to an organismic para-
digm.
Historically, the mechanistic-deterministic paradigm has its
origins with John Locke, the British empiricist philosopher, and most
important for scientific application v\?as Newton. This has been cover-
ed in depth in other sources (Matson, 1964; Reese and Overton, 1970;
Schan, 1963). Kuhn's scheme of scientific revolutions (Loevinger, 1978)
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applied to the mechanistic paradigm with two substantive theories will
be used to illustrate briefly the process. Aspects of both Newton's
and Skinner's theories representing the physical and behavioral sciences
will illustrate the paradigm application.
CHAPTER III
SCHEME OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
According to Kuhn, therefore, a scientific paradigm begins with
a great discovery, frequently announced in a book. Underlying this
grand discovery is a presupposition (s)
,
sometimes explicitly stated;
often it is implicit until the paradigm as a whole is challenged. A
consequence of the paradigmatic discovery is the development of a
general theoretical matrix; this, in turn, gives rise to a method
that is the basis for further discovery and articulation of theory
into new areas. The paradigm defines its own data and legitimizes
some data that were not previously acceptable for "scientific" study.
The method generates new applications that, in turn, will solve new
puzzles. This process of puzzle-solving continues until a number of
unsolved puzzles or theoretical anomalies are discovered that then
creates a crisis for the scientists working with the paradigm.
This gives rise to "extra-ordinary science" where some scientist will
make a new discovery that resolves the crisis and creates a new
paradigm. The resulting paradigm shift represents what Kuhn calls a
scientific revolution. This brief summary is further illustrated in
Figure 2.
This chapter will present the application of this scheme for the
mechanistic and organismic paradigms. Newton's and Einstein's theor-
ies will be used to exemplify the process applied to these mature
physical sciences. Illustrations from mechanistic science both
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physical and behavioral - leading to the paradigm shift will be
made. The scheme will then be illustrated, demonstrating how Anisa
as a paradigm deals with the anomalies leading to a new organismic
paradigm for education.
Presuppositions underlie Grand
Discovery turned
into Method
and
leading
to Theory
and Assimilation
of Old
Facts
New Applications
New Small
Discoveries
Anomalies
Theoretical
Crisis lead
to
new Grand Discovery
Figure 2. Scheme of Scientific Revolutions (after
Kuhn, 1962; Loevinger, 1978)
generate
and
and
and
The Mechanistic Paradigm
Presuppositions . The basic metaphor of the mechanistic paradigm is
the machine, i.e., the lever or computer. For Newton, it was the
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study of matter in motion resulting in the machine model of the
universe. Primarily, efficient cause, which must be external force,
served as the explanatory scheme. Chainlike cause-and-effect linear
sequences operate in nature. Complete predictions and control are
therefore possible since knowledge of the forces to be applied to the
state of the machine at one point in time permits prediction of the
state at the next.
Grand discovery . Paradigms, Kuhn maintains, are shared exemplars.
Newton's Second Law of Motion, for example, is a widely shared
exemplar which is written as f = m x a. The student of science
learns to identify forces, masses, and accelerations in a variety of
situations. A great deal of "tacit knowledge", as Pol anyi character-
izes it, is present in the process. Kuhn cites the following varia-
tion on f = m X a when applied to a body in free fall:
mg=m
d^s
dt^ or
simple pendlum to mg sin = -ml
d2
dt-.
Method. Parts of the universal machine are inherently at rest and
active only as a result of external forces — efficient causes.
Newton was concerned with methods of understanding matter in motion.
Efficient causes are external to any system under study and method
is related to identifying efficient cause-and-effect relationships.
There is a unidirectionality of cause and effect. A linear rela-
tionship exists between efficient causes and effects. Thus, the
basic research method involves breaking the problem down into
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independent and dependent variables. This reduction or elementarism
of the mechanistic paradigm assumes that the machine represents a
collection of elements where the whole is predictable from its parts
and physically identical elements are equivalent.
Theory . Newton in his Principia laid down the theoretical laws for
matter in motion. Thus, for example, his First Law of Motion (or Law
of Inertia) states: ’’A body remains at rest, or if already in motion,
remains in uniform motion with constant speed in a straight line,
unless it is acted on by an unbalanced external force." (Asimov, 1966).
Newton's Second Law of Motion, which could also be considered as
the exemplar of the paradigm, states that force is equal to the
product of mass and acceleration (f = m x a) . His Third Law of
Motion states that for every action there is an equal and opposite
reaction.
This theoretical framework served as the basis for both his
terrestial and celestial laws and are valid today for matter moving
at speeds less than the speed of light. They gave rise to highly
successful research programs and serve as the basis for the applied
science of engineering.
Assimilation of old "facts" . Newton's theory was a significant break
from Aristotlian dynamics. Even before Newton was bom, there was a
rejection of Aristotlian and scholastic explanations expressed in
terms of the essences of material bodies. A stone fell because its
"nature" drove it toward the center of the universe. Henceforth,
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sensory appearances - (e.g., color, taste) were explained in terms
of the size, shape, position, and motion of the elementary corpuscles
of base matter and the attribution of other qualities to atoms
resorted to the occult and was considered out of bounds for science.
The mechanico-corpuscular view of nature directed scientific attention
to new subjects of study. Newton's dynamics expressed in his three
laws of motion reinterpreted well-known observations in terms of the
motions and interactions of primary neutral corpuscles. While the
corpuscular paradigm bred new problems and their solution derived from
the mechanico-corpuscular view, Newton still had to interpret gravity
as an innate attraction between every pair of particles of matter
which retained as much an occult quality as Aristotle's "tendency to
fall". Although troubled, the scientists working within standards of
practice set forth in Newton's Principia
,
nevertheless, accepted the
view that gravity was innate. Innate attractions and repulsions were
irreducible primary properties of matter. While, on this dimension,
it would appear that there was a revision to Aristotlian standards,
the explanation of the old facts were assimilated within a new con-
ceptual scheme.
Generate new applications . The mechanistic world view has been the
basis for theory development in a number of areas of inquiry. In the
behavioral sciences, particularly psychology and education, the result
is the reactive organism model of man (i.e., man is reactive to
external efficient causes). The learning theory of B. F. Skinner
epitomizes this approach. The rat receiving reinforcement contingent
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upon pressing a bar ("Skinner box") can be considered the exemplar
of this behavioral science. The research methodology involves
isolating the independent (reinforcement schedule) and dependent
(bar pressing) variables and studying these under controlled condi-
tions. Objective learning curves were the result. Skinner referred
only to objective observable behavior. The "empty organism" or "black
box" analogy characterizes the degree of objectivity involved that
made this empirical approach legitimate science under the mechanistic
paradigm. The implicit learning of those who underwent such labora-
tory experiences were generalized to application at the human level.
Although the units of study changed, i.e., organism- thing to
organism-organism interaction, application of the method has been
applied at the human level, particularly in the education of excep-
tional children.
In its ideal form the reactive-organism model, analogous to
other parts of the universal machine, is inherently at rest and active
only as a result of external forces (stimuli functioning as efficient
causes). Hypothetical constructs such as thinking and willing are
also viewed as phenomena that can ultimately be reduced to more simple
data governed by efficient causes. The emergence of novelty — or
qualitative change — is an epiphenomenon which can also be reduced to
quantitative change.
New applications were also made to education. The classical
physics research design, i.e., a probe, target, and neutral observer
(cloud chamber), served as a prototype for educational research. The
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educational problem was decomposed into independent and dependent
variables. If this was not possible, it was not a legitimate
scientific problem. Research designs were created to obtain objective
data largely excluding the observer or participant observer to insure
maximum objectivity. The experimental designs articulated by Stanley
and Campbell (1966) serve as the legitimate puzzle-solving rules of
the mechanistic paradigm applied to education and the behavioral
sciences
.
Whether the design involved Latin Squares, analysis of covariance,
double blind methods, etc., the goal was to establish the linear cause-
and-effect relationships between independent and dependent variables —
the efficient causes that could then be generalized by prediction and
control to other like situations. In emulating earlier mechanistic
physics, the results also had to meet the criterion of being "time
independent." Thus, if the experimental hypothesis were tested at any
other time — past, present, or future — the results would remain
invariant.
While the use of randomized groups and other designs maximized
objectivity, objective measurement was "aided" by the development of
standardized normative tests. The effects of various interventions
were then measured objectively using these instruments, i.e., intel-
ligence, achievement, interest, etc.
The paradigm, which determines legitimate problems, developed a
solution for objective measurement. The problem was converted into
puzzle form for which there was a solution with defined rules.
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Accepting the assumption of random distribution of a trait, e.g.,
intelligence, achievement, etc., and using Fisher's statistical Unit
Normal Curve, the technology of standardized tests emerged. Clear
rules for establishing reliability, validity and other psychometric
procedures were developed. This resulted in objective measuring
instruments which still dominate the educational field of evaluation.
While these have proved to be very valuable for the purposes of a
limited evaluation, e.g., measuring the effects of a given program
intervention using appropriate control group designs, etc., they have
not been able to measure growth of the individual or organizations
over time. They remain essentially cross-sectional measures. This
latter issue will be elaborated further in Chapter VI. It highlights
one of the anomalies of the mechanistic paradigm, i.e., measuring
change in the individual or group involving the emergence of novelty.
Anomalies . Those scientists who found a paradigm in Newton's Principia
took the generality of its laws for granted. There were, however,
early philosophical criticisms in the seventeenth century by Leibniz
concerning Newton's conception of absolute space. However, it was not
until the crisis in physics in the late nineteenth century that
anomalies began to appear which led to relativity theory. Technical
problems relating to the wave theory of light evoked a crisis in the
1890' s. If light was wave motion traveling in a mechanical ether
governed by Newton's Laws, then detection of drift through the ether
was possible. Much equipment and experimentation were conducted but
/
no drift was observable. The Michelson-Morley experiments later
proved to be crucial in empirically resolving the problem but
Einstein first solved it on theoretical grounds.
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Newton essentially theorized that the laws of motion were the
same everywhere. It was based on the concept that time was an
imperturbable river flowing ever onward — an absolute. Matter and
time, therefore, were treated as separate entities. Newton was able
to use Euclidian geometry as the mathematical symbol system to con-
ceptualize his laws of motion. With respect to matter in motion,
Newton assumed that the natural state of matter was at rest and would
move only if external force (efficient cause) were brought to play.
Einstein, basing his theory on the constant speed of light,
viewed the problem of space, time, and matter in motion in a new way.
He theorized that time and uniform motion are not constant but
relative. An anology to show this relationship is two people travel-
ing at different speeds in two space ships with clocks that can be
seen from each. The faster the ships separate from each other, the
more one of the clocks would seem to be slowed. Thus, if one ship
could travel at the speed of light, each clock would appear to the
observer on the other ship to have stopped. Not only was time relative
but length proved relative also.
From his time-and-mot ion equations, Einstein derived the formula
E = rac^, which equates energy with mass times the speed of light
squared. Briefly, matter gives off energy in the form of light, thus
losing some mass, indicating that energy and mass can be converted
I
61
from one to the other. This became empirically verified when
uranium was split, converting part of its mass into great amounts of
energy. It is notable that Newton viewed matter and energy as
separate entities; Einstein essentially hyphenated them as matter-
energy.
Einstein also showed that there was a continuity between space
and time; these, too, were hyphenated into a space-time continuum.
Thus, events for one observer which are separated by intervals of
space and time are separated by different intervals of space and time
for another observer.
In dealing with the anomalies of Newtonian mechanics, Einstein
met the crisis in physics by moving into extraordinary science by
inventing the general theory of relativity. He dealt with the problem
of gravity which he believed was a force that could not be distin-
guished from any force we feel in accelerated motion. His concern was
not with studying observers moving at constant speeds in straight
lines but moving separately in arbitrary ways. For this he used mathe-
matical equations from Reiman's geometry of tensor calculus. Euclid's
geometry used by Newton could not handle the problem. In essence, he
established that gravity was a distortion of space and time. The
inertia of a planet will keep it moving in a straight line; however, a
large mass — a sun — will influence the space-time continuum with the
planet's path curving around the sun. A key concept from his general
theory of relativity that could be empirically verified was that light
(photons) would be bent by gravity because photons had mass. In 1919,
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astronomers photographed starlight passing through the gravitational
field of the sun during a solar eclipse and it was bent to the degree
that Einstein's theory predicted.
Dealing with the anomalies of Newtonian mechanics, Einstein
invented the general theory of relativity which theoretically assimi-
lated Newton's terrestrial and celestial laws as well as accounting
for the current anomalies. This response of extraordinary science to
the crisis in physics represents what Kuhn refers to as a scientific
revolution — a major paradigm shift. Einstein's paradigm did not
disprove Newton's Laws but made them a special case that still apply
for matter traveling at ordinary speeds but not applicable at speeds
approaching the speed of light. This paradigm shift gave us a totally
new view of how nature works.
This illustration from physics parallels the process by which the
anomalies of the mechanistic paradigm applied to the behavioral
sciences can be theoretically assimilated by the organismic paradigm
represented by the Anisa theories.
The following anomalies have been identified as leading to a
theoretical crisis in the behavioral sciences based on the mechanistic
paradigm.
Causation. From Galileo, Bacon and the acceptance of the Newton-
ian machine model of the universe, material and efficient causes
carried the burden of explanation in the mechanistic paradigm. Mater-
ial cause is the substance which constitutes the object; thus, for
example, physiological, neurological, or genetic materials are necessary
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conditions for behavior. Efficient cause is the external force, the
independent variable that moves the object. Formal and final causes
were eliminated from mechanistic science. (Bunge, 1963; Rychlak, 1968)
Overton and Reese (1973) offer the following definitions: "Formal
cause is the pattern, organization, or form of an object. Thus, the
specifications of psychological structures, for example, constitutes a
formal cause. Final cause is the end toward which an object develops.
The attribution of an endpoint of development, such as differentiation
and hierarchical integration, is an example of final cause." Formal
and final causes are explicitly teleological.
An example from Piaget's theory can illustrate these causes which
serve as the necessary and sufficient conditions to explain develop-
ment. Genetic and maturational factors (material causes) interact with
the physical and human environments (efficient causes) that effect
structures (formal causes) . Piaget holds that these are the necessary
conditions for development. The introduction of equilibration (final
cause)
,
however, is needed to have a sufficient explanation of develop-
ment. Piaget's theory, therefore, takes into account the four causes
which provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for development.
His theory is consistent with the organismic paradigm and compatible
with the Anisa theory. Jordan not only introduces final cause but
subjective aim which are the key theoretical concepts indicating the
basis for a shift from the mechanistic to an organismic paradigm.
In addition to the four causal determinants, there are other
problems concerning causality. For example, the mechanistic paradigm
64
deals with efficient causes as external to the object. Based on the
assumption that man is a reactive organism, he would then respond to
external efficient causes. Causality would also be unidirectional or
one-way with effect dependent upon cause. The concept of unidirection-
ality allows for the breakdown of stimulus-response relationships in
the classical learning theory research designs.
If one takes the Anisa perspective, subjective aim and final
cause are assumed and man is viewed as being proactive (i.e., the
organism is inherently and spontaneously active), then external
causation cannot in itself be the sole factor determining an effect.
Wliat results, therefore, are environmental events interacting with
the organism in a relationship of reciprocal action wherein each
effects and changes the other. Overton and Reese (1973) refer to this
as "reciprocal causation" or interaction rejecting the mechanistic
approach which maintains that a full efficient causality is possible.
This will be elaborated further under the organismic paradigm.
The mechanistic paradigm also presupposes a linear cause-and-
effect relationship that operates in chainlike sequences. There is
an invariable one-to-one relationship implying that a particular
cause will have a particular effect. Thus, it is possible to isolate
the chainlike sequences and causes are additive in their effects.
An anomaly for the mechanistic paradigm is a non-linear relation-
ship found in an organized complexity. This would be analogous to
the process involved in the concept of negative entropy. The Anisa
position does not rule out the concept of linearity but linear
rela-
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tionships cannot provide an adequate explanation for all of
development. The problem, however, is to explain an organized com-
plexity as an organized system with ordered changes in its develop-
ment. What is needed is the discovery of the laws of organization.
The issue is characterized well by von Bertalanffy (1968);
In the world view called mechanistic, which was bom of
classical physics of the nineteenth century, the aimless
play of atoms, governed by the inexorable laws of causality,
provided all phenomena.
. .No room was left for any directive-
ness, order or telos...The only goal of science appeared to
be analytical, i.e., the splitting up of reality into even
smaller units and the isolation of causal trains .. .Organiza-
tion... was alien to the mechanistic world... In biology,
organisms are by definition organized things. Characteristic
of organization, whether of a living organism or a society,
are notions like those of wholeness, growth, differentiation,
hierarchical order... etc. (p. 45).
The discovery and invention of the laws of organization, or
teleological laws, are concerned with the formal and final causes of
order in an organized complexity. They are primary — efficient
causes are subsumed under them. Thus, in the Anisa theory of develop-
ment, the concept of development subsumes learning and maturation.
Holism versus reductionism. Tlie reductionist assumption of the
mechanistic paradigm states that an organism is a collection of
elements which cannot combine to yield emergent qualities (Overton and
Reese, 1973). The Anisa position, based on the organismic view, holds
that the organism is an organized totality with parts in interaction
but obtaining their meaning from the whole. The interacting parts
create emergent qualities that are a novel entity and are more than
the sum of the parts.
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versus antecedent-consequent
. The mechanistic
view of man as reactive makes analogies based on antecedent-consequent
relations. The organismic paradigm deals with functions or goals and
the structures which achieve them. The analysis of structure- function
involves the attribution of purpose to man. Purpose is inherent and
conceptually it is explanatory (Overton and Reese, 1973).
The nature and direction of developmental change is a central
concern for the Anisa theory of development. Consistent with the
organismic view, structures and functions change during development
with change directed by the purpose. The reactive view holds that it
is behavior that changes and change is determined by efficient causes
which are the result of external events, e.g., the reinforcement
history.
Discontinuity versus continuity . The mechanistic view of
reactive man holds that all change is continuous and is predictable
from previous states — the reductionist position. Emergent qualita-
tive differences in development are only apparent for they can be pre-
dicted. In contrast, for the organismic view as Overton and Reese
observe, ”... changes in the parts or the organization of the parts
result in a whole with new or novel systemic properties. These new
properties are emergent in the sense that they cannot be predicted
from the parts. Thus, there is a basic discontinuity of development.”
Anisa theory not only deals with such changes in the ontological
development of the individual but also in the emergence of new social
structures and cultural forms.
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Time, a measure of motion versus motion a measure of time. The
mechanistic paradigm holds to the concept of motion being a measure of
time time being an absolute. Consistent with the assumption of the
universe as a machine, once efficient cause-and-effect relationships
are established they hold for past, present and future. One criterion
of mechanistic science regarding experimental findings is that the
results are "time independent." This problem is part of the crisis in
social psychology (Gergen, 1973, 1976; Sherif, 1977; Gottlieb, 1977;
Wolff, 1977; Secord, 1977). Social psychological experimental findings
usually fail in replication for they do not fulfill the "time inde-
pendent" criterion. When the subjects who participated in the experi-
ment are no longer naive, (i.e. become aware of the experimental hypo-
thesis) they fail to act as the hypothesis would predict. Thus, behav-
ior varies unpredictably as a consequence of historical, cultural and
social events as well as public knowledge about scientific explanation.
Gergen (1973, 1976) challenges the fundamental premise upon which the
mechanistic scientific enterprise is based: namely, that behavior is
consistent and can be explained through cause-effect relationships.
One way the social psychology crisis could be resolved would be
by giving up science and social psychologists becoming historians
(Gottlieb, 1977). However, if it is to continue as a science, what
kind of science would social psychology be? The Anisa organismic
paradigm, this writer suggests, is a possible alternative. The Anisa
science of education is relevant to social psychology in that the sub-
ject matter of both is people who interact with each other, with their
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environment, and social institutions. These organism-organism
interactions lead to reciprocal change — one of the anomalies from
the mechanistic point of view.
If time is an absolute as the mechanistic paradigm holds with
motion or change a measure of time, then social psychology fails to
achieve the "time independent" criterion of science. Thus, is social
psychology or education a science or history? Using the Kuhnian per-
spective, however, we may view the failure of social psychology to
achieve the expected paradigm outcomes, cited above, as a counter-
instance and thus an anomaly. A theoretical crisis then exists. The
crisis may be resolved by a theoretical assimilation of a new paradigm.
The first principle underlying the Anisa theories deals with
universal constant of change or the translation of potentiality into
actuality through a process that views the universe as hierarchically
organized. Time inheres, therefore, in process which can be conceived
as a measure of motion with the possibility of the emergence of novelty
or new creation. Such a conception deals with the crisis in social
psychology and gives us a totally new view of how nature works.
Karl Pribram (1979), a neuropsychologist, provides some empirical
and theoretical evidence from his studies of holographic memory of
significantly different views concerning space-time dimensions.
Pribram believes the brain behaves, in part, like a holograph, which
was invented by Gabor. Holography uses photographic film and laser
light to create three-dimensional images that float in space. The
viewer can move around them as if they were objects, seeing new angles
69
as the viewer moves. The technical details are not pertinent here.
What is germane, however, is the work done by David Bohm, a theoretical
physicist who worked with Bohr, Heisenberg, Wigner and Einstein in
quantum physics. Pribram cites that his work with the brain and
Bohm’s conceptions of the physical universe have in common an order of
reality that is similar in organization to holograms.
Bohm points out that since the invention of the microscope and
the telescope, man has been looking at the universe through lenses.
Our conceptual models in physics and biology have been largely formed
from such perceptions and thus limited. Since scientists try to be
objective, a lense objective permits man to work with objects and
particles. However, as Bohm observes in quantum physics, particles
don’t act only like objects but behave as if they were wave forms.
These wave forms may compose hologram- like organizations or "implicate
order." Pribram states: "That is a very different way of looking at
the universe than the lens-defined world view and different from the
"objective" approach, which Bohm refers to as the "explicate order."
Since our senses (e.g. eyes, ears, etc.) are lens systems, the universe
we see and understand is the explicate order which is the "real world"
but not the only order of reality.
Pribram notes that Bohm worked with Einstein in his search for
a unified field theory. Einstein believed that God did not play dice
with the universej he did not hold to the probablistic, statistical
view that the physical universe is made of random movements of elec-
trons, photons, quarks — particles. In searching for a unified field
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theory, Bohm deals with the conceptual solution to the particle-wave
problem by proposing that behind haphazard appearance lies a domain
of constraints. He felt that these constraints, when discovered, will
have a consistent, nonstatistical basis for the appearance of random
activity of individual particles.
Pribram states that if one looks at the universe with a "nonlens
system” such as a holographic system, one has a very different reality
which can explain phenomena previously inexplicable in science —
paranormal phenomena and synchronicities
.
Holographic theory, Pribram observes, as a way of looking at con-
sciousness, is closer to Eastern philosophy which deals with an order
of reality other than the world of appearances. There are many paral-
lels in this view and Anisa theory, which is largely based on IVhite-
head's organismic position and represents a synthesis between Eastern
and Western philosophies. This is developed further in Chapter IV.
The particular concern, however, is the mechanism in the brain that
can probe the "implicate order.” The hologram and the Fourier-
frequency domain deal with the density of occurrences only. Pribram
notes that time and space are collapsed; boundaries of space and time
(i.e., locations) disappear. In the absence of space-time coordinates,
causality, which is the basis for mechanistic scientific explanations,
is suspended.
Pribram uses the example of an EEC, where neither of the coord-
inates displays time or space indicating that it is possible to trans-
late time-space phenomena into other domains. In the frequency domain.
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time and space collapse where everything happens all at once. These
happenings, however, can be worked out on space-time coordinates,
bringing us to the domain of objective appearance. Pribram uses the
example of the brain which is holographically organized on dimensions
other than space or time although space and time tags could be
attached to memories.
Since there is now some empirical scientific base for understand-
ing such phenomena, Pribram suggests that we discover the rules for
’’tuning in” on the holographic implicate domain. It could allow us to
reach into the timeless and spaceless domain which corresponds to some
metaphysical systems definition of God.
The parallels between Pribram’s view and Anisa theory are con-
siderable. An early philosophical concept of man as being proactive
can be largely traced to Leibnitz. Pribram (1979) states:
Leibnitz talked about ’monads’, a windowless, indivisible
entity that is the basic unit of the universe and a micro-
cosm of it. God, said Leibnitz, was a monad. Leibnitz was
the inventor of the calculus, the same mathematics that
Gabor used to invent the hologram. I would change one word
in the monadology. Instead of calling it windowless, I
prefer to call monads lensless. In a monadic organization,
the part contains the whole — as in a hologram. ’Man was
made in the image of God. ’ Spiritual insights fit the
descriptions of this domain. They’re made perfectly
plausible by the invention of the Hologram (p. 84).
The above highlights previous evidence concerning time that is
an anomaly from the mechanistic view. The Anisa paradigm, it will be
shown, is theoretically able to assimilate the mechanistic data and
account for the anomalies.
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Object
-subject. The experimental methods used in the behavioral
sciences, e.g., psychology and education, mirrored nineteenth century
mechanistic physics in both method and assumptions. These were
isomorphically transposed to the study of human behavior. The applica-
tion of the experimental method as the paradigm for psychology and
education had the effect of institutionalizing the method which pro-
ceeded the problem or content of study. Thus, the subject matter and
the method of investigation were perceived in a similar fashion.
Gadlin (1975) states:
With the experiment seen only as method, the subject-
experimenter relationship is prescribed as a person-
thing relationship in which, as noted above, subjects
are manipulable objects; that is, the experimenter-
subject relationship is depersonalized because the
'objectivity' of the experimental method requires it (p. 1005).
Subject matter and method have been seen as separate and inde-
pendent in early social psychology. Gadlin notes that subject "arti-
facts", i.e., evaluation apprehension where the subject experiences
some anxiety to win a positive or at least not a negative evaluation
from the experimenter, were recognized over fifty years ago. Neverthe-
less, while there was a conceptual crisis, the laboratory experiment
continued as the accepted methodology; it continues with many defend-
ers (Kruglanski, 1978). The dominant paradigm, therefore, is mechan-
istic based on a behavioristic version of the experimental method.
Gadlin suggests an intensive exploration of alternative methodologies
while acknowledging (as Kuhn) that it is scientific suicide to abandon
the experimental method. Gadlin (1975) states: "We desire a movement
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toward a new paradigm. We consider the recognition of the existing
paradigm a necessary first step toward that development in psychology."
Psychology should address phenomena as its first concern, not
methodology. Gadlin would develop methods to fit phenomena rather
than researching those that fit methods. Conducting research
involves entering into relationships with people which do affect the
outcome of the research. The current methodology requires an imper-
sonal one wherein the subjects are treated as objects, but this is not
really possible. This author believes Gadlin has clearly discovered
an anomaly which requires an alternative paradigm.
Attempts to deal with this anomaly are explored by Gadlin with
suggestions to consider the relational quality of research with what
he calls "reflexivity • " This perspective would treat subjects as
informants; a method that allows teachers to learn from students as
well as from their performance. Gadlin (1975) states:
It also suggests some possibilities for a whole new range
of research, in which those we formerly considered our
subjects are now our collaborators, when its relational
nature is acknowledged, can become a social project rather
than a laboratory exercise .. .This self-consciousness
includes the psychologist’s awareness of his own role with
respect to his inquiry .. .Understandably
,
we have only
hinted at the possible content of an alternative paradigm
for psychology (p. 1008).
It appears that Anisa offers such an alternative paradigm. The
reflexive quality of the experimenter-subject relationship suggested
by Gadlin, in essence, characterizes the teacher-student relationship
prescribed in the Anisa theory of pedagogy; that methodology is the
prototype for a science based on organism-organism interaction.
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Because of the subjective aim and purpose of the individual, such
a methodology is, therefore, necessary.
Means versus ends . Mechanistic science, in essence, is amoral or
neutral, i.e., it states "what is"; it does not deal with the "what
ought to be" questions. Axiological concerns of values, ethics,
morals are not legitimate scientific questions within the mechanistic
paradigm. The objective is to understand nature by being able to
predict and control — essentially identifying efficient causes. As
noted above, it recognizes only material and efficient causes as the
necessary conditions for behavior and does not consider final causes
which involve purpose as legitimate concerns of a science of behavior.
The anomaly can be demonstrated when Skinner's operant and respon-
dent conditioning techniques are applied in the field of education.
The systematic use of these techniques with children to create a better
"reader" has been demonstrated with reasonable empirical success. It
is, however, a very different order of question to use Skinner's
theory to answer the question, "How do you create a 'good man'?" The
mechanistic paradigm cannot answer such a question; in fact, considers
it "meaningless" in a scientific sense. Skinner himself states that the
learning theory techniques are neutral and can be used by a "saint" or
a "sinner."
Kohlberg makes the observation that many studies of child develop-
ment are conducted which statistically describe behavior character-
istics of given ages. These descriptive studies are then frequently
taken to mean that this is what "ought to be." Kohlberg refers to
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this as the ’’psychologist’s fallacy.” This ’’fallacy" has had an
impact on educational practice; most educational theories of develop-
ment are of this descriptive nature. These range from age-related
descriptions of intelligence, achievement, weight, etc. which tend to
become expected norms for teachers. Working within this mechanistic
paradigm, it is not surprising that there are few "prescriptive"
scientific theories of education — there is no basis for dealing with
the "ought" issues.
The Anisa paradigm deals with efficient cause — acknowledges it
as a necessary condition for understanding development. With the
introduction of subjective aim and final cause, it also conceptually
assimilates purpose ~ what ought to be. Both efficient and final
causes are, therefore, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
prescriptive theory of education.
Theoretical crisis . The awareness of these anomalies and attempts to
theoretically resolve them has created a crisis for the mechanistic
paradigm as applied to the behavioral sciences. Kuhn (1970) states:
Confronted with anomaly or with crisis, scientists take a
different attitude toward existing paradigms, and the nature
of their research changes accordingly. The proliferation of
competing articulations, the willingness to try anything, the
expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy
and to debate over fundamentals, all these are symptoms of a
transition from normal to extraordinary research (p. 91).
The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one is not a cumu-
lative process or extension of the old paradigm. Kuhn characterizes
it as a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals that results
in change in elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of
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the former paradigm's methods and applications. The transition
period from a mechanistic to organismic paradigm will involve
enormous problems that can be solved; but, when the transition is com-
plete, the profession will have a changed view of its methods and
goals. It is analogous to a change in visual gestalt where lines
that were first seen as a bird are now seen as an antelope, or vice
versa. The switch of gestalt is a prototype of what happens in a
paradigm shift. When the paradigm changes, the world itself changes;
scientists create new instruments and look in new places but also see
different things in aspects of the world they looked at before. In
this revolution from the normal scientific tradition, there is a
reorganization where the scientist learns to see a new gestalt. \Vhen
the switch is complete, the scientist's world of research will appear
incommensurable with his previous one. Scientists operating under
different paradigms are always at some degree of cross-purpose.
It is notable that major paradigm changes like Copernicus or
Einstein, as well as smaller ones, like oxygen or X-rays, may appear
revolutionary only to those whose paradigms are affected by them. To
those not involved they may seem a normal process of development.
Chemists could accept X-rays as an addition to knowledge because their
paradigms were not affected by the new radiation. For Kelvin, Crookes,
and Roentgen, however. X-rays violated their existing paradigm. This
parallel will be helpful in understanding the reaction of a paradigm
shift in the educational community. Since education is generally at
a pre-paradigm stage, only those educational researchers practicing
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under the mechanistic paradigm will be primarily affected. Most
will probably view the changed concepts as another educational theory.
It is notable that educational scientists, representing a family
of theories dealing with a field of knowledge, can be grouped even
though their content areas differ. For example, Piaget, Werner,
Jordan, et al. represent theories formulated within what will be
developed as the organismic paradigm; Skinner, Hull, Miller, et al.
represent theories within the context of the mechanistic paradigm.
Those practitioners working within one or the other of these theoret-
ical families will be affected. Theoretical controversies from dif-
ferent theoretical families represent within paradigm debates; differ-
ences within the same family focus on theoretical and empirical issues,
not epistemological or paradigm concerns.
' Differences between paradigms, however, are irreconcilable.
Therefore, attempts at a synthesis or eclectic approach between Jordan
and Skinnerian behaviorism are futile. These represent different world
views and have different criteria for establishing truth of proposi-
tions .
Kulin (1970) states the difficulty of communication that exists
when different paradigms are involved:
To the extent, as significant as it is incomplete, that two
scientific schools disagree about what is a problem and
what a solution, they will inevitably talk through each
other when debating the relative merits of their respective
paradigms. In the partially circular arguments that regular-
ly result, each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or
less the criteria that it dictates for itself and fall short
of a few of those dictated by its opponent. There are other
reasons, too, for the incompleteness of logical contact that
consistently characterizes paradigm debates. For example.
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since no paradigm ever solves all the problems it defines
and since no two paradigms leave all the same problems
unsolved, paradigm debates always involve the question:
Which problems is it more significant to have solved?
Like the issue of competing standards, that question of
values can be answered only in terms of criteria that lie
outside of normal science altogether, and it is that
recourse to external criteria that most obviously makes
paradigm revolutionary (pp. 108-109) .. .Since new paradigms
are born from old ones, they ordinarily incorporate much
of the vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and manip-
ulative, that the traditional paradigm had previously
employed. But they seldom employ those borrowed elements
in the same way (p. 148)... most fundamental .. .the proponents
of competing paradigms practice their trades in different
worlds ... Both are looking at the world and what they look at
has not changed. But in some areas they see different
things, and they see them in different relations one to
another. That is why a law that cannot even be demonstrated
to one group of scientists may occasionally seem intuitively
obvious to another (p. 149).
Kuhn further elaborates on the meaning of a paradigm which is
what the members of a scientific community share. Thus, a paradigm
governs not a subject matter but a group of practitioners. Understand-
ing paradigm-directed or paradigm-shattering research begins by know-
ing the responsible group or groups.
Daniel Jordan et al. took man as the primary unit of study, re-
viewed the historical thinking on his nature, and was largely influenced
by Whitehead. Whitehead's process metaphysics, which serves as the
basis for an organismic view of nature, is the fountainhead of a group
leading to a new scientific community. For the past eighteen years,
Jordan and his colleagues have been laboring to formulate a set of
first
principles from which could be deductively derived a coherent body
of
theory dealing with all aspects of education. The conceptual base
rests primarily on the work of process philosophers and is
organismic in
nature.
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The Anisa Paradigm
Presuppositions
. Scientific research begins only after a group
believes it has answers to basic questions: What are the fundamental
entities of which the universe is composed? What questions may legit-
imately be asked about such entities and what techniques employed in
seeking solutions?
The basic presupposition of Anisa is its first principle — the
bedrock statement of the nature of reality (Jordan, 1972). Change is
the universal constant. The becoming state is contained in the begin-
ning state; therefore, change presupposes potentiality. The legitimate
question to be asked about such an entity as potentiality is how it is
released into actuality. Process is how potentiality is transposed
into actuality; thus Anisa theories focus on process, and related
research seeks solutions to puzzles concerning the nature of process.
The basic metaphor of the organismic paradigm is the living
organism, an organized whole. In contrast to the machine, the whole
is organic, equal to more than the sum of its parts, and gives meaning
to the interrelated parts. The whole is in continuous transition from
one state to another through differentiation and integration. The pro-
gressive change is not the result of only efficient cause-and-effect
but involves subjective aim and final cause — teleological relation-
ships. Change is both qualitative and quantitative in which the parts
and configuration of parts change. Thus new organizations emerge irre-
ducible to lower levels and qualitatively different from them.
It pre-
cludes the mechanistic view of a completely predictive and
quantifiable
universe.
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In other terms, it represents the active organism model of man.
Because of subjective aim and final cause, man is inherently and spon-
taneously active rather than activated by external efficient causes
only. He is an organized complexity that tends toward higher levels
of organization and integration. Change is given; it is not explain-
able by efficient or material causes alone. Although efficient causes
are necessary and may inhibit or facilitate change, final causes are
basic with both required for the necessary and sufficient conditions
to understand change — development.
This shift in metaphors from the machine to purposive organism
gives us a new world view — the basis for a paradigm shift. Tlie intro-
duction of subjective aim and final cause theoretically assimilates the
anomalies discovered in the mechanistic paradigm. It does not negate
efficient causation but makes it a special case quite analogous to the
scientific revolution from Newtonion to Einsteinion physics.
For the behavioral sciences, particularly psychology and education,
the basic Anisa presupposition offers the basis for a new paradigm.
The Anisa theories, as a disciplinary matrix, move education out of its
philosophical and pre-paradigm stage of competing theoretical schools.
Its great power and scope move it to a paradigm status for education
and the beginnings of a dual paradigm status for the behavioral
sciences. It makes conceptual order out of a variety of competing
theoretical models and is the necessary first step en route to normal
science. As noted above, theoretical schools, e.g., Piaget, Werner,
cybernetics, information, communication theories, etc. fall primarily
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under the organismic paradigm. As a paradigm shift it is able to
incorporate the mechanistic paradigm as essentially a special case.
Thus, there is a large cohort — community of scientists — who are
already committed and working within the organismic paradigm.
Having isolated a community of specialists, the question is
raised regarding what they share that accounts for the professional
communication and relative agreement of their professional judgments.
While the answer is a shared paradigm, Kuhn further observes that
scientists share a theory or set of theories. Kuhn introduces the
term "disciplinary matrix" because "...it refers to the common posses-
sion of the practitioners of a particular discipline; 'matrix' because
it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring
further specification." Some elements Kuhn refers to as "symbolic
generalizations" which are expressions accepted without question which
permits the group to use powerful techniques of logical and mathemat-
ical manipulation in their puzzle-solving activities. For example,
"elements combine in constant proportion by weight", or "action equals
reaction", or Joule-Lenz Law, H=RI^ which allowed tne community
members additional understanding of the behavior of heat, current, and
resistance.
In addition, Kuhn states that members of a shared paradigm hold
commitments to beliefs in particular models (e.g., the electric
circuit may be regarded as a steady-state hydrodynamic system; the
molecules of a gas behave like tiny elastic billiard balls in random
motion) . The models provide the group with permissible analogies and
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metaphors which help to determine acceptable puzzle-solutions as
well as identifying unsolved puzzles.
Another component of a disciplinary matrix concerns values
shared by a scientific community particularly when dealing with a
crisis or choosing between different ways of practicing their disci-
pline. Examples of deeply held values concern predictions which
should be accurate, quantitative, and specify margin of error.
Another example is the setting of values for judging whole theories:
puzzle- formulation and solution, simple, self-consistent, etc. Other
values concern the social usefulness of the science itself.
These components should prove helpful in communicating and under-
standing among a variety of disciplinary matrices working within a
single paradigm. Differences, again, that exist within theoretical
families are not incommensurable as are differences between paradigms.
Grand discovery . A paradigm is more than a scientific group's shared
commitments; paradigms are based on shared example — the "exemplar."
For Newton's paradigm, his f = m x a served as the primary exemplar;
"Skinner's box" provided the example of the mechanistic paradigm
applied to the behavioral sciences.
The primary exemplar for the Anisa paradigm is learning, which
is defined as "...the conscious ability to differentiate aspects of
experience, integrate them into novel patterns, and generalize them
to other situations. Differentiation, integration, and generaliza-
tion constitute a trio of interrelated processes that defines a
developmental unit of change - a state. Sequences of stages are
the
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primary means by which increasing complexity of function and
structure is built up and integrated through hierarchical organiza-
tion’* (Jordan, 1974).
The role of the exemplar for a paradigm is its scientific
achievement which serves as the basis for practice. The common belief
that scientific knowledge is embedded in theory and rules learned in
laboratories or texts is wrong. Kuhn (1970) states:
After the student has done many problems he may gain only
added facility by solving more. But at the start and for
some time after, doing problems is learning consequential
things about nature. In the absence of such exemplars,
the laws and theories he has previously learned would have
little empirical content (p. 188) ... learning is not
acquired by exclusively verbal means. Rather it comes as
one is given words together with concrete examples of how
they function in use; nature and words are learned together.
To borrow once more Michael Polanyi’s useful phrase, what
results from this process is 'tacit knowledge' which is
learned by doing science rather than by acquiring rules for
doing it (p. 191).
The implications of "learning" as the exemplar for the Anisa
paradigm are yet to be understood and appreciated. Anisa science
(exemplar of learning) is learned by doing rather than by acquiring
rules for doing it. The teacher is actively involved in becoming a
competent learner as he reciprocally interacts with the learning of
his students. The generative aspect of the Anisa teacher is salient.
The relationship of teacher to student is not the classical experi-
menter-subject but analogous to Gadlin's suggested reflexive model
where the student is treated as both object and subject.
The implications of learning as the exemplar for practicing this
science are clear concerning the controversy between applied and basic
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research in instruction (Bruner, 1964; Glaser, 1976; Snow, 1977;
Kerlinger, 1977). Kerlinger makes the distinction between basic and
applied research: "Scientific research never has the purpose of
solving human or social problems, making decisions and taking action.
The basic researcher is preoccupied with, and should be preoccupied
with, variables and their relationships." He holds that the purpose
of applied research "...is to help in making decisions ... to relatively
specific problems..., but this problem solving does not ordinarily
lead to understanding of the complex phenomena behind educational
practice." The "basic research" approach is within the normal puzcle-
solving of mechanistic science. This approach is not precluded for
certain kinds of problems with our multivariate statistical methods,
sophisticated research designs, and computer data processing means in
natural classroom settings.
Learning as the Anisa exemplar, however, largely eliminates the
distinction between basic and applied research. Bruner (1964) and
Glaser (1976) see the present change in theory-building from describing
to prescribing. The Anisa approach fulfills Glaser's arguing for a
"science of design." Glaser states: "...a theory of learning is des-
criptive, whereas a theory of instruction is prescriptive in the sense
that it sets forth rules specifying the most effective way to achieve
knowledge or mastery of skills."
He further identifies elements of a prescriptive theory:
Regardless of the descriptive theory with which one works,
four components of a prescriptive theory for design of
instructional environments appear to be essential, (a)
analysis of the competence, the state of knowledge and the
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skill to be achieved; (b) description of the initial state
with which learning begins; (c) conditions that can be
implemented to bring about change from the initial state
of the learner to the state described as competence; and
(d) assessment procedures for determining the immediate
and long-range outcomes of the conditions that are put into
effect to implement change from the initial state of compe-
tence to further development: (Glaser, 1976, p. 8).
Glaser holds, therefore, that instructional theory be embedded between
theories of learning and actual school practice. The Anisa theory is
basically prescriptive and consistent with Bruner and Glaser, and it
resolves some of the above issues currently being debated.
Beyond the current debates — generally within the mechanistic
paradigm — the significance of learning as the primary exemplar for
establishing Anisa as a paradigm can best be shown by placing its role
in an evolutionary perspective. Anisa, as a cosmology, is consistent
with the "big bang theory" in physics; it is also consistent with
general systems theory supporting the concept of a continuous and
highly differentiated evolutionary process. The basic concern is the
evolution of organized complexities. Empirical sciences have developed
laws, as noted above, for the evolution of matter, biology, eco-systems,
socioculture, and principles for the evolution of science itself, e.g.,
Piaget and Kuhn. Anisa, as a process metaphysics, therefore, encompas-
ses both the micro- and macro-levels — the reductionist as well as a
general theory of organization including social change.
Daniel Jordan, in reviewing the empirical evidence of evolution,
notes that there appear to be "leaps" in this process. One such leap,
for example, in the evolution of man was man's release from efficient
cause (instinct); this release resulted in increased freedom and conse-
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quent responsibility — the basis for ethics and morality. The key to
the increased role of subjective aim and final cause in the process was
learning. It remains the exemplar for man as he consciously takes
charge of his own ontological and phylogentic development by becoming
a competent learner — leams-to-learn. Thus, Jordan's concepts of
differentiation and integration are operative at the biological levels
with generalization added at the psychological. It appears intrinsi-
cally appropriate that "learning" should be the exemplar for a paradigm
of education.
Method . The basic metaphor of the Anisa paradigm is the living organ-
ism — an organized whole. Since the whole is organismic rather than
mechanical, the whole is equal to more than the sum of the parts and
gives meaning to the parts. Primarily through differentiation and
integration (i.e., learning) the whole is in progressive change from
one state to another. IVhile the changes may involve efficient cause-
and-effect connections, in order to explicate the process the subject-
ive aim and final cause relationships must be included. In essence,
this represents the paradigm shift for it assimilates both the neces-
sary (efficient cause) and the sufficient (final cause) conditions as
basic to understanding the process of change.
Man, the active organism at the apex of evolutionary development,
is inherently active; change is the constant and given. \Vliile effi-
cient causes can enhance and suppress change, subjective aim and final
causes are primary. Change is also both quantitative and qualitative
87
where the configuration of parts change, resulting in the emergence of
newly organized complexities.
The complete causal mechanistic determinism ideal of objectivity,
prediction, and control symbolized in quantitative terms is rejected.
An organized complexity, however, consistent with negative entropy,
allows for an open system that permits the emergence of originals — a
theory of improbability with the ultimate prediction of one change in
infinity.
Since Anisa represents a paradigm shift that makes the mechanistic
research designs special cases within the organismic framework, what
are, then, the appropriate research methods? The answer to this key
question will largely determine the viability of the organismic para-
digm. Again, the organismic paradigm subsumes the mechanistic as a
limited case; thus, the organismic extends rather than contradicts the
mechanistic methods. For example, the locus of behavioral change is
viewed as external from the mechanistic perspective; but both internal
and external from an organismic perspective. Merlina (1975) suggests
that both perspectives may overlap: "There might be a certain range of
phenomena when the two make such identical pronouncements that the
simpler of the two can be used without hesitation." For example,
Kohlberg's theory of cognitive development hypothesizes mechanistic
processes to account for early acquisition of reading while organismic
processes account for later development of formal logical operations
(Howard, 1979). Other evidence suggests that mechanistic principles
may parsimoniously explain certain habitual behaviors but organismic
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principles may best account for the emergence of adaptive behaviors.
Thus, human survival is enhanced by both processes which help maintain
a balance between stability and change.
It is helpful to understand this overlapping for the Anisa
theories of development, curriculum, administration, and evaluation
have been inductively based on many empirical studies conducted within
the mechanistic perspective. The focus of this study, however, is con-
cerned with the issues of evaluating a research paradigm in its own
right and in relation to the Anisa paradigm that gave rise to it.
Therefore, the methodology of the classic experimental tradition is
acknowledged as a limited case. If the new paradigm is to prove viable,
the invention of new research methodologies must assimilate the discov-
ery of the anomalies under the old.
A great deal of creative effort will be required as the paradigm
emerges into its "normal science" stage. Much work has already been
done by creative scientists laboring within a family of theories that
can be grouped under the organismic paradigm, e.g., Piaget, Werner,
Bertalanffy, Laszlo, et al . Anisa, as a paradigm for education, draws
heavily on these accomplishments but is not limited by them for the
paradigm itself will generate new methodologies.
Since the process of inventing new research methodologies based
on the Anisa paradigm will need to deal with the anomalies discovered
under the old — but not restricted to them — each of the identified
anomalies will be treated separately. While they are highly inter-
related and difficult to organize into a hierarchy, the key issues are
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concerned with reciprocal causation and organized complexities. The
overlapping issues of means-ends and object-subject will also be
addressed.
Causality . First, the new methodologies must deal not only with
the anomalies related to the unidirectional, linear, cause-and-effect
relationship of efficient causation, but also with final causes.
Toward this end, research designs will involve concerns for reciprocal
causation in explaining development. Thus, the organism and the
environment stand in a relationship of reciprocal action in which each
member affects and changes the other. This reciprocal causation —
interaction — rejects the mechanistic method which holds that a total
efficient causality is possible.
Reciprocal causation is concerned with research strategies that
deal with interactions that are either weak or strong. Overton and
Reese (1973) characterized weak interactions as those that might be
involved in most short-term learning studies that can be handled by the
traditional experimental design of independent variable (efficient
cause) operating on the dependent variable and analyzed using the
usual statistical procedures. Where the interactions are strong, as in
development over a long period of time, the traditional procedures
break down. Different questions are raised about strong reciprocal
causality which also involve explanations concerned with final
causation. Thus, if Anisa represents a paradigm shift, it must be able
to deal with efficient causation.
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Kuhn's concept that each paradigm determines the legitimate
puzzles and rules for their solution is illustrated by the way Piaget
deals with the problem of reciprocal causality or interaction in the
research process as contrasted with traditional learning theory.
Piaget deals with reciprocal causation using concepts of assimilation
and accommodation — the former is concerned with the influence of the
organism on the environment; the latter with the influence of the
environment on the organism. Learning theory, in contrast, specifies
the identification of stimulus and response as independent factors.
The contrast of these two approaches will illustrate the differences
in research strategies generated by the respective paradigms.
Under the mechanistic paradigm the legitimate problem and con-
comitant research strategy for understanding the factors involved in
ontogenetic development is defined as the nature-nurture problem.
Thus, the legitimate questions are "Which one?" and "How much?" in
order to understand the contributions of nature (heredity) and nurture
(environment) to individual development. These are legitimate and
meaningful questions involving unidirectionality of efficient causa-
tion in research strategies attempting to partial out the hereditary
and environmental factors.
From the Anisa (organismic) perspective, however, the questions
of "Which one?" and "How much?" are by themselves meaningless questions
The legitimate question is "How?" This can best be illustrated by
the
organismic view held by Piaget. Since development involves
reciprocal
causation, there are strong interactions between material
and effi-
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cient (environment) causes. More specifically, heredity structures
interact with the environment and give it meaning (assimilation) and
concomitantly these structures change (accommodation) to environmental
demands (efficient causes). There is, therefore, strong interaction
between heredity and environment — an epigenetic view. Thus, research
strategies that attempt to partial out the factors are meaningless
(Reese and Overton, 1973).
The legitimate question for Anisa is "How?" Since the Anisa
theory of development cannot be explained fully by material and effi-
cient causes only, the necessary and sufficient conditions require
final causes to understand the course of development. The legitimate
research question, therefore, is "How?” efficient causal factors and
how material factors relate to the final level of development.
This illustration demonstrates the key role that a paradigm plays
in determining legitimate research problems. Having identified the
puzzle, however, is only the first step in working out the rules for
its solution. It is again desirable to note the futility in evaluating
research done within one research paradigm in terms of rules that stem
from another research paradigm. Since Piaget's theories are consistent
with the organismic position, their related research methodologies
offer an established framework for the emerging Anisa paradigm.
As Jerome Bruner (1976) observes, the Genevan research requires
a "clinical method." Thus, if one were exploring the underlying
structure of a particular performance, it would be necessary to deviate
from the strictly controlled procedures to probe for the child's
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reasons and draw out his reactions to procedures. This "clinical
method" has never lent itself to the strictly controlled designs that
the dominant mechanistic paradigm demands in American learning experi-
ments. But, as Bruner (1976) states:
...we would surely be lacking in historical insight if we
failed to recognize that the work of the Geneva school, for
all its "untidy" naturalism, has provided a generation of
American developmental psychologists with a set of robust
phenomena on which they could exercise their astringent
rigor with great profit (p. 226).
Bruner notes also that there was a long period of disdainful neglect of
Piaget's work primarily on methodological grounds. This issue is
related to what could be referred to as paradigm-mixing. Anisa, as a
paradigm shift, however, gives conceptual order to this earlier method-
ological confusion.
The research strategies developed by the Genevan group involving
the "clinical method" are consistent with Anisa; they can serve as
prototypical designs for future Anisa studies. Other approaches that
attempt to explicate the ways in which the developing organism inter-
acts with its environment are the ecologically oriented strategies
that are compatible with the Anisa paradigm (e.g., Bronfenbrenner , 1978,
Willems, 1973; Wohlwill, 1966; Lorenz, 1977).
To be more specific with the issue of reciprocal causation, a
research method suggested by Bandura (1978), a social learning
theorist, will be presented as an illustration for future studies.
The analysis of behavior in terms of reciprocal determinism
involves
understanding the production of effects by events but not in
the doc-
trinal sense that actions are completely determined by
a prior sequence
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of causes independent of the individual. Events are probabilistic
rather than inevitable because of the complexity of interactions.
People are not simply reactors to external stimulation and cognitive
factors partly influence which external events will be observed, per-
ceived, organized, etc. Through symbolization and reflective thought,
plans of foresightful action are created. Thus, by altering the
environment, creating self-inducements, and conditional incentives,
people have some influence over their own behaviors. Bandura, in agree-
ment with Piaget and Jordan, holds that an act includes among its deter-
minants self-produced influences (subjective aim). From a social
learning perspective, psychological functioning involves a continuous
reciprocal interaction between behavioral, cognitive, and environmental
influences
.
Historically, social psychology held that locus of the causes of
behavior were individual dispositional and situational determinants.
There was general agreement that behavior results from the interaction
of persons and situations. However, the interaction view and related
methodology held to a unidirectional orientation. These can be sum-
marized in the following schematic (Bandura, 1978):
Unidirectional
B = f (P,E)
Partically Bidirectional
B = f (P<—»E)
Reciprocal
B signifies behavior, P the cognitive and other internal
events of
the person, and E the external environment.
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In the unidirectional concept of interaction, persons and
environments are treated as independent variables that combine to
produce behavior. The methodological concerns are analogous to the
nature-nurture issues and the kinds of research designs used to study
them.
The bidirectional concept recognizes that both personal and
environmental influences are operative; nevertheless, it holds a uni-
directional, cause-and-effect view of behavior. Persons and situa-
tions are held to be interdependent causes of behavior, which is a by-
product that is not involved in the causal process. The research
methodology used relies heavily on factorial designs in which
responses of individuals are measured under differing situational con-
ditions. Analysis is then made to determine how much of the variation
is due to personal characteristics, how much to situational factors,
and how much to their joint effects. The basic weakness in this con-
ceptual scheme is treating behavior as a dependent rather than an
interdependent factor.
In the interaction of reciprocal determinism, however, behavior,
internal personal factors, and environmental influences all operate as
interlocking determinants of each other — a process of triadic recip-
rocal interaction. The relative influence of these interlocking
factors will vary; thus, in some cases environment will emerge as the
dominant factor. For example, if a person were dropped in deep water,
he would engage in swimming irrespective of his varied cognitive and
behavioral repertoires. In other instances, cognitive factors are the
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primary influence as in defensive behavior based upon false beliefs
which keep the individual out of contact with environmental conditions
that might serve as a corrective influence resulting in extreme cases
of bizarre internal contingencies that neither the beliefs nor actions
are affected by extremely punishing environments.
The methodology for evaluation of these processes requires analy-
sis of sequential interactions between the triadic, interdependent
factors within the interlocking process. Few investigations have been
conducted that have examined more than two interacting factors simul-
taneously. From Bandura's perspective of reciprocal determinism, the
search for the environmental cause of behavior is a futile effort
because, in an interactional process, one and the same event can be a
stimulus, a response, or an environmental reinforcer depending on where
in the sequence the analysis begins.
Differences between unidirectional and reciprocal analyses of
behavior are sharply drawn regarding self-regulatory phenomena.
Radical behaviorism disavows any contract of "self." In contrast,
internal determinants conceptualized as self-concept (Rogers, 1959;
Sullivan, 1953) have gained increasing attention among reciprocal
researchers
.
Social learning theory (Bandura, 1978), however, treats recip-
rocal determinism as central in analyzing phenomena at different com-
plexities from intrapersonal, interpersonal to interactive functioning
of organizational and societal systems. An individual's
concepts
and does, and, in turn, his concepts areinfluence what he perceives
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altered by the effects of his actions and consequences to others. A
notable difference between information-processing models, which are
primarily concerned with internal mental operations, is the process of
understanding how conceptions are converted to actions. Thus, people
play an active role in creating information-generating experiences as
well as in processing and transforming stimuli impinging upon them.
The computer metaphor does not handle the reciprocal transactions
between thought, behavior, and environmental events. An individual is
not only a perceiver, knower, and actor but a self-reactor capable of
reflective self-awareness.
The concept of freedom has meaning. In their conceptions,
behavior, and environments or reciprocal determinants, individuals are
neither powerless robots controlled by efficient environmental forces
nor entirely free to do whatever they choose. Thus, man can be con-
sidered partially free as he shapes his future conditions by influenc-
ing their causes of action and creating structural mechanisms for
reciprocal influence, e.g., organizational systems of checks and
balances, legal systems, etc. Institutional reciprocal mechanisms pro-
vide a process of social change for safeguards and against unilateral
control. The process of reciprocal determinism offers the opportunity
for man to shape his own destiny as well and the limits of his self-
direction.
The research methodologies that are appropriate for dealing with
reciprocal causation clearly demonstrate paradigm differences. The
structure- function versus the linear, antecedent-consequent unidirec-
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tional causality are key issues in the mechanistic and organismic
views. Differences that exist among Bandura, Piaget, Chomsky (1968),
and Jordan are within-theory differences and not paradigm differences.
Thus, for example, the Anisa assumption of subjective aim as a given in
the active organism parallels Bandura's self-regulatory functions.
There are also parallels between Chomsky's "nativist" notion that all
intellect is present at birth and Piaget's notion that cognitive struc-
tures develop through interaction involving assimilation and accommoda-
tion. These within-theory differences can be reconciled on empirical
and theoretical grounds.
Jordan's concept of subjective aim and Chomsky's "wired in" human
language have wide areas of convergence. Jordan, however, introduces
final cause in addition to Chomsky's material, formal, and efficient
causation to explain development. Chomsky's perspective is much
narrower, though within the organismic perspective. The substantive
and methodological problems involved are potentially reconcilable,
whereas the Jordan-Chomsky-Piaget and Skinner-Hull et al. are incom-
mensurable, the latter basing their methodologies on linear, efficient
causation
.
Organized complexities . The second methodological issue still
related to causality is concerned with organized complexity. The
Anisa paradigm deals with the problem of change; this holistic posi-
tion maintains that changes in the organization of the parts result
in a whole with new or novel systemic properties. These new
emergent
structures cannot be predicted from the parts. From the Anisa
per-
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spective, the explanation of the new organizational properties are not
found in the antecedent, efficient causation but in the discovery of
laws of organization involving formal and final causes. These teleo-
logical laws subsume efficient and material causal laws. The research
strategies for the latter generally involve the linear aspects of
analysis of variance statistical models. These models are essentially
mechanistic attempting to isolate linear causal chains. They cannot
deal with interaction — reciprocal causation — that introduces
novelty or an organized complexity where the whole has characteristics
that are not present in the separate parts.
Since the whole is equal to more than the sum of the parts, the
key research issue is the discovery and invention of methods that can
help us understand the "more" in the sum of the parts. We are con-
cerned with -the process of organic growth — both ontological and
phylogenetic. Major issues are involved when we attempt to explain
the nature of an organic creative process where something entirely new
comes into existence — something that was not there before. This is
demonstrable at the physical level where two independent electrical
systems are coupled together and a new entirely unexpected system
characteristic will emerge. Cybernetics and general systems theory
have demonstrated the sudden emergence of new systems characteristics
explainable, however, by a linear causal chain joining to form a cycle
which produces a system with properties that differ from all preceding
systems.
Many scientists have acknowledged that progress in organic
development is usually achieved through the integration of
different
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and independent systems to form a unit of a higher order. Bertalanffy
(1968) describes this process in General Systems Theory. Teilhard de
Chardin (1956) summarizes by stating, ’To create is to unify." This
process has been operative from the beginning of life.
Lorenz holds that no system on a high level of integration can
be deduced from a lower system. He further states:
We know with certainty that higher systems have arisen from
lower ones, absorbing them and containing them like bricks
in a building. We also know... the earlier stages in develop-
ment from which higher living beings emerged. But each step
forward has consisted of a fulguratio ("flash of lightning"),
a historically unique event in phylogeny which has always had
a chance quality about it — the quality one might say, of
something invented (p. 35).
The emergence of novelty allows for one change in infinity. Jordan
holds that the key to this process (creating novelty) is learning over
which man has some conscious choice. The methodological issue, how-
ever, is how we can analyze such highly developing systems.
Lorenz (1973) states that in the analysis of highly developed
systems the laws and characteristics of any system, like those of the
individual subsidiary systems within it, have to be explained on the
basis of the laws and characteristics of the system on the next lower
level of integration. This becomes possible only when one knows the
structure of the higher entity formed by the evolution of the systems
on this level. He further states, "If one assumes complete knowledge
of this structure, it is theoretically possible to explain every living
system and all its functions, even the most advanced, in natural
terms
without adducing supernatural factors." This is possible,
however.
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only if we accept the present structures in the creature's body as our
data — if we are not interested 'in its historical evolution.
The answer as to why a particular organism is structured in one
way rather than another is to be found, according to Lorenz, in the
history of the species. Thus, to the question why our ears are on the
side of our heads, the causal answer is that we are descended from
water-breathing ancestors who had gill slits at these points. There-
fore, to know the purely historical causes to fully explain why an
organism is as it is approaches infinity. Lorenz gives the example
that evolution produced oak trees and human beings in the Old World,
but eucalyptus trees and kangaroos in Australia is the result of pre-
sently undetectable causal sequences which we now describe as "chance."
Lorenz's view, however, is within the efficient causation of the mech-
anistic perspective. He characterizes Western thought of look through
the "rear view mirror."
Michael Polanyi (1958) postulates that a higher animal cannot be
understood by examination of its simpler ancestors nor can a living
system be reduced to inorganic matter and the processes that take
place within it.
Anisa looks through the "windshield" with its concern for man and
his creative advance into the future. Since man is to some degree
freed from efficient causation (instinct), he can through the process
of learning create — direct his own ontological and phylogenetic
destiny. He is consciously capable of structuring the unknown by
pro-
jecting an ideal which then directs his energies — a process requiring
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the emergence of novelty. The concepts of subjective aim and final
cause are introduced to deal with purpose.
While change is the constant, there is a dynamic balance between
stability and novelty. This is reflected in the concepts of immanence
and transcendence which translates operationally into administration
as the balance between leadership and management. In this process,
new organizational structures emerge. Some of these new organized
wholes emerge with a high degree of stability — adaptability not pre-
dictable from knowledge of the component parts. One of the method-
ological research issues is understanding the "whole" being which is
"more" than the sum of the parts. At the physical level, Buchminster
Fuller illustrates this with his concept of synergy which is operative
in the added strength that results in the nickel-chromium-iron alloy
discussed earlier (p. 42).
At the physical levels, also, the cybernetics breakthrough which
has led to the "second industrial revolution" demonstrates the applica-
tion of this approach by the sophisticated technological hardware
already developed. Based on the assumption of negative entropy (a
closed system with degradation of energy), there is an open system
where energy is available to accomplish a purpose an organized com-
plexity. Information and communications theories relying on circular,
causal and feedback mechanisms have produced significant hardware,
e.g., computers, communication systems, etc.
At the biological level, Bertalanffy ' s General Systems Theory
illustrates the extension of organismic thinking which has
spearheaded
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major new research methods. General Systems Theory applied to the
psychological and social levels has given rise to ecological research
methods. Bronfenbrenner (1977) delineates an approach to research in
human development that focuses on progressive accommodation throughout
life between the maturing individual and his changing environments.
These environments include the immediate and larger social settings.
With respect to method, his approach uses rigorously designed experi-
ments, both naturalistic and contrived. The changing relation between
persons, behavior and environments is conceptualized in general
systems terms. He develops a series of propositions with illustrated
research examples that are largely consistent and can serve as proto-
types for Anisa research. These approaches represent a family of
theories with research methods appropriate to various hierarchical
levels that are convergent with the Anisa paradigm as applied to an
educational setting. Chapter VII will explore in greater detail the
paradigm implications for an Anisa theory of evaluation.
Object-subject . Although the issues of reciprocal causation and
organized complexity are integrally related to the object-subject
anomaly, the methodological research concerns will be discussed sep-
arately. The rigor demanded by mechanistic science calls for the hard
methodologies" which involve the experimental method. As Gadlin (1975)
observes,
...psychologists have seen both the subject matter and method
of investigating that subject matter, the experiment, in the
same light, (p. 1005)... With the experiment seen only as
method, the subject-experimenter relationship is prescribed
as a person-thing relationship in which. . .subjects are manipu-
lable objects; that is, the experimenter-subject relationship
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is depersonalized because the 'objectivity' of the
experimental method requires it (P- 1005)
.
Abandoning the experiment would be desertion of a paradigm — a
form of scientific suicide. Gadlin suggests an alternative methodology
that can lead to the "real" scientific paradigm for psychology. In
essence, he believes that consideration of phenomena should precede
consideration of method. Rather than selecting for research phenomena
suited to our methods, we should develop methods to fit phenomena that
are of concern to us.
In mechanistic science, problems are decomposed into independent
and dependent variables to fit an appropriate experimental design.
The goal is to isolate the efficient cause-and-effect relationships.
This is accomplished by control of variables which can be measured by
objective means. The ideal is to be objective by eliminating any
experimenter participation — the double blind design epitomizes the
degree of objectivity used to isolate the efficient causes. B. F.
Skinner's approach also treats the "subject" as an "object" who reacts
to external efficient causes. The systematic application of his
research method (an applied behavior analysis par excellence) is also
the basic treatment and basic research method — contingency management.
The close coordination of the treatment method to the research process
gives applied behavior analysis an enviable degree of objectivity,
rigor, and precision.
The limitation to this rigor and objectivity, however, is to
reduce the subject (student) to an impersonal object who is merely
reactive to environmental positive and negative reinforcement
schedules
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with an external locus of control. In contrast, the active organism,
given subjective aim and final cause, maintains an internal locus of
control involving reciprocal causation. Thus, the Anisa theory of
teaching acknowledges the subject's volitional potentiality and pre-
scribes the arranging of environments by the teacher to guide the
quality of interaction so as to release the student's potentialities
at an optimum rate. The teacher, therefore, must take into account
the subjective aim of the student in guiding the quality of inter-
action; thus, the student becomes both object and subject. The Anisa
theory of teaching, therefore, becomes not only a prescriptive method
of teaching, but a new organismic research method.
It is fully consistent with the alternative research methodology
suggested by Gadlin. As Koch also pointed out, many current problems
in psychology and education are a consequence of "method preceding
content." Anisa acknowledges the primacy of the phenomena it studies
— release of human potential through learning — and provides an appro-
priate research methodology. As Gadlin suggests, research should be
reflexive which means entering into relationships that are not
impersonal ones; relationships where the experimenter (teacher) learns
from her students about their performance as well as from their per-
formance. It opens possibilities for a range of new research where
students who were formerly considered subjects became collaborators in
research endeavors. Gadlin (1975) states;
Experimentation, when its relational nature is acknowledged,
can become a social project rather than a laboratory exer-
cise... The research relationship might be developed as one
in which both researcher and participants mutually explore
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psychological phenomena.
. .Among the issues it raises is
the question of scientific methodology: What is it to
become, or what is to become of it? (p. 1008)
.
In addition, reflexivity requires acknowledging that the study of
human behavior includes the behavior of the experimenter; that the
experimenter is as prone to psychological processes as others. This
self-consciousness includes the experimenter's awareness of his rela-
^ioriship to his subject matter and his role with respect to his inquiry.
Thus, reflexivity also involves tripartite knowledge — about the
subject, the experimenter, and the knowledge itself. There is very
little information in the professional journals about such matters
although Habermas (1971), Ratner (1971), and Harkheimer (1972) do.
Unlike the dominant mechanistic paradigm, Anisa has developed
along these lines emerging with an authentic organism-organism unit of
study with means for investigating problems within that domain. The
Anisa theory of pedagogy epitomizes this ideal. Using prototypical
learning experiences provided in each of the Anisa specifications, with
concomitant means for evaluation, the master Anisa teacher has the
initial method for conducting on-going research. Viewed from the mech-
anistic perspective, this approach would be considered one of the "soft
methodologies." Nevertheless, the method is appropriate for the sub-
ject matter. It acknowledges the role of the participant observer
(H. S. Sullivan, 1953; Havens, 1976). From Martin Buber's (1958)
framework, the change is from an "I-It" to an "I-Thou" relationship.
It is consistent with a long line of development in the behavioral
sciences and philosophical thought.
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Peter G. Ossoria (1978) presents a series of works dealing with
issues concerning substantive and methodological problems in the
behavioral sciences. In regard to reflexivity, issues of first-person
and third-person descriptions have played an important part in the
history of science. Behavioral scientists have practiced on the
principle adopted from the natural sciences that they must apply a
transcendent "method." Great care is taken to avoid referring "subject-
ively" to phenomena as "my" behavior, beliefs, etc. An impersonal,
third-person idiom is demanded for an objective methodology with the
vantage point of a disembodied, objective observer whose own behavioral
character never enters the picture. There is, however, no such vantage
point. Since persons cannot have a place within "naturalistic"
theories and their corresponding worlds, they have an external relation
to theory. These theories are formulations of deterministic machinery
which, in order to be operative, requires a person, scientist, experi-
menter, teacher, etc. external to the factual scope of the theory.
Ossorio characterizes these theories as "the problem of the ghost
outside the machine." Also, since theories are bodies of statements
with no guarantee of having an isomorphic connection to the real world,
no body of statements can "confer a methodological status on itself."
All methodological facts about a theory lie outside the scope of the
theory; thus the worlds of biology, stimulus-response, psychoanalysis,
etc., have no place for "description", "explanation", "confirmation",
etc. Ossorio (1978) observes:
It is only in the real world, the behavioral world, that
theories have a methodological value and a place of any
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kind. It is by persons that they are constructed, and
it is for persons alone that they have some value, and
it is in the world of persons alone that they can have
a place. In this way, persons are the sine qua non of
our 'naturalistic' theories and the corresponding
'worlds.' Persons have no place within the worlds of
physics, biology, stimulus-response, psychoanalysis,
et al
. ,
because it is the latter worlds which must pre-
suppose the world of persons and their behavior in order
to have a place and hence a degree of reality (p. 183).
In summary, persons are essential. Ossorio works through some of
the major issues involved in the object-subject problem in the develop-
ment of a truly behavioral science. Much of his work is congenial
with the Anisa paradigm — it puts the person into theory. This
writer, as a loving critic, notes that Ossorio 's work diametrically
contrasts with Clark Hull's boring hypothetico-deductive approach to
learning theory. However, his work may be too informal and possibly
too complex for productive practical use. His effort, nevertheless,
is a significant step in the initial purzle-solving stage of a new
paradigm.
In dealing with the object-subject problem, Piaget's position is
the most compatible with Anisa. Piaget (1978) notes that he has been
criticized for engaging in epistemology and not scientific psychology.
This is the same criticism that mechanistic science would attribute to
Anisa. However, if the phenomena that is being studied is development
of cognitive functions in the formation and transformations of human
intelligence, then different questions are raised. For Piaget, they
are, "How is knowledge acquired, how does it increase, and how does it
become organized or reorganized?" According to Piaget (1978) , the
answers to these questions may take the following form.
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Either knowledge comes exclusively from the object, or it
is constructed by the subject alone, or it results from
multiple interactions between the subject and the object —
but what interaction and in what form? Indeed, we see at
once that these are epistemological solutions stemming
from empiricism, apriorism, diverse interactionism, which
are more or less static or dialectic. In short, it is
impossible to avoid epistemology in movement, or genetic
(psychogenetic) epistemology (p. 651).
This organismic perspective appears to resolve the mechanistic
anomaly concerning ob j ect-subj ect relationships and the kind of
research methodology that is appropriate. The "clinical method" of the
Geneva group, the "soft methodologies" of action or operations research
and the ecological approach of ethologists are placed in a different
legitimatizing perspective. These research methods developed within
this family of theories can serve as guides in the further development
of the Anisa paradigm.
Means -ends . The coherence and comprehensive scope of the Anisa
theories demonstrate the interdependence of the key factors discovered
as anomalies. The fourth domain is concerned with the means-ends or
the "is" - "ought" problem and its methodological implication. To use
a broad generalization, mechanistic science is neutral and amoral; it
tells you what is. It does not answer the axiological questions of
value, ethics, morality, i.e., what ought to be. This is well illus-
trated, as noted above, with B. F. Skinner's behavioral theory. The
respondent and operant theories of learning have produced powerful tech
niques for behavior change supported with hard empirical data. The
theory, however, deals with "means" not "ends." Skinner states
that
his techniques could be used by both a "saint" or a "sinner.
They
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can be instrumental in creating a better "reader", but it is a dif-
ferent order of question to use the theory to create the "good man."
Since Anisa deals with both efficient and final cause, it hyphen-
ates the means-ends problem. Thus, for a necessary and sufficient
explanation of development both causes are required. Given subjective
aim, man is freed to some degree to take charge of his own ontological
and phylogentic destiny. Based upon these theoretical propositions, a
goal evaluation model would be considered an appropriate research
methodology (Suchman, 1967)
.
A goal evaluation operations research design was used in the
initial field testing of the Anisa Model in Connecticut with Project
Anisa-Suffield (1973) and Project Inspire (1978). My first-hand
experience as Director of Research for the two projects provides some
empirical base for its appropriateness. Project Anisa-Suffield was
identified as a validated project by the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare in 1976; the project evaluation design was a primary
factor in its validation. This methodology and empirical finding will
be elaborated further in Chapter VII.
In the development of the Anisa Model, Jordan confronted the
central issue in creating a theory of education — the nature of man,
the basic unit of study. After establishing the first principles on
the nature of man's development, the Anisa Model emerged as a pre-
scriptive — not merely descriptive — theory of education. Since it
consciously prescribes (e.g., sets goals), a goal evaluation research
methodology is most appropriate. It deals with the "ought" question
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and places the what "is” concerns in perspective. Thus, many of the
mechanistic research methods can be employed as objective means for
studying efficient causal effects so that the evaluator will not
deceive himself, but these means are subsumed as a special case in a
larger value system. Anisa, as a behavioral science, truly places man
— the "person", the "knower" — in the transcendent, active-organism
role of determining his own destiny. In addition, there is purpose to
that destiny. It is a science not only of the individual but also of
mankind. It plays a key role as a new paradigm among the sciences
because it explains and prescribes the operations used in the develop-
ment of all sciences.
Time . The Anisa paradigm sheds some insights on the fifth identi-
fied anomaly — time. As discussed previously, Einstein resolved the
mechanistic science view of time as being an absolute by establishing
time as relative, reflected in a hyphenated space-time continuum. This
replaced Newton's concept of time as an absolute where motion is a
measure of time. The Anisa view is more consistent with Einstein; time
is a measure of motion. Anisa theory conceptualizes time as inherring
in process. Since Anisa, as a cosmology, is consistent with the "big
bang" theory in physics, we have an evolutionary view of the universe
with man as the "tip of an ever-ascending arrow." The full meaning of
this view of time is yet to be understood.
One aspect with regard to research methodology, however, is that
it makes meaningless the view that the experimental findings for mech-
anistic science fulfill the criterion of being "time independent.
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This is the major crisis faced by social psychology (Gergen, 1973).
IVhen viewed through the organismic perspective with an emerging uni-
verse, a very different concept of reality and time is required. There
3- further elaboration of methodological issues in Chapter V
where their implications for an emerging new paradigm will be con-
sidered.
As a further elaboration of the Anisa paradigm, its theoretical
matrix will be presented. A paradigm's theoretical matrix as Kuhn
observes, is the usual framework used for communication among
scientists.
Theory . To function as a scientist it is not enough to have a good
theory and sound data, for the heart of the scientific approach is the
constructive interconnection between them. Jordan presents such a
systematic conceptual scheme which calls for correcting, revising, and
expanding theoretical conceptions in response to data from empirical
studies. This relationship between theory and data is schematized in
Figure 3. The theory of evaluation has a key role in this matrix; the
primary focus of this study will demonstrate the integral relationship
of the theories of administration and evaluation.
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INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN THEORIES AND EVALUATION DATA
Figure 3. Conceptual Framework of the Anisa Model
(From Jordan § Streets. Unpublished Manuscript, 1972.)
Oliver Heaviside, a theoretical physicist, wrote:
Facts are of not much use, considered as facts. They
bewilder by their number and apparent incoherence. Let
them be digested into theory, however, and brought into
mutual harmony, and it is another matter. Theory is the
essence of facts. Without theory scientific knowledge
would be only worthy of the madhouse (Heaviside, 1950/1891).
Jordan also holds that science is more than knowledge (facts)
;
more than a method. It is organized knowledge that can be used.
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Toward that end, Jordan developed five theories: (1) Theory of
Development, (2) Theory of Curriculum, (3) Theory of Pedagogy,
(4) Theory of Administration, and (5) Theory of Evaluation. They are
presented and articulated in usable form. While they are deduced
from the paradigm's basic presupposition, they are not developed in
the ponderous hypothetico-deductive approach that some textbooks hold
as the pinnacle of scientific method and falsely represented as the
way great work in the mature sciences is conducted. Jordan's more
"informal" approach is more characteristic of how truly great science
is done. It contrasts diametrically with the formal hypothetico-
deductive learning theory developed by Clark Hull which has been most
unproductive and ponderous to work with (as are most physical theories
postulated in propositions and corollaries). Each Anisa theory serves
to organize knowledge within its domain; the integral relationship of
one theory to another is the basis for its coherence and comprehen-
siveness. For the practitioner (teacher, administrator, et al.) it is
organized in usable form; it is also a self-generative model. The key
element is the theory of evaluation which is the empirical base for
the paradigm. Thus, while the paradigm (theory) determines the
selection of legitimate data, data too, should serve to shape theory.
There is a reciprocal relationship not always evident in the behav.
ioral sciences. This process is analogous to the growth of knowledge
in both Piaget's and Kuhn's perspectives. In Bateson's (1979) terms,
"Science probes; it does not prove."
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Assimilation of old facts
. The Anisa presuppositions concerning the
nature of reality are able to assimilate many theoretical schools of
educational thought; therefore, it is the thesis of this work that it
is also instrumental in moving education out of its philosophical
preparadigm status. Since it represents a paradigm shift, it also
assimilates many of the old mechanistic "facts” discussed above. As
a great theoretical synthesis, it incorporates and integrates many
educational practices that have developed over the last one hundred
years of American education.
New applications . At this stage of paradigm development, it is still
premature to fully predict new applications of the Anisa paradigm. The
greatest possible new application, however, appears to lie in the behav-
ioral sciences. Historically, education in its attempts to become a
profession (practice based on a scientific knowledge) drew heavily upon
the behavioral sciences, particularly psychology. The latter was the
only behavioral profession to develop on a scientific footing, pat-
terning its science on mechanistic physics. Because of the crisis in
social psychology and psychometrics, Anisa, as a new paradigm, has the
possibility of making a significant new application to the behavioral
sciences
.
The organismic position regarding biological research and practice
will also offer significant new applications. The Anisa emphasis on
the role of nutrition in releasing biological potentialities places in
a new perspective optimum biological integrity as a basis for optimum
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learning. Pediatrics will be more concerned with optimum biological
development, as Herbert Birch noted, and not merely with survival.
Anisa operationalizes the concept of leaming-to-leam which has
new applications in the domain of epistemology. The Anisa paradigm
represents a process which conceptualizes the growth of knowledge
itself. As Bateson (1979) demonstrates, the organismic position leads
to a necessary unity between mind and nature.
There is a clear analogy between Piaget's view of the development
of intelligence and Kuhn's concept of the growth of knowledge. These
concepts closely parallel the Anisa position. This epistemological
concern can be illustrated by an example of what Piaget calls "schemes
of action" or simply "schemes." Thus, the infant is elaborated by
practice into patterns of movement that we can call sucking and grasp-
ing reflexes which remain hardly changed over a period of time. The
infant applies each "scheme" to everything he can; everything suckable
within reach is sucked, everything graspable that comes to hand is
grasped. Every time a scheme is applied to a new object, the scheme
itself is slightly affected, becoming more general.
Intelligence for Piaget is the total of coordinated schemes, and
it grows by its own exercise. It constitutes an organ of adaptation,
operating in two complementary ways — assimilation and accommodation.
The use of a scheme is assimilation; the modification of a scheme to
fit new objects is accommodation. By use, schemes become more abstract
and int eriorized . There is no role for the stimulus and response con-
cepts as separate entities; the schemes operate as a unity. There is
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no environment except as the organism has a structure prepared to
react to it. The only objects that exist are those for which he has a
scheme.
Piaget's "equilibration" refers to the inner logic or deep
structure of the stages of development. Thus, certain periods of
development have an inner, self-sustaining coherence — called a
stage. Other periods are intrinsically unstable and are considered
transitions.
There appears to be an analogous relationship between Piaget's
concept of the development of intelligence and Kuhn's concept of the
growth of knowledge — one has an ontological perspective, the other
phylogenetic. The "normal science" stage of a paradigm, focused on
solving all the legitimate problems the paradigm indentifies, is
analogous to the behavior of an infant who applies his sucking and
grasping schema to all problems. Piaget's "equilibration" is analo-
gous to Kuhn's "normal science" stage; the processes of "assimilation-
accommodation" are analogous to the "anomaly-paradigm shift" stage.
These new applications of Anisa to understanding the growth of
science (knowledge) are yet to be grasped. The problem, nevertheless,
centers on the nature of "science" which has been "dualistic." In
Western thought, there has been a dichotomy between subject and object
— observer and observed. The physical sciences served as a prelude
to the current view represented by Anisa in which man — life itself
is now the unit of study. Thus, Anisa as a science is concerned with
understanding the human mind — that is, of the observer. Artificial
117
Intelligence research dating back from Pascal, Leibniz, Boole, and
Babbage to the present sophisticated computers that can "think” are
the furthest steps in this direction. Following this step may be the
self-application of science, i.e., science studying itself as an object.
Piaget's and Kuhn's efforts appear to be in that direction. There will
be a further explanation of this in Chapter V.
At this very early stage of development of Anisa as a scientific
paradigm, there are no data to elaborate the following phases: new
small discoveries, anomalies, theoretical crisis, and extraordinary
science leading to new presuppositions and grand discovery. For a
simplified overview. Figure 4 presents Kuhn's scheme as applied to
Anisa. While there are other ways to conceptualize the growth of
scientific knowledge, for the purposes of this study, the Kuhnian
framework has provided some conceptual order to understanding the very
complex phenomena of scientific development.
Summary
The Anisa Model is viewed within Kuhn's structure of the growth
of science. Illustrations from the growth of the mature physical
sciences were presented demonstrating the following processes of growth
presuppositions, exemplars, normal science, puzzle-solving, anomalies,
extraordinary science, and paradigm shift. Anisa, when compared to
these processes, fulfills Kuhn's criteria for a scientific paradigm.
It was shown how Anisa moves education out of its pre-scientific
philosophical status to a dual paradigm science. A scheme for scien-
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tific revolutions was presented, illustrating the paradigm shift from
Newtonian physics to Einstein's general theory of relativity. The
crisis of the mechanistic paradigm was demonstrated by documenting
anomalies in linear causation, reductionism, continuity, and time. It
was shown how Anisa was able to assimilate these anomalies, thus repre-
senting a major shift from a mechanistic to an organismic paradigm.
Viewing Anisa in relationship to Kuhn's perspective should help
to provide insights and understanding for the professionals committed
to developing Anisa as an emerging new paradigm for education.
The first three chapters established criteria for assessing any
empirically based scientific theory. These criteria can be used,
therefore, to assess a range of theories consistent with mechanistic
science. The growth of scientific knowledge following Kuhn's paradigm
perspective, however, offers a more comprehensive framework for under-
standing science. The application of these criteria to the Anisa Model
will now be demonstrated as a specific case in point.
CHAPTER IV
ANISA MODEL AS A SCIENTIFIC THEORY
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the application of
criteria for assessing scientific theories specifically to the Anisa
Model. Within the Kuhnian paradigm perspective, Anisa will be present-
ed first as a disciplinary matrix. It will be demonstrated how Anisa
fulfills each of the three fundamental steps of the scientific process
(i.e, observation, model building, and ability to generate new and
testable hypotheses). Second, in the growth of scientific knowledge,
Anisa will be presented as an example of "extraordinary science" re-
sulting in a comprehensive, coherent scientific theory of education.
Using Kuhn's scheme of scientific revolutions, as illustrated in Chapter
III, it will be demonstrated how Anisa, representing a paradigm shift,
now moves into the "normal science" stage of paradigm development.
Observation: Units of Study
Since scientific models are the creation of an inventive mind,
it will be helpful in understanding the Anisa Model to discuss brief-
ly some of the influences that have shaped the inventor's view of
reality. Daniel C. Jordan, a Rhodes scholar, epitomizes C. P. Snow's
"two cultures." He has earned three degrees in music — two from Ox-
ford in composition, theory and the history of music. He holds two
advanced degrees from the University of Chicago in an interdisciplinary
course of study involving human development from biological,
psychological
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and anthropological perspectives. Post-doctoral study involved brain
chemistry and its relationship to memory and learning. These influences
contributed to his bridging the two cultures of art and science. He
characterizes Kuhn's observation about men who have invented new para-
digms; they are either very young or new to the field and not fully
committed to the traditional rules permitting them to be freer to con-
ceive of another set. Professor Jordan became aware of gaps between
theory and practice in education. He believed that education was
dominated more by practice than theory. There was no organized know-
ledge about human growth and development that could be optimally used
for practice by teachers.
His initial conceptual efforts began over eighteen years ago as
Director of the Institute for Research in Human Behavior at Indiana
State University. Initially, Jordan observed that educators were more
concerned with curriculum and not the nature of the child for whom it
was designed. Very early on, therefore, Jordan selected his basic unit
of study — man. Toward that end, he studied man's best thinking about
the nature of man reviewing all major philosophiers from Parmenides
to the process philosophers of today.
Over a ten year span, Jordan reviewed the most significant philo-
sophic works as the basis for theory construction. The organismic
philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead generated the best framework for
analyzing and synthesizing knowledge about human growth and development,
including the concept of purpose. In order to design a new edcuational
system that is coherent and comprehensive (i.e., to be able to unite
122
every aspect of human experience) required a philosophy that held prom-
ise for a new idiological base. Whitehead (1969) believed that "philos-
ophy is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of
general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be
interpreted (p.21)." His process philosophy, which is integrating and
all-inclusive, nevertheless, keeps any system open to new data with
no claim that his system is final. Whitehead's system is a synthesis
of both Eastern and Western streams of thought. However, it is not
eclectic; the synthesis was seen as providing the basis for an education-
al model with cross-cultural implications.
Hartshorne (1950)
,
currently the most outstanding process
philosopher, makes the following observation on IVhitehead's philosophy;
...one may say that the basic principles of our know-
ledge and experience, physical, biological, sociological,
aesthetic, religious — are in this philosophy given an
intellectual integration such as only a thousand or ten
thousand years of further reflection and inquiry seem
likely to exhaust or adequately evaluate.
.. (p. 19).
Jordan in his review of the major philosophers, therefore, dis-
covered an organzing principle for a science of education in specific
form from the cosmology of Whitehead (1929)
,
Process and Reality . For
Whitehead, the most pervasive characteristic of the universe is change.
Change means process, and process presupposes potentiality. This for
Jordan served as his first principle; the concept of process as the
translation of potentiality into actuality.
As noted in the Introduction (p. 1), Jordan viewed science as more
than knowledge. A science of education could not be created until
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the massive information available about human growth, development,
learning, and behavior could be organized into usable form. Jordan
found such a principle in Whitehead’s concept of process; this provided
him with a basis for deriving a set of concepts which could be used to
organize current knowledge about human development. This offered the
possibility of translating it into a coherent body of theory which
could serve as the substantive body of knowledge for professional
educational practices. With such an empirical scientific footing,
educational practices could be evaluated and continuously refined.
Analogous to medical practices, which are based on the biological
sciences, education could then make more accurate predictions with
a consequence of improved accountability.
Jordan and his colleagues in establishing a coherent body of theory
that addressed all aspects of education (i.e., human development,
curriculum, pedagogy, administration, etc.) attempted to test every
newly developed theoretical concept against relevant empirical studies
available from the literature of the biological and behavioral sciences.
Based on this broad philosophical and theoretical foundation, the
beginning of a comprehensive and coherent model of education was gener-
ated.
Using the criteria for assessing scientific theories established
in
Chapter I, what specifically are the units of study upon
which the Anisa
Model is based? Initially, Jordan selected "man” as
his basic unit
of study. Since man, according to Whitehead, is at
the apex of a
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hierarchically organized universe, he is also an integral part of the
universal process of change. Therefore, at the highest level of abstract-
ing, the basic unit of study is change itself — the process of trans-
lating potentiality into actuality. These energy transformations range
from the micro to macro units (i.e., the physical, biological, psycho-
logical, social, and spiritual). Since it involves the physical, human,
and unknown environments, including the self as both object and subject,
it encompasses the totality of the "proverbial elephant." Holding an
organismic as opposed to a machine view of reality, it is also con-
cerned with emerging hierarchic organizations, discontinuities and time.
As noted above (p.l22 ) the units of study, in other terms, involve
the full spectrum of thing-thing, organism- thing, organism-organism,
organization-organization interactions. It deals, therefore, with the
reductionist problem within a general theory of organization involving
a total cosmology, evolution, and epigensis. The terms comprehensive,
coherent, and empirical are, therefore, appropriate.
Model Building
Haivng established the units of study in the first observation
stage of the scientific process, the second stage is concerned with
model building. Jordan used language as the basic symbol system in
developing his theoretical model. In the process of model building
the
three components of data language, assumptions, and testable
hypotheses
are now the focus for evaluating the Anisa Model. While
these are pre-
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sented in linear order, the actual process of creation involves a
strong interrelationship between the development of a precise data
language and making explicit the underlying assumptions. The actual
process that Jordan used, however, appears to have reversed the linear
steps for he was most concerned with the second (i.e., the search for
an organizing principle). What Jordan refers to as the first prinicple
is equivalent to the term "assumption.” In further evaluating Anisa
as a scientific theory, therefore, I shall address its underlying
assumptions first and then deal with its data language in explicating
its respective theories.
Assumptions . The implicit or explicit assumptions of a theory are
those premises that are taken to be true for the purpose of developing
or testing the theory. The term assumption, therefore, refers to
principles assumed to be true without necessary empirical verification
as part of the theory. Again, for the Anisa Model these are equivalent
to its first principles.
What are the assumptions (first principles, the presuppositions)
of the Anisa Model? While there are different levels of assumptions,
at the most general level the explicit basic assumption underlying the
Model is the universal constant of change. As developed above (p.l22)
change means process, and process presupposes potentiality. The con-
cept of process as the translantion of potentiality into actuality
serves as the Model's explicit assumption its first principle
(presupposition)
.
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IVhitehead (1968) states, "existence (in any of its senses) cannot
be abstracted from 'process'." The concepts of process and existence
presuppose each other. He further states.
The notion of potentiality is fundamental for the
understanding of existence, as soon as the notion
of process is admitted. If the universe be inter-
preted in terms of static actuality, the potentiality
vanishes. Everything is just what it is... if we start
with process as fundamental, then the actualities of
the present are deriving their characters from the
process, and are bestowing their characters upon the
future. Immediacy is the realization of the poten-
tialities of the past, and is the storehouse of the
potentialities of the future... the potentialities in
immediate fact constitute the driving force of process
(p. 96).
In order to understand the nature of process, it is necessary
to understand how potentiality becomes actualized. The principle of
process maintains that the being of an entity is constituted by how it
becomes; thus, the reality of anything is its becoming. It implies,
therefore, that no individual can be described in static terms. \Vhen
a child is actualizing his potential, new powers are becoming which
sustain the process. The implications of this should have a great impact
on causing the re-examination of our norm-referenced testing and eval-
uation procedures which label and lock children into fixed categories.
It is notable that the actualization of one's potentialities brings
satisfaction. Whitehead (1968) states, "The process of self-creation
is the transformation of the potential into the actual, and the fact
of
such transformation includes the immediacy of self-enjoyment (p. 117).
Closely related to the "principle of process" is the "principle
of
relativity." It derives the explanation of
the process of becoming from
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the general ontological principle of relativity. Everything in the
universe, for Whitehead, is interdependent (i.e., man's relatedness
to all other entities in the universe and the impossibility of under-
standing any being apart from the circumstances in which it becomes)
.
Whitehead (1969) describes creativeity as "the universal of un-
iversals." It is the process whereby "the many become one and are
increased by one." Hartshorne (1972) clarifies this further.
Each human experience is 'one' a new singular actuality
not hitherto present in reality. But each experience
prehends a multiplicity of data (the 'many'). Thus
there are memories of preceding experiences of man
himself, there are prehensions of unit-events in
parts of the body, etc. Many actual entities (each
pulse of existence) furnish data for any one new
actual entity. Accordingly, the entity is a
'synthesis' of the world out of which it arises.
The synthesis cannot be causally predictable, except
approximately, because it is a subtle contradiction
to suppose that many things could dictate their precise
mode of inclusion into a synthesis (p.l75).
This view of creativity is synonymous with development, the actual-
ization of potentiality. Every advance or increment creates a novel
entity.
In defining the nature of man, Jordan accepts the assumption of
hierarchical structuring as the primary expression of order and beauty
in the universe. The order of the universe is defined in terms of
different hierarchically arranged ontological levels with man at the
apex of all living creatures. Whitehead sees man in the world, yet
standing apart from it by his capacity for conscious awareness
of
himself and the world. Man encompases the lower levels of
nature but
possess the ability to think, to be introspective, to think
about
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himself, and to think about himself thinking. Man can contrast "what
is and what might be." IVhitehead considers consciousness as the
subjective form of this feeling of contrast. This "contrasting"
capacity of consciousness permits man to deal with factors that may
frustrate his subjective aim or purpose.
The quality of man's consciousness depends on his cumulative
experiences preserved by memory (a form of immanence), and on subject-
ive aim or purpose, the means by which the future dwells in the present
(a form of transcendence)
. Jordan and Streets (1972) define "immanence"
and "transcendence" as follows;
Immanence is reflected in the ability to mold out of the
past a dynamic present; transcendence is using the present
to extract from the past what will enable one to move
beyond himself into the future. It is a basic ontological
principle of the philosophy of organism that a being in
the present is created out of its own past as it in-
corporates new data from the environment; everything
emerges out of something which exists previously. Thus,
each man at any given point in time is a summation of his
past (p. 11).
The characteristics of immanence and transcendence make man a
spiritual being. Spiritual is used in the psychological sense as
the conscious capacity to structure and to interact with the unknown
by responding to non-actual realities such as ideals, aims, purposes,
and theories. Man can accept the ideals or theories as substitutes of
the unknowns and give them symbolic expression which helps to give
direction to the translation of potentiality into actuality facilitating
their functiong as final cause. Man, therefore, is a spiritual as well
as a material being who asprires to ideals, formulating goals
consistent
129
with them, attains those goals and formulates new ones.
In the process of becoming, there is an intrinsic pressure to
know and to love. This results in a conscious speculation and
attraction to unknowns and unknowables and man's relationship to them.
Whitehead also introduces the 'Subjectivist principle" that everything
is in part determined by its own internal state. It acknowledges
external causation (efficient) but these causes do not fully determine
the behavior of any given entity. In man, consciousness and the capacity
for symbolization allow him to store information in memory, make plans
for the future, and so affect what he will become. The subjectivist
principle in man is translated into subjective aim or purpose or in-
tentionality. As he is to a larger degree freed from efficient caus-
ation (instinct)
,
the role of learning is increased as he takes charge
of his own ontological and phylogenetic destiny. Jordan conceives
of order as dynamic in nature with novelty emerging from new integra-
tions. As noted above, man escapes the limitations of materiality by
his ability to direct the process of his own becoming — through learn-
ing he patterns the use of available energy — by consciously entertain-
ing the possibilities (potentialities) open to him.
The model deals with the direction human potentiality may take
in relationship to ontological levels of the universe. This is accomp-
lished by defining the nature of environments. Thus, in addition to the
universe being characterized by change, it is also characterized by
ontological levels, hierarchically organized. Jordan and Streets (1973)
define environments as follows:
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The physical environment — which includes everything
except human beings (mineral, vegetable, and animal);
the human environment — which includes all humans..!;
the environment of the unknown and unknowables the
ultimate mysteries in the cosmos of which consciousness
enables us to be aware, even if we do not know what
constitutes them; and the Self — a reflection of the
above three environments in a particular human being(p.33).
Each level is known by its particular attributes. The mineral
level attributes involve its inorganic nature and cohesion; the
vegetable level incorporates the attributes of the mineral but adds
reproduction and growth; the animal level possesses the vegetable
attributes and adds sense perception, movement, and ability to learn;
the human level includes all the lower level attributes and adds con-
scious intelligence and reflection, the ability to acquire knowledge
(e.g., scientific and artistic), and the capacity to consciously
care (love).
Polanyi (1969) developed a theory of boundry conditions defining
the laws governing each organizational level. The term boundry con-
ditions is borrowed from physics which is explained as follows:
The theory of boundary conditions recognizes the higher
levels of life as forming a hierarchy, each level of
which relies for its working on the principles of the
levels below it, even while it itself is irreducible to
these lower principles. .. Each (level) reduces the scope
of the one immediately below it by imposing on it a
boundry that harnesses it to the service of the next
higher level, and this control is transmitted stage
by stage down to the basic inanimated level (pp. 233-234).
Awareness of boundry conditions provide a better understanding of
the nature of environments by delimiting the significant range of poten-
tialities in each one, and prevent errors of logical typing (see Chapter
V) by not making inappropriate extrapolations from lower to higher
levels
V
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Environments sre, therefore, related by their hierarchical organ-
ization. Every creature belongs to one or more levels and is thereby
connected to all levels. Man's interaction with each environment may
enhance or suppress his development. IVhile man may have the possibility
of infinite development, destruction is also a distinct possibility.
Huxley (1967) states:
Man's destiny is to be the world's senior partner, the
primary agent for the future evolution of this planet.
This applies both individually and collectively, both
in the short and in the long term. In him, the evol-
utionary process has finally become conscious of itself.
This is a unique privilege, but also a formidable re-
sponsibility which gives him dignity, but which he can-
not unload on the shoulders of God or Fate (p. 35).
While it is a possiblity, man's interactions with the environment
need not destroy their inherent order and beauty. Whitehead (1967)
maintains that, aesthetically, the hierarchical organization of the
universe reflects both order and beauty.
The teleology of the Universe is directed toward the
production of Beauty. Thus any system of things which
in any wide sense is beautiful is to that extent just-
ified in its existence. It may, however, fail in another
sense, by inhibiting more Beauty than it creates. Thus
the system, though in a sense beautiful, is on the whole
evil in that environment (p. 265).
From these prespectives man is at the apex of evolutionary pro-
cesses. Understanding the nature of process, environment and man
underscored the importance for Jordan of establishing first principles
as the basis for a theory education.
Once the basic assumptions (first principles) were established,
Jordan generated a universal model of education which is
comprehensive.
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coherent, 3.nd scientific in its foundations. Since the conceptual
base of the model rests on the work of process philosophers and is
organismic in nature, Jordan called the model Anisa. The word comes
from a Greek root word that refers to an ancient symbol, the tree
of life.
In the process of theory building, therefore, Jordan not only
made explicit his basic assumptions but made them the foundation
upon which he deduced a comprehensive and coherent theory. His basic
assumption (concept of process as the translation of potentiality
into actuality) leads to an organismic as opposed to a mechanistic
view of the universe — the basis for a paradigm shift. The basic
metaphor is the living organism — an organized and dynamic whole. It
represents the active organism model of man who, because of subjective
aim and final cause, is inherently active and self-directing rather
than activated by external efficient causes only.
With respect to fulfilling the scientific criterion of having
explicit assumptions, Anisa fully meets this criterion. In fact,
every effort was made to articulate the basic assumptions before
further theory construction. Jordan then formulated the body of theory
derived from the basic assumption which include theories of develop-
ment, curriculum, pedagogy, administration, and evaluation, each of
which is briefly presented below.
Data language. Since these theories are imagined mental
contructs
invented to explain observed phenomena, their primary
function is to
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help understand the world. Jordan uses language as the symbol system
to represent the underlying structure of the real world that he is
conceptually mapping. The particular focus of this presentation
IS to assess the theories with respect to their demonstrating the
criterion of a precise data language. Is the data language defined
as precisely as possible with referents in the "real world?” It
is important to caution that the terms used need to be considered
within the organismic paradigm. As Kuhn has noted, terms from one
paradigm to another are incommensurable. This should be considered
since Anisa represents a new paradigm for education. It is also de-
sirable to use the criterion of a clear data language which is inter-
nally consistent with the new paradigm.
Theory of development . The Anisa theory of human development
defines development in terms of the first principle, as the trans-
lation of potentiality into actuality — an epigenetic process in-
itiated and sustained by the individual's interactions with the en-
vironment. Development refers to change in an organism from one
state to a more complex and integrated state of organization both
physiologically and psychologically that is orderly, progressive,
cumulative, irreversible and rhythmic. The theory specifies two
basic types of potential — biological and psychological — and states
that interaction between the organism and specific environments de-
termines which potentialities become actualized, and how the actualized
potentialities will be structured to form character , identity, and
personality.
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The key factor in the actualization of biological potentialities
is nutrition — the translation of the genetic code into living tissue.
The theory calls for application a year before conception to provide
the prospective parents with proper nutrition that will make them as
healthy as possible in preparation for conception. During pregnancy
the mother's diet is carefully monitored. Empirical evidence has
demonstrated a connection between the nutritional status of the child
and his ability to learn. Since learning is the means by which psych-
ological potentialities are actualized, a necessary condition for
optimal learning is the provision for proper nutrition.
The theory of development sets forth five basic types of psycho-
logical potentialities — psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective,
and volitional. The key to the actualization of these potentialities
is learning. Since learning — the exemplar for the Anisa paradigm —
is a key term, Jordan (1979) defines it as follows: "Learning is de-
fined as the capacity to differentiate experience by breaking it down
into contrastable units, to integrate these elements in novel ways,
and to generalize the integration to other similar situations."
In addition, learning "...sets forth the proposition that different-
iation, integration, and generalization constitute a trio of inter-
related processes that defines a developmental unit of change — a
stage (sequences of stages being the primary means by which increasing
complexity of function and structure is built up and integrated through
hierarchical organization)." (Jordan and Shepard, 1972). As discussed
in Chapter V, each stage also represents a change in logical typing.
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Within this framework, whenever a student manifests a learning problem,
it is because he has a nutritional deficit that is impairing learning
or because he is failing to differentiate, integrate, generalise,
or because of some combination of all these factors.
Learning competence — knowing how to learn — is the conscious
ability to differentiate, integrate, and generalize. The five categor-
ies of psychological potentialities are defined as follows: Psychomotor
competence is an inner awareness of all the muscles which can come under
voluntary control. The various movements of the body parts can be
differientiated and integrated into patterns of movements which ex-
press the purposes of the individual.
Perceptual competence refers to the conscious ability to differ-
ientiate sensory information (vision, auditon, olfaction, etc.) and
integrate that information into generalizable patterns that constitute
interpretations of reality enabling the individual to make decisions
and act on the basis of that information.
Cognitive competence refers to the conscious ability to think and
reason. An individual comes to know something by acting upon it. The
interactions from this process are the basis for the development of
internal structures in the brain that form the basis for cognitive
competence.
Affective competence is the conscious ability to differentiate
affective states that reflect the viability of the individual,
to
integrate them so that they accurately inform the individual
of his
viability. Affective competence involves the differentiation
of
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feelings — balance of the hope and fear related emotions — and
their integration in reference to objects, events, people, or
ideals, and their generalization in ways that provide some stability
in life.
Volitional competence is the conscious capacity to form ultimate
aims, differentiate them into operable goals and integrate them into
a flow of intentional behavior. The role of purpose or subjective
aim, is an important factor in the translation of potentiality into
actuality. It enables man to achieve control over his own destiny.
Some of the processes that relate to the development of volitional
competence are attention, goal setting, self-arousal, perseverance,
effecting closure and fantasizing a state of goal attainment.
The separation and distinction among the different categories
of psychological potentialities was made only for the ease of under-
standing and fostering a specific dimension of development; it is fully
understood that every act of experience will involve all five categories,
each to a greater or lesser extent. The theory affirms the importance
of early experience in shaping subsequent development and states the
hueristic value of critical or sensitive periods, stages and sequences.
The theory also affirms that development as a whole is sustained
through interaction with the environments. The quality of the en-
vironments, therefore, influences the quality of the interactions which
influences development.
The theory accounts for the importance of introducing some degree
of novelty into the environment as the basic means of creating dis-
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equilibrium between developmental level and experience which forces
new patterns of interaction that facilitate the actualization of
psychological potentialities. It explains the emergence of character
development in terms of value formation defining values as the rela-
tivity enduring structurings of actualized potentialities — pattern-
ed uses of energy.
The theory identifies three value sub-systems (material, social,
and religious/aesthetic) which are associated with each of the three
basic environments — physical, human, and unknown, respectively.
It explains the higher-order competencies (technological, moral, and
spiritual/philosophical) which are built on the above value sub-systems.
It defines the reality of personal identity — the Self — as the three
value systems combined into an integrated totality resulting in s^lf-
competence which is the combination of the higher-order competencies.
The theory provides the basis for undertanding pathology and its
etiology — biological and psychological. It identifies the conditions
for the prevention of mental illness and deliquency, and can generate
testable hypotheses concerning therapy and rehabilitation.
Theory of curriculum . The primary purpose of the Anisa Model is
to actualize human potential at an optimum rate. In order to help
accomplish this purpose, Jordan developed a comprehensive theory of
curriculum and a theory of pedogogy which are interdependent and coher-
ent with the theory of development directly related to the categories
of potentialities. The theory defines curriculum as five sets
of ob-
what the students with the assistance ofjectives and delimiting
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teachers must do to achieve them (Jordan, 1979).
The first is concerned with the achievement of learning compe-
tence in the five psychological potentialities. Learning competence,
again, is the conscious ability to differentiate, integrate, and
generalize experience. These objectives constitute the process
curriculum (i.e., the learning -to- learn part of the curriculum).
Specifications are written for each potentiality identifying activities
needed to achieve them. Cognitive processes, for example, involve
classification, seriation, conservation, transitivity, deduction,
analogy, etc. The process curriculum integrates all other aspects of
the curriculum.
The second set of objectives are concerned with the content curric-
ulum. This provides the basic information about the world organized
according to the ontological levels; physical, human, and unknown. The
content curriculum, therefore, is organized in a similar fashion to the
traditional, i.e., the physical sciences, behavioral sciences, and
philosophy/theology
,
respectively
.
The third set of objectives is concerned with the mastery of three
basic symbol systems; mathematics, language (speaking, reading, writing),
and the arts (music, drama, visual). These symbol systems are the
secondary means of integrating the entire curriculum.
The fourth set involves three types of higher-order
competencies
and values related to environments. The value systems
and related
competencies are as follows; (1) material values and
technological
competence result from interactions with the physical
environment.
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(2) social values and moral competence result from interactions with
the human environment, and (3) religious and fiducial competence re-
sult from dealing with the unknown and unknowable environment. Jordan
refers to these values as religious because one can approach an un-
known only on faith. Fiducial competence "...is the ability to acti-
vate faith as one pursues an unknown so that the anxiety from risk
involved can be managed by turning it into courage." These values
and competencies are, therefore, the combined effects of the process
and content curricula.
Actualized potentialities are structured — expressions of energy
use called values. Thus, a value is defined as a relatively enduring
patterned use of energy. The integration of the three value systems
is the basis of personal identity. Since each value is organized around
an ideal, the ideal for material and technological competence is phys-
ical causality (efficient causation of thing-thing interaction); justice
is the ideal for social values and moral competence; and, "unity/truth/
beauty the trinity of ideals for religious values and fiducial com-
petence."
The Anisa Model is a prescriptive theory; it deals with both
means and ends. A "value-free" education, therefore, is rejected as
being impotent and aimless. It differs from the mechanistic view
which deals only with means and is amoral or neutral concerned pri-
marily with "what is." Anisa takes a stand on the issues of values,
ideals, and higher-order competencies since human beings demonstrate
the capacity to create ideals that serve as lures for the structuring
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of energy use. The prescriptive nature of the Anisa paradigm deals
with the "ought” issues (final cause) and subsumes the value-free
"what is" (efficient cause) issues as a special case.
The fifth set of objectives are concerned with the self. The
goal of this curriculum is self-knowledge which permits the conscious
translation of potentiality into actuality resulting in an integrated
value system — personal identity. The curriculum is organized around
the process curriculum; thus, body awareness (psychomotor development),
self-percept (perceptual development), self-concept (cognitive develop-
ment), self-worth (affective development), and self-determination
(volitional development). These are integrated around a self-ideal
representing the person’s material, social, and religious values as
these values, however, pertain to the self. Jordan (1979) observes,
"...justice is the ideal around which social values are organized to
yield moral competence. On the level of the self-ideal, this is re-
flected as fairness; every self-ideal will include a commitment to
fairness to some degree."
Theory of pedagogy . The theory of teaching also takes its defini-
tion from the theory of development. The process of translating poten-
tiality into actuality is accomplished by interaction with the environ-
ment and the primary role of the teacher is to facilitate that process.
Teaching, therefore, is defined "...as arranging environments and
guiding the child's interaction with them to achieve the goals
speci-
fied by the curriculum." The theory asserts the need to
individualize
instruction and specifies how this will be accomplished by (1)
diag-
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nostic and speculative methods for determining the developmental
level of the child and (2) prescribing or experimenting by arranging
environments and guiding interactions so that the experience matches
the developmental levels of the child on any dimension related to
a particular objective specified by the curriculum.
"Match" is defined as the optimal disparity (novelty) between
internal schemata and the learning experience that is being provided.
Curiosity is the best indicator of the tension inherent in optimal
disparity; it is an important source of intrinsic motivation to be
facilitated by the teacher.
The theory emphasizes the significant influence the teacher has
as a model. Provides for coordination of staffing patterns so that
children have several adults who know them and preferably over a
three or four year period of time. Provides for the more experienced
children to teach the less experienced throughout the system.
Theory of administration . Defines administration in terms of
service qualified by the goals of organization as specified in the
theory of curriculum. Identifies two basic functions of administra-
tion — leadership and management — which are in dynamic equilibrium.
Leadership deals with the present in terms of future possibilities
(transcendence) ; management is concerned with the present by coordina-
ting resources representing past accomplishments and accumulated
knowledge (immanence)
.
The Situational Leadership as developed and operationalized by
Hersey and Blanchard (1972) is most congenial to the Anisa theory
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of administration and serves as the leadership and management system
at the present Anisa field-testing sites in Connecticut. This is
elaborated further in Chapter VII.
It is beyond the purposes of this study to delimit fully the
theory of administration but merely to indicate its dimensions and
integration as an interdependent theory. It is in an orchestrating
position for implementing the Model. It emphasizes the rational
basis for institutional self-renewal by making the results of re-
search and evaluation mandatory input for the decision-making process.
The theories of administration and evaluation are viewed as integral
systems
.
Theory of evaluation . This dissertation is a further elaboration
of the Anisa theory of evaluation. Some of the initial concepts will
be noted. Evaluation is defined in terms of the purpose of the
activity or program being evaluated. Thus, the integral relationship
to administration which has the primary responsibility for goal setting
as prescribed by Anisa theory.
The theory seeks to relate means to ends, distinguishing efficient
from final causes. Conceives evaluation as an on-going process con-
cerned with every aspect of the program — formative and summative.
Provides for a circular, causal, and feedback process for timely
modification, including modification of the evaluation design itself.
Emphasizes the importance of longitudinal studies and guards
against
ready acceptance of short-term effects as proof of impact.
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The primary focal point of evaluation is the analysis of child-
ren’s interactions with particular environments and their develop-
mental consequences — in essence, evaluating the effects of the
theory of teaching. In this process, it recognizes internal states
of the individual (such as subjective aim, intentions or memory) as
causal factors on behavior. Uses evaluation findings as basis for
re-examination of the assumptions (first principles) underlying the
Model and the theories on which its operationalization depends. Views
the purpose of evaluation with the explanatory and predictive functions
of research and science.
In general, how adequate is the data language in Anisa? How does
it compare with other education theories? The definitional terms in
Anisa deal with the fundamental components of the educational process
(e.g., learning, development, teaching, curriculum, administration).
The definitions are coherent and straightforward. A notable contrast
with definitions found in many of the current educational theories,
however, is the fact that their definitions are closely linked to
illustrations. For example, the concepts of "differentiation" and
"integration" would generally be defined with reference to a number
of specific behaviors illustrating each. There are, nevertheless,
potential advantages and disadvantages for defining key theoretical
concepts in an abstract rather than a concrete way. The potential
disadvantage is that teachers, administrators, and parents will be un-
clear about the meaning of the key terms without specific concrete
referents. The important advantage, however, is that the concepts can
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be applied to a very broad range of levels and problems. This is
analogous to Newton's exemplar of force is equal to mass times
acceleration (f = m x a)
; the abstract formulation permitted engineers
to apply the concepts to a wide range of matter in motion from pen-
dulums to matter in free fall. This same abstractness contributes to
Anisa as a "generative theory", which provides the theoretical basis
for each teacher to generate a learning situation for students rather
than relying on a fixed "recipe" approach. The teacher, therefore,
continues to leam-to- learn and serves as a model for the students who
in a reciprocal process also learn-to-learn.
Testable hypotheses . While the Anisa Model demonstrates a precise
data language and explicit assumptions, to qualify as a scientific
theory it must also fulfill the criterion of being able to generate
new and testable hypotheses. The scientist moves from theoretical hunch
land to the land of verification by employing experimental designs
that can be empirically tested in the real world. If they are not
verified, the theory is either abandaned, modified, or a new theory is
developed.
What are the new and testable hypotheses generated by Anisa the-
ory — hypotheses that can be confirmed empirically? In the seven years
of field-testing Anisa two kinds of hypotheses have been generated.
First, hypotheses based upon the traditional (Campbell and Stanley,
1966 ) research designs using control groups norm-referenced
objective
measures, and statistical procedures (e.g., t-tests, analysis of var-
iance, etc.) were extensively used. These hypotheses concerned re-
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lationships between educational experiences and effects on students
and staff. A six-year longitudinal study of achievement outcomes,
for example, has been conducted using a control group design. The
results have been positive (see Chapter VII). In general, all of the
"hard methodologies” for hypothesis testing consistent with the mech-
anistic paradigm can be used. However, in evaluating a good scientific
theory, it should be able to generate a second kind, that is, a new
and testable hypothesis. Some new hypotheses were tested on evaluating
the effects of the process-curriculum (e.g., classification, ser-
iation, etc.), using newly developed instrumentation (Hambleton, R.
et al., 1974). The traditional control group design, however, was
still used attempting to establish a cause and effect relationship
between Anisa teaching practices and process outcomes.
Since Anisa is concerned with change, emerging hierarchic struct-
ures, reciprocal and final causes, etc., relatively few have been
systematically tested in the field. The theory, nevertheless, is able
to generate numerous testable hypotheses. The major practical limit-
ations are related to funding for both the design of the experimentation
and development of new instrumentation. The Anisa Model has identified
new research methods (see Chapter VII) that are available for empir-
ical hypothesis testing.
It is notable that the strengths and weaknesses of Anisa as a
theory can be evaluated separately from the characteristic of implement-
ing (hypothesis testing) Anisa in the field. At a very pragmatic level
Anisa, as an adequate theory of education, should serve as a guide
for
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the following: (1) to focus the energies of teachers and adminis-
tration on a systematic effort to help children learn, (2) to provide
the basis for deciding how to organize optimal learning environments
and for deciding what activities to include in the curriculum, and
(3) to provide criteria for evaluating program effectiveness (Bissell
et al., 1975). An inadequate theory is one that fails to give the
teachers and adminstrators such a framework for planning, structuring,
and evaluating. With respect to the Anisa Model, Dr. Bissell (1975)
states, "...there is no question that Anisa offers unique attributes
as an educational approach. Its attempt to deal with organizational
and administrative aspects of schools as well as aspects of classroom
methods on curriculum is unique. Few other approaches to early educa-
tion are as broad in scope as is Anisa."
Summary
It was demonstrated how Anisa fulfills each of the three basic
steps of the scientific process (i.e., observation, model building,
and hypothesis testing) qualifying as a scientific theory of education.
The observation step clearly identified the unit(s) of study. Initial-
ly starting with man as the basic unit of study, a more fundamental
unit — change — was identified. In model building, Anisa demon-
states a clear and explicit articulation of its underlying assump-
tion — the first principle of process as the translation of
potential-
ity into actuality. From this basic assumption, five
comprehensive
and coherent bodies of theory were developed: (1)
theory of development.
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(2) theory of curriculum, (3) theory of pedogogy, (4) theory of
administration, and (5) theory of evaluation. A precise data lang-
uage was developed. Every newly developed theoretical concept was
tested against relevant empirical studies helping to establish a firm
empirical footing. Beginning with such an empirical base, Anisa is
able to generate testable hypotheses using the legitimate mechanistic
research designs. Using these criteria, therefore, the Anisa Model
qualifies as an empirically based scientific theory.
Chapters II and III illustrated the growth of knowledge using the
Kuhnian paradigm perspective. This chapter demonstrated Anisa as a
disciplinary matrix, i.e., a scientific theory. The theory, however,
also represents an example of "extraordinary science" for it deals
with the anomalies of mechanistic science creating a paradigm shift.
As a new scientific paradigm for education, it is entering the "normal
science" stage. The following chapters address the conceptual, in-
strumental and methodological problems of the "normal science" stage of
paradigm development.
CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS FOR A THEORY OF EVALUATION: CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS
Since the Kuhnian perspective was used to establish Anisa as a
new paradigm, this same framework will be used to develop its implica-
tions for the growth of Anisa. It was illustrated how Anisa dealt with
the anomalies leading to the theoretical crisis of mechanistic science
resulting in a paradigm shift. Anisa, therefore, based on its pre-
suppositions and exemplar of learning, now is seen to be in the "normal
science" phase of growth.
For those who are already working within the organismic view and
those in education who will toil within the Anisa paradigm, the insights
that Kuhn offers for the growth of knowledge should help clarify the
emerging problems that need to be solved. It is notable, again, that
paradigms become accepted because they solve some problems that a group
believes to be important. The hope of success in the beginnings of a
paradigm is the discovery of selected and still incomplete puzzles.
The actualization of that hope occurs in the normal science phase which
deals essentially with three interrelated issues: (1) determining what
are the significant facts; (2) matching fact (nature) with theory, and
(3) further articulation of theory. We are moving into the
mopping-up
phase of solving legitimate problems and fitting them into the concept-
ual boxes supplied by the Anisa paradigm. Within these issues, the
following problems will be the primary focus of Chapters V, VI and
VII,
respectively: conceptual; instrumental; and methodological.
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Normal Science; Conceptual Problems
The conceptual problems are related to the first issue of deter-
mining what are the significant facts of the Anisa paradigm. The path-
ways of scientific thought are determined by the presuppositions of the
scientific practitioner. It is highly desirable for the scientist to
know consciously and be able to state explicitly his presuppositions.
While the Anisa first principles were presented above, a further
elaboration will be made to clarify and offer some possible solutions to
identified conceptual problems. Since the Anisa framework rests on the
empirical base of its theory of evaluation (see Figure 3) , the first
order of evaluation should be concerned with evaluating the first
principles underlying the nature of man.
Anisa was highly influenced by the organismic philosophy of White-
head, who viewed the universe as being characterized by change. Change
implies process which presupposes potentiality. The actualization of
potentiality is the basic principle of the organismic approach. This
approach can also accommodate the mechanistic by transcending its limi-
tations with its concern for wholeness, unity, and organism which
results in a comprehensive and coherent view of man and the nature of
physical reality. Man, as an active organism, is an integral part of
a hierarchically structured universe. Hierarchy is defined as sets of
things graded in levels with each level implying the appearance of new
qualities which require new criteria of explanation.
Whitehead begins with human existence as the apex of known hier-
archic organization and works in the reverse direction to the happenings
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in atoms. This scheme enabled Wliitehead to explain more adequately
the emergence of consciousness and purpose. Wliitehead (1958) states:
Mankind has gradually developed from the lowliest forms of
life, and it must therefore be explained in terms applicable
to all such forms. But why construe the later forms by
analogy to the earlier forms? Why not reverse the process?
It would seem to be more sensible, more truly empirical, to
allow each living species to make its own contribution to the
demonstration of factors inherent in living things (p. 15).
Central to these concepts is Whitehead's "subjectivistic
principle" which maintains that everything — atoms to man — is, in
part, determined by its own internal state. It acknowledges that effi-
cient environmental causes influence this state but do not fully deter-
mine the behavior. At the human level, with the addition of conscious-
ness and the capacity for symbolization, this principle is translated
into subjective aim or purpose. This capacity gives man greater
ability to project an ideal and plan for the future giving him a
greater degree of freedom in determining not only his own ontological
but phylogenetic future.
An excellent summary of the development of organismic principles
in scientific thought is presented by McCullough (1977). More recently,
Gregory Bateson (1979), another significant worker within the organ-
ismic perspective, in his Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity , relates
some of the conceptual issues which can be applied to the Anisa first
principles. If Anisa is to fulfill its promise of a new paradigm, its
theory of evaluation should clarify what the significant facts are to
be studied. Given the above first principles, the significant
facts
are related to man — consciousness, change, hierarchic
organization.
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etc. At the highest level, the object of study is to understand man
himself, a large portion of which is mind.
Anisa deals with these problems in a very general way. Bateson (1979)
^^^^her clarifies some of the paradigm puzzles. For example, he estab-
lishes basic criteria of mind such that if any aggregate of phenomena,
any system, satisfies these criteria, the aggregate is a "mind." He
believes that such a structuring of epistemology, evolution, and epi-
genesis is possible and can resolve the mind-body problem along these
lines. He argues that phenomena called "thought", "evolution",
"ecology", "life", and "learning" occur in systems that fulfill the
following criteria:
1. A mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components.
2. The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by dif-
ference, and difference is a nonsubstantial phenomenon not
located in space or time; difference is related to negen-
tropy and entropy rather than to energy.
3. Mental process requires collateral energy.
4. Mental process requires circular (or more complex) chains
of determination.
5. In mental process, the effects of difference are to be
regarded as transformations (i.e., coded versions) of
events which preceded them. The rules of such trans-
formations must be comparatively stable (i.e., more stable
than the content) but are themselves subject to trans-
formation.
6. The description and classification of these processes of
transformation disclose a hierarchy of logical types
immanent in the phenomena (p. 92).
Several of these will be presented in greater detail to show how
these within-paradigm differences, which can be reconciled, deal with
basic conceptual problems. First, the problem of object-subject will
be presented, i.e., how the theory can, in essence, explain itself.
r
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Second, but closely related, are problems concerning hierarchic
structures. The ’’logical types” developed by Russell and Whitehead in
Principia Mathematica offer a possible solution to this problem
resolving some of the concerns raised by Kurt Godel (1979). Third,
problems of change will be discussed. For Anisa, change is the con-
stant, with learning as a key factor in the dynamic balance between
stability and novelty. Bateson introduces stochastic processes for
both individual and evolutionary changes, with the latter effectively
dealing with the Weissmannian barrier between somatic and genetic
change. Fourth, the problem of continuity vs. discontinuity and its
relationship to time will be considered.
Problems of self-reference: object-subject . With respect to the first
two problems, Bateson draws upon Russell and Whitehead whose goal in
the Principia Mathematica was to derive all of mathematics from logic
without contradictions. This required eliminating ’’strange loops” from
logic, set theory, and number theory. Initially, it appeared that
Russell and Whitehead outlined a system that was both consistent
(contradiction- free) and complete, i.e., every true statement of number
theory could be derived within their framework. Their system for
dealing with ’’strange loops” in logic involved sets. For example, most
sets are not members of themselves; thus, the set of horses is not a
horse (a set is not an animal). These sets are ’’run-of-the-mill”;
however, there are ”self-swallowing” sets that contain themselves as
members, or the set of all sets. Every set is either run-of-the-mill
or self-swallowing, and no set can be both. Carried further, it is
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possible to create R: the set of all run-of-the-mill sets. R, there-
fore, might appear as run-of-the-mill creation; but, you must revise
your opinions when you ask "Is R itself a run-of-the-mill set or a
self-swallowing set?" The answer is neither, for either choice leads
to Russell's famous paradox (Hofstadter, 1979).
Russell and Whitehead attempted to save logic from paradox. The
common element in paradoxes is "self-reference" or "strange loopiness."
Another example is the paradox of Epimenides. Epimenides was a Cretan
who said, "Cretans always lie". Contradiction is created when we ask,
"Could Epimenides be telling the truth?" The answer is: "If yes, then
no," and "If no, then yes". Presented to a computer, the answer is
Yes... No... to infinity.
The Epimenides paradox is a one-step strange loop. It violates
the dichotomy of true and false, because if you think it is true, then
it quickly backfires making you think it is false. Once you decide it
is false, a similar backfiring occurs — a strange loop.
Russell and Whitehead created the theory of types to handle para-
dox. Hofstadter (1979) summarizes their system:
A set of the lowest "type" could contain only "objects", or
sets of the lowest type. A set of the next type up could only
contain objects, or sets of the lowest type. In general, a
set of a given type could only contain sets of lower type, or
objects. Every set would belong to a specific type. Clearly,
no set could contain itself because it would have to belong to
a type higher than its own type (p.21).
This theory of logical types rids set theory of its paradoxes —
strange loops. This was accomplished by introducing a hierarchy which
prevented looping back inside language. In a hierarchy, therefore, we
1
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may go from "class", to "class of classes", to "classes of classes",
etc. Bateson uses the theory of "logical types" to deal with issues
of hierarchic organization which are central to living systems, par-
ticularly mind. Bateson demonstrates a number of analogues in the real
world to Russell's abstract step from class to class of classes.
There is speculation as to whether Whitehead and Russell knew when they
were working on the Principia that their interest was vital and cast
light on the life of human beings and the whole of biology.
As noted above, the goals of mechanistic science are objectivity,
control, prediction, which are then conceptualized in quantitative
terms. The role of mathematics (logic) is equally central to organis-
mic science; therefore, it is appropriate to consider some of its
limitations. Bateson (1979: 58) demonstrates how logic is a poor model
of cause and effect. The if. .
.
then . . . of logic in a syllogism is very
different from the if... then... of cause and effect. Computers can
simulate all the processes of logic, but they cannot simulate all the
sequences of cause and effect. Thus, when sequences of cause and
effect become circular or more complex, the mapping of those sequences
onto logic becomes self-contradictory. The if. .
.
then . . . of logic is
timeless and generates paradoxes; the if. .
.
then . . . of causality
requires time. This concept of time will be further elaborated as a
key variable in change processes.
While Bateson applies Whitehead's "logical types" as the analogue
for hierarchic structures in living systems, there are major questions
in the axiomatic system presented in the Principia Mathematica.
155
Kurt Gb'del in his 1931 paper revealed that there were "holes"
in Russell and Whitehead’s axiomatic system and that no system
could produce all number-theoretical truths. Godel's Incompleteness
Theorem brought the Epimenides paradox into the Principia which was to
be free of inconsistency or "strange loops." It is notable that
Russell and Whitehead developed "logical types" to deal with paradox,
and it is this system that Bateson applies to hierarchic living
structures. While Gb'del 's strange loop did not destroy the Principia
,
his limitative theorem made Russell and Whitehead's work less interest-
ing to mathematicians.
Godel's work is not only of interest in showing the limitation of
formal logic — or any quantitative system used in science, but focus-
es attention on problems of understanding our own minds — conscious-
ness. Since this is one of the major concerns for Anisa, these limi-
tations will be explored. Hofstadter (1979) deals with this in great
detail. Godel's theorem shows that there are fundamental limitations
to formal systems suggesting that ultimately we cannot understand our
own minds. This raises semantic questions of what we mean by "under-
standing" our own minds. For instance, the self-mirroring involving
being able to monitor your own brain in detail is absurd; however, the
goal of knowing oneself in some profound way may be feasible. There
is, nevertheless, probably some Gb’delian strange loop which limits the
depth of understanding. As Hofstadter states, "Just as we cannot see
our faces with our own eyes, is it not reasonable to expect that we
cannot mirror our complete mental structures in the symbols which
carry them out?"
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The essential point is that all limitative theorems of meta-
mathematics, e.g., Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem, Church's Undecid-
ability Theorem, Turing's Halting Theorem, and Tarski's Truth Theorem,
suggest that once the ability to represent your own structure reaches
a certain point, that is, an end which assures that you cannot repre-
sent yourself totally. As noted above, it also limits the degree to
which science in its Western version of object and subject can use the
self-application of science, i.e., science studying itself as an
object — Kuhn and Piaget notwithstanding.
While Godel's Theorem demonstrates fundamental limitations to
consistent formal systems in mathematical logic, with self-images, the
use of the Godelian metaphor translated to other disciplines as equally
valid would be a big mistake. It may suggest new truths for psychology
or Anisa, for example, but there is no evidence that it could be trans-
lated without modification. Go'delian's proof does, however, have some
implications for understanding consciousness. Hofstadter believes that
"strange loops" are the crux of consciousness. The explanation of
"emergent" phenomena in our brains — ideas, hopes, images, analogies,
free will and consciousness — are based on a strange loop, the inter-
action between levels in which the top level reaches down towards the
bottom level and influences it, while at the same time being itself
determined by the bottom level. There is a self-reinforcing
"resonance" between different levels; the self comes into being at the
moment it has the power to reflect itself.
The explanation of the mind requires "soft" concepts such as
levels, mappings, and meanings. Hofstadter observes that we don't
need a description of positions and movement of physical particles
but descriptions of neural activities to "signals" which relate to
"symbols", "subsystems", and "self-symbols." He views this act of
translation from low-level physical hardware to high-level psycholo-
gical software as analogous to the translation of number-theoretical
statements into metamathematical statements (logical typing)
. Hof-
stadter believes that the level-crossing which takes place at that
exact translation point is what creates Godel's incompleteness and
also creates our nearly unanalyzable feeling of self. A Godel vortex
where all levels cross — a vortex of self — is responsible for the
tangledness of mental processes. This self-reference may well be the
heart of all Artificial Intelligence and can be the focus for attempts
to understand how the human mind works — Godel's work is therefore an
important contribution toward that end.
This position is close to one held by Roger Sperry (1977), a
neuroscientist, who states:
In my own hypothetical brain model, conscious awareness does
get representation as a very real causal agent and rates an
important place in the causal sequence and chain of control
in brain events, in which it appears as an active, operational
force... To put it very simply, it comes down to the issue of
who pushes whom around in the population of causal forces that
occupy the cranium. It is a matter, in other words, of
straightening out the peck-order hierarchy among intracranial
control agents. There exists within the cranium a whole world
of diverse causal forces; what is more, there are forces
within forces within forces, as in no other cubic half- foot of
universe that we know. . ..To make a long story short, if one
keeps climbing upward in the chain of command within the brain,
one finds at the very top those overall organizational forces
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and dynamic properties of the large patterns of cerebral
excitation that are correlated with mental states or
psychic activity... Near the apex of this command system in
the brain... we find ideas. Man over the chimpanzee has
ideas and ideals. In the brain model proposed here, the
causal potency of an idea, or an ideal, becomes just as
real as that of a molecule, a cell, or a nerve impulse.
Ideas cause ideas and help evolve new ideas. They interact
with each other and with other mental forces in the same
brain, in neighboring brains, and thanks to global communi-
cation, in far distant, foreign brains. And they also
interact with the external surroundings to produce in toto
a burstwise advance in evolution that is far beyond anything
to hit the evolutionary scene yet, including the emergence
of the living cell (p. 242).
Hofstadter*s work using Godel, Escher, and Bach makes a contribu-
tion to our understanding of consciousness and hierarchical living
systems which are within the organismic paradigm and, therefore,
relevant to solving some of the Anisa puzzles. It resolves the breach
that supposedly exists between two languages of discourse: the subject-
ive and objective. For example, the ’’subjective” sensation of redness
and the ’’objective” wavelength of red light. The subjective feeling
of redness comes from the vortex of self-perception in the brain; the
objective wavelength is how you see things when you step back, outside
the system. Although no one is ever able to step back far enough to
see the big picture, we need to be aware that it exists.
Hierarchic organization: form and process . The basic facts that the
Anisa paradigm must deal with are rooted in its presuppositions on the
nature of reality. The central concept is change. Thus we need to
understand this process of change from the individual to evolutionary
change. Since Anisa assumes that the universe is hierarchically
organized with man (mind) at the apex of evolutionary development, the
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understanding of these basic phenomena are the primary puzzles that
the organismic paradigm needs to solve. Bateson converts some of these
phenomena into puzzle forms which can be solved. Thus, the phenomena
of ’’life", ’’evolution", "learning" are defined if they fulfill the
defined criteria specified above.
One of the significant puzzles to be solved is concerned with
understanding hierarchic organization. As part of a solution to this
puzzle, Bateson draws on Russell and Whitehead’s Principia applying
their work on abstract logic or mathematics not to an empty hierarchy
of names of names or classes of classes of classes for this empty world
is insufficient for the scientist. Bateson maintains that we must deal
with an interaction of digital (i.e., naming) and analogic steps; thus,
the process of naming is itself nameable which requires an alternation
in place of the simple ladder of logical types proposed by the Principia.
He recombines his two "stochastic systems", which he has divided into
"evolution" (genetics) and "mental process" (learning), as two alternat-
ing steps. The Principia presents a ladder made of steps that are all
alike (names of names of names, etc.) while Bateson believes there is an
alternation of two species of steps. Thus, to get from the "name" to
the "name of name", we go through the process of naming the name; there
is a generative process where classes are created before they can be
named. This movement from classes to process requires an understanding
of the relationship between form and process; the former as an analogue
to "tautology" and the latter as an analogue of the aggregate of pheno-
mena to be explained.
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It is agreed that the brain contains no material objects other
than its own circuits and metabolic energy. Thoughts about dogs and
oranges are only "ideas" of dogs and oranges. The process of coding,
i.e.
,
the representation that substitutes the idea of dogs or oranges
for the things is a big jump in "logical typing"; the name is not the
thing named and the idea of dog is not the dog. Thus, the first step
from dogs into the coded version places the thinker into an abstract,
tautological universe. Bateson believes that the very process of per-
ception is an act of logical typing — all images are a complex of
many- leveled coding and mapping.
The dichotomy between form and process which exists in our
scientific minds also characterizes the relationship among the pheno-
mena we attempt to analyze. The things-in-themselves (the Ding an
sich) are not accessible to direct inquiry but, nevertheless, have
relationships among themselves. They also can have no direct exper-
ience of each other; a concept of great significance for understanding
the living world. The basic presupposition is that "ideas" have a
reality. They are what we can know; the "laws" that bind the "ideas"
together are as close as we can get to ultimate truth.
Bateson illustrates this process with an example from his work in
anthropology with a New Guinea culture. The first step was classifi-
cation of behaviors in terms of types, e.g., typing of sexes. This
then led to questions of processes that generated the differences that
led to those interactions between men and women that created the dif-
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ferentiated ethos that was the basis for his typology of persons;
thus, he wanted to understand how the behavior of men determined that
of women, and vice versa.
His next step was from process to a typology of process. He
labeled the processes using the term "schismogenesis" and then classi-
fied them. A basic dichotomy was possible indicating that the proces-
ses of interaction that lead to the potentiality of promoting schismo-
genesis could be classified into two genera: the symmetric and the
complementary. The symmetric applied to those interactions that could
be described as competition, rivalry, mutual emulation, etc. For
example, A's action would stimulate B to action of the same kind of
feeding back to stimulate A to similar actions... Thus, if A engaged in
boasting, this would stimulate B to more boasting, and vice versa.
The complementary interaction sequences, on the other hand, were
such that the actions of A and B were different but complementary, i.e.,
dominance- submission, exhibition-spectatorship, dependence-nurturance,
etc. It suggested that these paired relationships were schismogenic
with dependency promoting nurturance, and vice versa.
Using this typology, not of persons, but of processes, Bateson
experimented with effects generated by these processes, i.e., what
happens when symmetrical rivalry (leading to excessive competition) was
mixed with complementary dependency-nurturance? The results of the
interactions between these processes proved to be mutually negating,
i.e., have mutually opposite effects on relationship. Therefore, when
complementary (dominance-submission) has gone too far, a little compe-
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tit ion relieves the strain; and, when competition goes too far, a
little dependency is a comfort. In summary, there is an alternation
between classification and the description of the process. There is
an alternative ladder from description of persons (typing) which leads
back to the study of process by which persons got that way. These
processes are then classified into types of processes leading from the
typing of process to the study of the interactions between classified
processes. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
The point of Bateson's example, therefore, is to illustrate that
taking the concept of "logical typing" out of abstract mathematical
logic and using it to map real biological events onto hierarchies we
encounter in mental and biological systems that hierarchies are not
only lists of classes, classes of classes, and classes of classes of
classes, but has become a zigzag ladder of form and process. Bateson
further suggests that perception and learning follow such a zigzag
model. In addition, the relation between somatic and phylogenetic
change and the relation between the random and the selected have the
same zigzag form. Similar relations obtain between continuity and dis-
continuity and between number and quantity. Therefore, this zigzag
relationship may possibly resolve a large number of puzzles in the
fields of ethics, education and evolutionary theory.
Bateson uses another illustration of calibration-feedback as
synonymous with form-process. It will be helpful to present several
examples of calibration-feedback to clarify the relation between two
levels of structure mediated by an intervening description of
process
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FORM PROCESS
of interaction
Interaction
between themes
Interactions
determining
typology
Description of
actions
Figure 5. Levels of analysis of a New Guinea culture.
(Bateson, 1979)
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because this is the analogue in the real world of Russell and
Whitehead’s abstract step from class to class of classes. The illus-
trations, therefore, should help to clarify the relationship between
higher and lower logical type and its significance for understanding
"time. '*
Bateson uses an example based upon Harst Mittelstaldt
' s (1960)
work suggesting two methods of perfecting an adaptive act. The first
involves an act of shooting a bird with a rifle. There is the sighting
of the rifle correcting for errors by immediate feedback. The import-
ance is the act of self-correction occurring within the single act of
shooting; therefore, the concept of "feedback" is used to characterize
this method of perfecting an adaptive act. The second method involves
a man shooting a flying bird with a shotgun. Error correction in the
single act is limited; improvement requires that correction be performed
upon a large class of actions. He must practice over and over again,
shooting skeet, etc. which adjusts his nerves and muscles to a point
where an optimum performance is automatic. Mittelstaldt refers to this
method as "calibration." Thus, self-correction in using a shotgun
comes from information based on practice — from a class of completed,
past actions. The relation of "calibration" to "feedback" is as a
higher logical type is related to a lower. The contrast of logical
typing is the contrast between a single instance and a class of
instances. "Calibration", therefore, is comparable to "form" and
"feedback" to "process."
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An example of the hierarchic relation between feedback and cali-
bration IS illustrated by the temperature control in a house equipped
with a furnace, thermostat, and a human being.
Figure 6 summarizes levels of temperature control.
CALIBRATION FEEDBACK
Personal
status
Genetics and
training of
person
Figure 6. Levels of Control of House Temperature. The
arrows mark the direction of control. (Bateson, 1979)
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The temperature variation (a process) at the lowest level
affects a thermometer that is connected to the system which breaks an
electric connection (a calibration) that controls the furnace. This
simple, servo circuit will have the temperature of the house oscillate
between two set threshold points. This feedback circuit is controlled
by a calibration that sets the thermostat to different temperatures
(bias). The owner will judge from his experiences the temperature
range most suitable to him. This bias (the calibration of the feedback)
is also governed by feedback from the sense organs of the owner.
His "bias” or "threshold" is set by a feedback system based on his
experiences or wishes. For example, he may become calibrated to become
more tolerant of cold as a result of hardship or mere lack of oil sup-
plies. The feedbacks and calibrations alternate, therefore, in a hier-
archic sequence. The sphere of relevance increases with each completed
alternation. At the lowest level, the furnace was ON or OFF; at the
next level of the ladder, an oscillation around a set temperature of the
house. At the third level, the sphere of relevance increases to include
the owner. Thus, with each zigzag of the ladder, there is a change in
logical typing of the information collected by the sense organ at each
level
.
Bateson provides a more relevant example of a driver of an automo-
bile traveling at 70 miles per hour triggering the radar (sense organ)
of a traffic policeman. The "bias" of the policeman is set at a dif-
ference greater than 10 miles above speed limit. His "bias" was set by
the police chief who acted on orders, i.e., calibration, from the state
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capitol. The capitol acted self-correct ively with the legislator's
eyes on their voters. The voters also set a "calibration" within the
legislature in favor of either Democratic or Republican policy. The
alternating ladder of calibration and feedback moves up to larger
spheres of relevance and more abstract information and wider decision.
The significant aspect of this example within the system of police
and law enforcement — and in all hierarchies — is the undesirability
of having direct contact between levels that are nonconsecutive. It is
not desirable for the organization to have a direct line of communica-
tion between the driver and the state police chief. This line of com-
munication creates a bad morale problem for the police force. In turn,
it is not desirable for the policeman to have direct access to the
legislature, which then undermines the authority of the police chief.
To jump down two or more steps in the hierarchy is also unwise.
Thus, it is unwise to have the policeman have direct control over the
accelerator of the car. The jumping of logical levels in legal and
administrative systems is called ex post facto legislation. In genet-
ics, the Weissmannian barrier prevents the direct influence from the
somatic state to the genetic structure and, therefore, prevents the
disasters that could occur if the hierarchy of organization within the
organism were destroyed.
The comparison of "learning" to shoot with a rifle and "learning
to shoot with a shotgun poses some problems for the hierarchy of
logical types. IVhile both learnings involve cybernetic circular,
causal and feedback sequences, there is an important difference.
The
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man with the rifle has immediate feedback and does not need to change
himself as does the man with the shotgun. The whole operation of
aiming-and-firing is a single act that must be carried forward to the
next firing. The nonverbal, kinesthetic information gained results in
a change in himself. The key difference, therefore, is that the rifle-
man goes around his feedback circuit a number of separate times; the
man with a shotgun must accumulate his skill over successive experiences.
The issue that Bateson raises is the relation between calibration
and feedback. Is there such an alternation in the world of adaptive
action and is it also characteristic of mental processes? Bateson
observes that some typologists would prefer to believe that the world
is primarily dominated by calibration (normative psychometritions)
;
there are others who see only process or feedback. The resolution sug-
gested by Bateson depends on the concept of "time" as is the resolution
of Russell's paradoxes of abstraction by the introduction of time.
Bateson (1979) states:
...the system of thermostatic control of the temperature of
the house and the system of law enforcement are necessarily
discontinuous for reasons connected with "time." If any
event is to depend upon some characteristic of a multiple
sample of some species of event, time must elapse for the
accumulation of that sample, and this elapsed time will
punctuate the dependent event to produce a discontinuity.
But, of course, there would be no such "samples" in a world
of purely physical causation. Samples are artifacts of
description, creatures of mind, and shapes of mental process.
A world of senses, organization, and communication is not
conceivable without discontinuity, without threshold. If
sense organs can receive news only of difference, and if
neurons either fire or do not fire, then threshold becomes
necessarily a feature of how the living and mental world is
put together. (p. 202).
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A paradigm raises legitimate problems that need to be converted
into puzzle form with the likelihood of solution. Bateson accomplishes
this by providing a possible solution to a range of problems translated
into puzzle form. Of his six criteria of "mind", the most important
possible solution to understanding hierarchic organization is his
insight of applying Russell and Whitehead's logical typing to real
world phenomena of biology and mind. More specifically, it makes an
important contribution to Anisa for it helps to clarify a number of
conceptual, within paradigm, issues.
There are clear parallels between Bateson's concepts of "cali-
bration" and "feedback" and Jordan's operationalized concept of
"management" and "leadership" or, in other terms, the dynamic balance
between "order" and "novelty." The contribution that Bateson makes is
to show how this zigzag process operates by introducing "time" to
handle the discontinuity as change leads to a higher hierarchic level
(logical typing)
.
Unity of genetics and learning: stochastic systems . Learning, as
defined by Anisa, is the key to the release of psychological poten-
tialities, allowing man to take charge of his own as well as direct
his phylogenetic destiny. Because of the Weissmannian barrier between
somatic and genetic change, for example, the role of learning in rela-
tionship to evolution raises questions. Bateson appears to have
worked through some of the problems by showing how two stochastic
systems, working at different levels of logical typing, fit together
into a necessary unity. This unity combines the stochastic system
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within the individual, which is called "learning"; the other is in
heredity and in populations and is called "evolution."
Bateson (1979) defines the meaning of stochastic. (Greek:
stachazein — to shoot with a bow at a target; that is, to scatter
events in a partially random manner, some of which achieve a preferred
outcome.) "If a sequence of events combines a random component with a
selective process so that only certain outcomes of the random are
allowed to endure, that sequence is said to be stochastic."
No system can produce anything new unless the system contains some
source of the random; this is true both for computers and living
systems. Thus, creative systems are divergent; events that are predict-
able are convergent. Divergence is a potential source of either dis-
order or innovation. Our limited biosphere is determined by two inter-
locking stochastic processes which are changing. The rate of change,
however, is limited by three factors: (a) the Weissmannian barrier
between somatic and genetic change ensures that the somatic adjustments
shall not rashly become irreversible; (b) in every generation, sexual
reproduction provides a guarantee that the DNA blueprint of the new
shall not conflict outrageously with the blueprint of the old, a form
of natural selection of the level of DNA regardless of what the deviant
new blueprint may mean to the phenotype; and (c) epigenesis operates as
a convergent and conservative system — the developing embryo is, within
itself, a context of selection favoring conservation.
There are two stochastic systems, according to Bateson, that com-
bine to determine the larger total system we call evolution.
Each sub-
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system has two components — a random component and a process of
selection working on the products of the random component. For the
first stochastic system, the random component is internal: genetic
change through mutation or reshuffling of genes in population. It is
assumed that mutation is nonresponsive to environmental demand. The
eggs are generally protected from the external environmental dangers.
The second stochastic system is concerned with external adapta-
tion; the random component is related to the interaction of the pheno-
type with the environment. A particular acquired characteristic pro-
duced in response to a given environmental change may be predictable.
For example, if a food supply is limited, metabolizing the organism's
own fat will result with loss of weight. Prediction of particular
change is also possible within the environment; thus, change in climate
may reduce the biomass for some species. Bateson emphasizes that
together there is an unpredictability; neither organism nor environment
contains information about what the other will do next. There is,
nevertheless, a selective component present which is somatic change
evolved by habit that is adaptive. In essence, the combination of
phenotype and environment constitute the random component of the
stochastic system that proposes change; the genotype disposes by allow-
ing some changes and precluding others. The key concept is that
genetics sets the limits of somatic change.
The genome of the individual contains the potentials for change,
providing storage for alternative pathways of adaptation. Many
alternative pathways are not used and remain invisible in any given
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organism. The gene pool of the population is usually heterogeneous,
providing a bank of alternative genetic pathways that the population
can take under pressure of selection. Dobzhansky documented that the
unit of evolution is the population. It is the population that
responds to environmental pressures. The individual has the capacity
for adaptive somatic change, but the population, by selective mortal-
ity, undergoes change which is transmitted to the next generations.
The potentiality for somatic change is the object of selection; environ-
mental selection acts on populations.
How do each of these two stochastic systems contribute to the
total process of evolution? First, in both the selective component
gives direction to the changes that will be ultimately incorporated.
There is a time frame that differs between the two stochastic proces-
ses. The first stage of genetic change is conservative since the new
DNA in random genetic change is in existence from fertilization but
may not effect external adaptation until later. This internal selec-
tion first evident in cytological processes, e.g., dance of the
chromosomes, mitochondria, etc., shows very deep formal patterns
shared by all cellular organisms. With respect to the theory of reca-
pitulation, therefore, the expectation is that embryos will resemble
in formal pattern the embryos of ancestral forms more closely than
formal patterns of adults will resemble those of ancestral adults.
Bateson observes that this differs from Haeckel's and Herbert Spencer's
view that embryology has to follow the pathway of phylogeny. Bateson's
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concept holds that deviation from the beginning of the pathway is
less probable than from later states.
The machinery of change, therefore, is not permissive nor
creative but shows a determination where changes that do occur are
members of a class of changes for that particular machinery. Thus, the
system of random genetic change is filtered by the selective process of
internal viability giving to phylogeny a pervasive homology. This
process within the genetic subsystem could be considered as analogous
to Jordan's concept of differentiation and integration operative at
this biological level.
In considering the other stochastic system, Bateson arrives at a
different view. He notes that no learning nor somatic change can
directly affect DNA, but that somatic changes are, nevertheless, usually
adaptive. The individual may initially pant at high altitude but the
individual can learn to adjust his physiological system to permit him
to stay at the high altitude. The adjustment may immediately reduce the
stress through acclimation but may be nonintegrative in the long run.
Somatic adjustment, therefore, creates a context for genetic change, but
whether genetic change follows remains a question.
Bateson speculates on the spectriim of what possibilities somatic
change can achieve with this stochastic component of evolution. The
most significant aspect, he observes, is related to all somatic changes
as quantitative or "analogic." In man, the nervous system and DNA are
largely "digital" but his physiology is analogic. Digital is simply
defined as a discontinuity between one signal and an alternative, thus.
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for example, ’’yes” and ’’no" are digital signals. An analogic signal
is present when a quantity in a signal is used to represent a continu-
ously variable quantity. The random genetic changes of the first sto-
chastic process are essentially digital; the somatic changes are
solely analogic or quantitative. Since quantity does not determine
pattern, the difference is significant. At a deep epistemological
level, Bateson notes, the contrast between digital and analogic is
sharp; this discontinuity is a fundamental barrier between the somatic
and the genetic.
Bateson then shows how the double stochastic system of biological
evolution is also characteristic of thought. Instead of a Platonic
prime mover hiding in the machinery of evolutionary processes, Bateson
holds that "thought" is also stochastic. Creative thought must always
contain a random component — the trial and error of mental progress.
The new can only be achieved by trying pathways randomly presented,
some of which when tried are selected and survive.
Since thought is stochastic, there should be a binary division of
thought processes that will also be stochastic in both halves with the
random component of one half, digital and the random component of the
other, analogic. Bateson considers the first as the selection proces-
ses that govern the outcome. He illustrates the two principal modes
of testing thoughts; the first simply being a test of coherence. Does
the new idea make sense in terms of what is already believed? The
parallel of this process in the brain is close to the stochastic pro-
cess of random genetic change wherein an internal selection process
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works for conformity between the new and old. As discussed above, the
contrast between epigenesis and creative evolution, in epigenesis all
new information is kept out and serves as a critical filter requiring
definite standards of conformity. Bateson maintains that in the pro-
cess of thought, there is a similar filter requiring definite standards
of conformity resembling logic — the building up of tautology to
create theorems. Rigor for thought is the analogue of internal coher-
ence in evolution. The stochastic system of thought (learning), there-
fore, resembles that component of evolution in which random genetic
changes are selected by epigenesis.
The other process of thought involves the brain and the environ-
ment. This is analogous to the process of evolution concerned with
adaptation — somatic changes and environment. In learning, as in
somatic change, there are limits and facilitations that select what can
be learned. Some are internal and others external to the organism.
What can be learned at any given time is related to what has been
previously learned. There is also a learning to learn with some
ultimate genetic limitation to what can be immediately changed in
response to environmental demands.
Bateson puts the two stochastic processes together by showing the
formal relationship that exists between the two. The primary rela-
tionship is shown by the contrast between the digital and the analogic
or between the "name” and the "process" that is named. He observes;
But naming is itself a process and one that occurs not only
in our analyses but profoundly and significantly within the
systems we attempt to analyze. Whatever the coding and
mechanical relation between DNA and the phenotype, DNA is
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still in some way a body of injunctions demanding — and
in this sense, naming — the relations which shall become
apparent in the phenotype (p. 184).
By introducing naming as a phenomena instrumental in the organiza-
tion of what we study, hierarchies of logical typing become necessary.
Russell and Whitehead's abstract logic becomes useful but their empty
hierarchy of names or classes is now filled, coping with the inter-
action of digital (naming) and analogic steps. As noted above, the
process of naming is nameable which permits an alternation for the
simple ladder of logical types developed in the Principia .
Bateson recombines the two stochastic systems of both evolution
and thought process by seeing the two as alternating. It differs from
Russell and Whitehead's ladder made of steps that are all alike; it
becomes an alternation of the two species of steps. To get from the
name to the name of the name, one goes through the process of naming
the name. There is a generative process, therefore, wherein the
classes are created before they are named.
Bateson's concept is consistent with the organismic paradigm.
Therefore, differences that exist are reconcilable: he converts the
fact of change into a puzzle form that has the possibility of being
solved. The solution, which integrates change at both the individual
and evolutionary levels, involves stochastic processes. The additional
significance of this solution is that it appears to solve the problem
of hierarchic organization required by the organismic paradigm. The
key to this possible resolution is the application of Russell and
Whitehead's logical typing. Anisa is concerned with change through the
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release of biological and psychological potentiality into actuality
at an optimum rate. Bateson's stochastic processes at the genetic
(biological) and thought (psychological) levels integrate these two
levels as well as providing a zigzag process between form and process
(calibration-feedback) to account for hierarchic organization.
Reciprocal causation, emergent phenomena, discontinuity, and time.
These issues were discussed in Chapter III by contrasting the differ-
ences between the mechanistic and organismic explanations of these
phenomena. Again, as noted in Chapter III, there may be differences
among a family of theories within a paradigm but these differences are
reconcilable. While a paradigm raises legitimate problems that can be
converted into puzzle form, the puzzle solution is a within-paradigm
issue. Thus, different theorists working within the organismic per-
spective are still grappling with these problems and converting them
into puzzle form. At this early stage of paradigm development, there
is no consensus on the rules and procedures for puzzle solution.
Jordan deals with causation by maintaining that both efficient
and final causes must be present to provide the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for understanding development. Reciprocal causation
a circular, causal, and feedback process — is also operative rather
than a simple linear, unidirectional causation. The central problem
of Greek philosophy — the problem of purpose, teleology
— came within
the possibility of solution with the development of cybernetics
and
systems theory where self-corrective circuits provided a
model of
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adaptive actions for organisms. This issue continues as a problem
''^i^hin the organismic paradigm, i.e., is final cause necessary or can
the cybernetic circular causation account for the phenomena.
The problems of reciprocal causation, emergent phenomena, discon-
tinuity, and time will be discussed with heavy reliance on Bateson’s
latest synthesis. The cybernetic concept of circular, causal, feed-
back, and self-correcting systems is a relatively simple idea.
Although the concept was recognized as early as James Watts’ invention
of the governor for the steam engine in the eighteenth century, Clark
Maxwell's mathematical analysis of the governor of a steam engine
(1868) and Bernard’s homeostasis, the major breakthrough came with
Norbert Wiener, et al. (1943) following World War II. The shift in
assumption from the Second Law of Thermodynamics (entropy) to negative
entropy gave rise to information, communication, and general systems
theories leading to what has been referred to as the "second industrial
revolution." Application of these concepts at the physical hardware
level has been most productive.
Bateson points out several problems that were encountered by the
early inventors in attempting to understand self-correcting circuits.
In designing the governor for the early steam engine, for example,
there was no theoretical base for predicting how it would run. (Would
it go into runaway, exponentially maximizing speed until breakdown or
slow down and stop?) Clark Maxwell worked out formal mathematical
equations dealing with relations between variables at each step around
the circuit but these did not predict the outcome. Maxwell discovered
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that the engineers had failed to take into account time. Every
system has relations to time, and these time-constants are determined
by the whole . The constants are not determined by equations of rela-
tionships between successive parts but are emergent properties of the
system.
To illustrate, Bateson uses the example of the engine running
smoothly and then encountering a hill. There are immediate changes;
the velocity of the flywheel falls off, the governor spins slower, and
more fuel is injected in the cylinder resulting in increased speed.
The significance is that the whole process occurs in time. In attempt-
ing to describe the events as though one were inside the circuit, it
would be described as a change in A determines a change in B, etc. In
a description of the event, however, there is a change in syntax. The
description now compares change with change, using the result of that
comparison to account for the next step. There is a change in what is
being described. It is analogous to the difference between the language
a physicist would use in describing how one variable acts upon another
and talking about the increases or decreases of the circuit as a whole
in another language.
This change in discourse reflects what Bateson refers to as a
change in logical typing. The questions the engineers posed to Clark
Maxwell were about the circuit as a whole and they expected the answers
to be in terms of relations between the indiviaual variables. This is
quite analogous to the questions educational researchers raise under
the mechanistic paradigm and the kind of answer they consider accept-
\
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able. What is needed is an answer in terms of the time-constants of
the total circuit. This is the bridge between the two levels of dis-
course, the variables at one level of discourse disappear at tne next
nigner or lower level.
Another example is the word switch or relay where what goes
through is energized from a source that is different from the energy
source which operates the switch. Thus, the switch exists only at
moments of its change which has a special relation to time. Switch is
more closely related to the concept of "change” than an "object."
Bateson (1979) states:
The truth of the matter is that every circuit of causation
in the whole of biology, in our physiology, in our thinking,
our neural processes, our homeostasis, and in the ecologi-
cal and cultural systems of which we are parts — every
such circuit conceals or proposes those paradoxes and con-
fusions that accompany errors and distortions in logical
typing (p. 109).
However, with respect to systems involving circular causation, it
is possible for systems with positive gain to go into a runaway creat-
ing escalating or vicious circles. In Bateson's example of symmetrical
interchanges, as presented above, if on a psychological level person A
exhibits competitive behavior it makes it more likely that B will
exhibit the same behavior, leading to progressive escalation or a run-
away. The positive gain at each interchange coupled with adequate
metabolic energy can destroy the system in greed, rage, etc. It is
notable that it takes relatively little energy for a person to destroy
others or the integration of a system. Some runaway systems, however,
contain negative links for their own correction; for example, a popula-
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tion explosion might self-correct in the form of epidemics, war,
or planned social programs
.
There is no systematic knowledge of the dynamics of these proces-
ses although ecology as a science appears to be a beginning. Bateson
observes that neither random genetic change coupled with natural
selection nor trial and error in thought coupled with selective rein-
forcement will necessarily work for the good of either the species or
the individual. Also, inventions or stratagems that are rewarding for
the individual may not necessarily have survival value for the group.
Equally true, policies that the group might prefer may not necessarily
have survival value for individuals.
In explicating the above, Bateson suggests a number of patterns
that lead to disasters. The following are examples; (1) a species is
so well adapted that by overgrazing it will destroy its ecological
niche; (2) what appears desirable in the short term is a disaster over
the long term; (3) a group acts as if it is no longer partially depend-
ent on neighboring groups; and (4) a group becomes addicted and tries
to hold constant the same rate of change (e.g., armaments races are
similar to individual drug addiction) . The essence of these disasters
is found to contain an error in logical typing. Immediate gain at one
logical level is reversed and becomes a disaster in a larger context.
Donald T. Campbell’s (1975) illustration of the selfish-altruism
continuum wherein the selfish needs of the individual spell disaster
in the long range for the social group is a good example. E. 0.
Wilson
(1975) cites numerous examples from studies of ants, termites,
and bees
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where the selfless altruistic acts of some result in disaster for the
individual organism but have survival value for the colony or hive.
It is notable to point out the contrast between the organismic
and mechanistic perspectives in dealing with the phenomena (facts) of
change, causation, hierarchic organization (wholes), emergent phenomena,
continuity, and time. The organismic paradigm subsmnes efficient
causation but handles phenomena involving reciprocal causes. While the
mechanistic paradigm precludes the possibility that the universal
machine has emergent qualities of novelty, these phenomena are primary
concerns for understanding organismic processes. Clark Maxwell's
experience with designing the governor of a steam engine illustrates
the difference between the mechanistic reductionist position and the
organismic position of the whole being more than the sum of the parts.
The hierarchic organization takes into account non-linear circular or
reciprocal causation and not merely the unidirectional linear causation
which occurs within an absolute time concept. Organismic structures
are hierarchically organized based upon emergent qualities that require
time and a discontinuity between levels, i.e., higher levels are quali-
tatively different from the lower and the new whole cannot be under-
stood by the interaction of the individual parts alone.
These contrasts with the mechanistic paradigm clearly represent a
different world view with different presuppositions concerning the basic
facts of how the universe operates. There are differences, however,
between some organismic theoretical concepts presented by Bateson and
Jordan. It is notable, again, that such differences pose a higher
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probability of being reconciled because they are within-paradigm dif-
ferences than the futile attempts at reconciling paradigm differences.
VVhile it is beyond the scope of this study to reconcile these differ-
ences, some will be presented to help clarify the problems and convert
them into puzzle form which may result in a solution by others.
It will be desirable to contrast the two approaches to change,
showing areas of divergence and convergence. Jordan’s first principle
deals with the universal constant of change. Since change presupposes
potentiality, the primary concern is how potentiality is actualized.
Process is the means toward that end which is determined by the quality
of interaction with the several environments. Since we have the active
organism in contrast to the mechanistic reactive organism, subjective
aim and final cause are inherent givens. To the degree that man is
freed from efficient cause (instinct), he is able, through learning, to
take greater charge of determining his own ontological as well as
phylogenetic destiny. Since learning (the conscious ability to differ-
entiate, integrate, and generalize experience) is the key factor, Anisa
would need to account for changes in the genetic (DNA) biological pro-
cesses. While differentiation and integration do occur at the DNA
level, the more precise understanding of how is yet to be developed.
The Weismannian barrier, for example, poses a problem.
With respect to direction of change, Anisa holds to the view that
there is purpose or final cause. Translated into other terms, it is
closely analogous to the concept of negative entropy (the universe is
an open system with process that tends toward organized complexity)
.
/ /
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Negative entropy also presupposes circular, causal, and self-correcting
feedback processes. It would appear that Bateson works through some of
these problems of change in ways most congenial to Anisa but extending
their scope. For example, Bateson unifies epigenesis (learning) and
evolution (genetics) by showing, at the deeper level, how they are
related to the twin components of the second law of thermodynamics.
The random workings of probability always eat up order or pattern
(negative entropy); to create a new pattern, a large number of uncom-
mitted random alternatives (entropy) is necessary. Tlie combining of
the two stochastic systems of evolution and mental thought (which fol-
lovtf an alternation of two species of steps — logical typing) is
briefly how Bateson deals with change. These stochastic processes also
deal with hierarchic organization, emergent phenomena, discontinuity,
and time. It is patently clear how this view of the universe differs
from the mechanistic with its linearity, objectivity, control, predic-
tion, and quantification. The parallel with Anisa regarding man’s being
largely freed from efficient causes, able to make conscious choices in
determining his own future, is found in the stochastic processes where
selection is made from the random.
An oversimplified interpretation of Anisa ’s concept of final cause
could lead to an over-optimistic view of man taking charge of the
direction of evolution toward some ultimate goal of perfection. Bateson
cautions — and it is most important for a theory of evaluation — man
is capable of making choices that could lead to a runaway or escalating
vicious circles that could be disastrous for the system. In addition.
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some choices may have short-term advantage for the individual but
long-term disaster for the group viewed at a different level of logical
typing. Survival, therefore, is not guaranteed. If this is how nature
works, a paradigm theory of evaluation should map these processes on-
going, short, and long-term — with data from various hierarchic levels
within a system and related interdependent systems. In fact, to
increase the probability and quality of survival, great effort should
be devoted to developing the most systematic and sophisticated theory
of evaluation for making the best choices (decisions) for the individual
and group, both for short-term and long-term planning and decision-
making.
The present focus has been on conceptual issues; these were primar-
ily centered on the Anisa first principles. Concern with the presuppo-
sitions of a new paradigm is the first order of business for such pre-
suppositions are the fundamental postulation of how nature works. For
Newton it was matter in motion from which followed his terrestrial and
celestial laws of mechanics. From the first principles of Anisa, the
theories of development, pedagogy, curriculum, administration, and
evaluation were deduced. It is beyond the scope of this study to deal
exhaustively with many of the specific issues related to each of the
respective theories. Dealing with the fundamental issues should,
through a deductive process, lead to a clarification of many problems
and further articulation of theory.
Bateson, for example, deals with the fundamental issue of change
within an organismic paradigm as a combination of two stochastic pro-
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cesses operating at the levels of evolution and thought. While Watson
and Crick saw a double helix organization in DNA, Bateson sees a zig-
zag alternating process of form and process operating at different
levels of logical typing that explain how hierarchic organismic struc-
tures emerge. If this organismic view is isomorphic with how nature
works, it contributes further clarity to Anisa, particularly the con-
cepts of hierarchic organization based on logical typing. The direct
application to Anisa relies on the process of learning which could be
modified to incorporate Bateson's thinking. Differentiation would be
considered as one level of logical typing; integration taking place at
a higher level; and generalization emerging at still a higher organiza-
tional level. Inherent in this process are the factors of discontin-
uity related to time which account for the emergence of a new hier-
archically organized whole that is more than the sum of the parts.
Having arrived at this level of generalization — Anisa refers to this
as a sensitive period — when the random and selective aspects of the
stochastic processes will operate.
The Anisa Master Teachers' understanding of these developmental
processes should give them an appreciation of the kinds of environments
they should arrange — including the random (novelty) — as they guide
the interactions. They should have a greater understanding of errors
of logical typing; and appreciate the discontinuity of experience that
requires time for hierarchic development, following the zigzag process
of calibration (stability) and process (change) . Other more specific
applications to each of the Anisa theories can be deduced; for example.
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analogous processes, operative at the social level of institutional
development, are found in the Anisa concepts of administration related
to leadership (change) and management (calibration) as they operate in
hierarchic organizations.
There is, however, an area of divergence concerning basic con-
ceptual issues. Bateson suggests — but only suggests — that the
central problem of Greek philosophy, the problem of purpose which has
been unsolved for 2,500 years, may be resolved along his conceptual
lines of thinking. It appears to resolve the Platonic form (mind) and
matter’ (body) dichotomy somewhat parallel to the first organismic
thinker, Aristotle with his concept of "in rebus." It took the genius
of St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century to appreciate Aris-
totle's "in rebus" concept as useful in resolving the theological
problem of three-in-one found in the father, the son, and the holy
ghost. Aquinas, rather than refuting Aristotle, which was his charge,
found his ideas useful. The issue that Bateson raises concerning the
resolution of the problems of final cause — mostly for mechanistic
science — needs to be dealt with more systematically. It is presently
divergent with Anisa, but further exploration of this and related
problems is merited. There is a wide range of conceptual problems that
need to be identified and resolved by that emerging community of
scientists committed to the organismic paradigm.
CHAPTER VI
IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTRUMENTATION
Norm
-Referenced Tests: Problems and Issues
The mechanistic paradigm converted the problems of measurement,
instrumentation, and cjuantification into puzzle forms that were solved by
the rules and procedures developed for the objective-normative tests
based upon Fisher's statistical Unit Normal Curve. It is, again, notable
that these procedures can be employed for limited purposes within the
organism paradigm, e.g., components of research designs, cross-sectional
measures, etc., for they can be subsumed as special cases under the
organismic paradigm.
In brief, the underlying assumption for Fisher's Normal Curve holds
that given traits or characteristics (e.g., intelligence, achievement,
interests, etc.) are randomly distributed in the population. The mathe-
matical models used to quantify are primarily statistical based on a nor-
mal distribution. Psychometric rules and procedures for validity, relia-
bility, and, particularly, objectivity have been refined over the last
three quarters of a century. They are consistent with the mechanistic
view which attempts to isolate efficient causes involving independent and
dependent variables with the goals of objectivity, control, prediction,
and quantification. IVhile the normative, standardized tests have been
remarkably successful in achieving these goals, they are only valid with-
in the parameters of the mechanistic paradigm or as special cases in the
organismic.
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Objectivity was obtained by creating test items which were then ad-
ministered to a random sample of a given population. This empirical pro-
cedure was then statistically quantified which permitted the objective
comparison of an individual's test performance with some normative ref-
erence group, indicating where the specific individual placed in relatioi
to the normal distribution. In order to assure greater objectivity, the
same standardized instructions were used in the administration of the
tests. For an instrument to be psychometrically acceptable, validity
and reliability studies were conducted. Predictive validity, for example,
was largely related to the instrument being able to predict either in the
universe assuming that traits once identified are immutable, thereby mak-
ing prediction possible. The reductionist position was maintained and
through ingenuity of design, further refinement of psychometric proce-
dures was theoretically possible.
The rules and procedures for this puzzle solution are now inappro-
priate given a paradigm shift. The Anisa paradigm, therefore, poses new
problems requiring different solutions. The organismic phenomena
(facts) that are now the focus of measurement differ significantly from
the mechanistic. The concerns are now the measurement of change in the
individual and group over time and not merely cross-sectional measures.
Measures of hierarchically organized, dynamic complexities learning
to learn — involving newly emergent phenomena pose significant diffi-
culties that need to be converted into puzzle form. Some possible solu-
tions developed by Feuerstein (1979) will be presented below. It
is
desirable, however, to put into perspective the role of normative
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psychometrics and the Anisa paradigm. This is a further elaboration of
the topic discussed in Chapter III which should now help toward putting
some of the pieces- of the puzzle into a form that could lead to a solu-
tion.
There is an analogy between (1) the paradigm shift from Newton's
mechanics to Einstein's general theory of relativity and (2) the norma-
tive testing and Anisa theory. The parallel can best be shown by the
shift in underlying assumptions of the respective theories. Thus, the
underlying assiomption of Newton's theory is that the natural state of
matter is at rest. His theories were concerned with explaining matter
in motion. Given the underlying assumption of matter being stationary
unless a force (efficient cause) either directly or at a distance acts
upon it, Newton was able to use Euclidean geometry as the mathematical
symbol system to quantify his laws of matter in motion. His terrestial
and celestial laws still remain valid for matter moving at speeds less
than the speed of light and serve as the basis for current engineering,
including our remarkable space program.
The above is quite analogous to the development of normative psycho-
metrics. The underlying assumption holds that certain traits (e.g. in-
telligence, achievement, etc.) are randomly distributed in the popula-
tion. The mathematical symbol system used to quantify the data is Fish-
er's statistics, described earlier. The testing technology that has
resulted has had great impact upon both psychology and education. Des-
pite some of its limitations cited earlier, the scientific respectabil-
ity of normative measures in the behavioral sciences still dominates
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training and practice. Its mathematical base and resultant technology
make it comparable to Newton’s use of Euclid’s geometry while its face-
validity is manifest in a significant engineering technology. The
training of psycologists and educators solely within the mechanistic
paradigm further legitimizes this view of reality, and it would be
professional suicide to wholly abandon the paradigm. The mechanistic
paradigm will continue to dominate professional training and practice
with its view of reality until a new paradigm develops new solutions.
Many are intuitively aware of mechanistic limitations, including the
legal and ethical problems involved in applying testing technology.
Einstein dealt with the anomalies of Newtonian physics by essen-
tially shifting an assumption from the natural state of matter being
at rest to the natural state being in motion. Einstein had to use
Riemann’s geometry as the symbol system to conceptually account for
his hyphenated space-time and matter-energy concept of reality. It
did not disprove Newton’s terrestial and celestial laws based on Eu-
clid’s geometry but made them a special case within his larger general
theory of relativity which presents a very different view of nature.
This process is analogous to the assumption underlying normative
testing where a random process (entropy) is operative and Fisher’s
statistics serves as the mathematical symbol system. Within an organ-
ismic paradigm, there is a shift in assumption (negative entropy)
where an organized complexity is operative. To this writer’s know-
ledge, there is no known or at least accepted mathematical symbol sys-
tem that can deal with organized complexities. The organismic para-
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digra highlights the problem which is a necessary first step to possible
solution. Kuhn observes that a new paradigm may intuitively point the
direction for a solution to a puzzle before refined rules and procedures
are developed. Thus, quantification may follow rather than necessarily
preceeding a solution. There have been attempts at quantification of
the problem using ipsative, non-parametric, and Bayesian statistics,
for example. These approaches, however, still rely on assumptions con-
cerning statistical groupings or distribution.
Just as Fisher’s Unit Normal Curve provided the mathematical base
for the entire spectrum of normative standardized testing, it would be
highly desirable to have a mathematical system to underpin a testing
technology which could measure longitudinal changes in the individual.
The computer sciences are providing digital and analogical systems that
may prove helpful. Here, digital refers to number and analogic refers
to quantity. A combination of these two are probably required to map
real world phenomena. As noted above, DNA and neurological processes
are digital. A neuron either fires or does not. Physiological somatic
processes are analogic.
Beyond the mathematical issues, computer technology provides a
means even at the teacher level for gathering observational data on
each individual, storing it, and having immediate retrieval. This may
prove to be a viable first step in dealing with measurement of longi-
tudinal change in the individual. The data would be the result of par-
ticipant observation (reciprocal causation) where the data are shared
with the individual for mutual decision-making as the teacher guides
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the quality of interaction in releasing potentialities. It could follow
the model suggested by Bateson: form to process or calibration to feed-
back in the zigzag, alternating steps of hierarchic levels — logical
typing.
Current thinking, both in physics and behavioral sciences lean to-
ward some form of statistical mathematics. While mechanistic science
holds in principle that everything is predictable and controllable given
enough knowledge, this concept is viewed as untenable under the organ-
ismic paradigm. Prediction and control are impossible even at the
physical level such as breaking a glass or predicting when and what
molecule will be the first to go in boiling water. Even in the Brownian
movement of molecules, knowledge of what may happen at a given moment
does not provide data to predict what would happen next. As Bateson
has pointed out, there is a big difference between statements about an
identified individioal — person or molecule — and statements about a
class. These statements are of a different logical type with predic-
tion from one to the other always uncertain. Bateson observes that the
statement, "The liquid is boiling", is of a different logical type
from, "That particular molecule will be the first to go". Prediction
of the movement of planets or chemical reactions which involve aggre-
gates of billions of molecules are possible because the description of
the subject matter involves large classes of molecules or individuals.
The value to science of statistics rests on this understanding that
statistical statements refer only to classes or aggregates, not to
individuals
.
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As a practicing psychologist, I have frequently committed this
error in logical typing by predicting the behavior of a given individual
based on normative data, appropriate only for a larger class. This is
an important insight for understanding and using standardized tests.
The problem of evaluating the longitudinal development of a given indiv-
idual through some form of quantifiable measurement still remains.
While a variety of instruments have been developed for clinical evalua-
tion of the individual, e.g., Rorschach, Thematic Apperception Test,
etc., none has been as elegant and productive as the normative tests
with their excellent mathematical underpinning. It would be highly
desirable to have such a mathematical base for the development and
growth of a new testing technology for evaluating organismic processes.
At the most speculative and hopeful level, the answer may be
found along the lines that Einstein was pursuing. As presented in
Chapter III, Einstein did not hold to a statistical view of the uni-
verse — most current physicists differ — but felt that behind hap-
hazard appearance, there was a domain of constraints which had a non-
statistical basis, hence his statement that God did not play dice with
the universe.
While it appears almost imperative to have a mathematical system
as a basis for developing a new testing technology to measure changes
in the individual over time, that is a problem which may have to be
left for future generations. In the interim, there, nevertheless,
are
insights into new rules and procedures from the organismic
approach
that may be fruitful for practitioners. These should help
in dealing
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with some of the measutement anomalies — the counterinstances found
with normative measures.
Moral and ethical concerns have evolved from the development and
use of normative tests; the organismic approach may help to resolve
these. Normative testing technology is a product of mechanistic
science. Even if a distinction were made between pure and applied
science, ethical problems remain. Mechanistic science deals with
"what is" (i.e., it is a means) and does not deal with ends. Thus,
pure behavioral science concerns itself with issues of understanding
the nature of human intelligence and achievement. Having operationally
defined the nature of these characteristics, the science then created
a testing technology. Some critics make a distinction between problems
of pure science — whose goal is understanding and explaining nature —
and the application of the technology produced from pure science. This
distinction existed in physics particularly. Many theoretical physi-
cists, however, are no longer taking this position and are assuming
responsibility for both the intellectual creation of theory as well as
the use of the resultant technology. They no longer separate themselves
from the ethical and moral problems that result from the application of
the nuclear technology — weapons or power plants. This is the funda-
mental anomaly of mechanistic science which deals with means and not
ends
.
This is analogous to the behavioral sciences and normative psych-
ometrics. Some behavioral scientists attempt to separate the
theoreti-
cal understanding from the application of the testing technology.
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Thus, ethical problems that arose were viewed as only the result of the
misuse of the technology of normative tests and not the result of short-
comings in its scientific theoretical basis. Many behavioral scientists
had the same degree of confidence in their view of reality, based on
normative statistics, as engineers had in Newton’s view of reality,
based on Eucleadian mathematics. Both were used as conceptual maps of
reality and the basis for sound professional practice.
Psychologists and educators, therefore, in their attempts to base
their professional practices on a scientific footing, began the system-
atic application of the norm- referenced testing technology. Since
there was a seemingly objective scientific basis for understanding and
measuring intelligence, normative, statistical knowledge was then used
to improve educational practice. There is no need to docimient the ex-
ponential growth in measurement since the turn of the century when Binet
first attempted to identify intelligent French children who could bene-
fit from education. While it can be argued that educational practices
have improved, resulting in greater benefits to children, there are,
however, serioios technical as well as ethical limitations to the use of
norm- referenced tests.
For example, Whitney Griswold, the late president of Yale Univer-
sity observed in one use of standardized tests that at about age eleven,
an English chid is reduced to an abstraction and becomes a part of a
formula which predetermines the rate and extent of his total education.
This "creaming and streaming" concept is based on intelligence testing
which assumes intelligence is a stable, unchanging trait that can
pre-
dict future performance. The comparison of the merits of
homogeneous
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vs. heterogeneous grouping is not the central issue; but, rather, there
are the related ethical concerns at several levels. Beyond the techni-
cal issues of selecting the appropriate test, etc., there is the ethical
problem of invading the privacy of the individual through either
group — or individual — testing and then having the institution make
decisions about placement in whatever "track” without the participation
of the individual. The educational institution in applying the use of
"objective scientific instruments" creates ethical problems at several
levels. This institutional decision-making violates a range of values
related to the Judaic-Giristian and constitutional democratic beliefs
about the locus of control and responsibility resting with the individ-
ual. Some psychologists attempt to lessen the degree of ethical con-
flict by invading the privacy of the individual with prior permission
and then presenting the results to the individual for his own decision-
making. This latter practice can be further rationalized as a means
that a teacher can use in determining the intellectual potential of a
child in order to plan a program that would allow the student to achieve
his highest potential. This teacher-practice would, therefore, be con-
sistent with implementing an educational goal that currently has a
wide national consensus with boards of education, under the guise of
developing each student to his highest potential.
These several levels of ethical concern pose major problems for
the application of normative psychometrics. At the
theoretical level,
it is impossible to make the distinction between pure
and applied
Both the theoretical base and psychometric technology
are
science.
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the products of mechanistic science with all of the associated anoma-
lies previously discussed, particularly those related to efficient
causes, objectivity, prediction, control, and means-rather-than-ends
.
The Anisa paradigm as the basis for a new educational science
deals with the theoretical and applied distinction by hyphenating the
means-ends issues. Since it is a prescriptive theory, it deals with
the moral and ethical "ought" issues. The volitional locus of control
is centered in the individual. As he grows, subjective aim and final
cause help him to progressively gain more control of his destiny. This
eliminates treating the individual as an object. Professional inter-
vention is involved, therefore, in treating the student as both object
and subject. If any testing is conducted, prior permission and sharing
of findings are necessary conditions for mutual decision-making. The
Anisa theory of education serves as the prototype for all professional
practices. This approach is largely congruent with the Judeo-Christian
Western World values concerning the individual and particularly demo-
cratic constitutional beliefs about man. Thus, the need to discover
and invent instruments to measure changes in the individual over time
for the mutual benefit of both the teacher and the student.
Where normative tests are employed, it is vitally important not
to commit an error of logical typing. The Anisa paradigm makes a sig-
nificant contribution to psychometrics by putting in perspective the
appropriate use of normative tests. It is important to understand when
using normative tests that they only give more information about the
and not about the individual. This is theaggregate — the group —
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most frequent error made by test-users where normative test data are
misused in making predictions about the single individual. As discussed
on page 153, this is an error of logical typing; statements about the
individual are at a different level from statements made about the
group. Anisa does not, therefore, preclude the use of normative tests
but places them in this perspective with limited usefulness.
Anisa takes into account the subjective aim and purposes of the
individual and appears to resolve some of the ethical problems discussed
above regarding the use of normative measures. There are, nevertheless,
situations (i.e., national emergency) — a higher level of logical typ-
ing — where the survival of the group transcends the individual and
the society may use standardized test results for more effective mobil-
ization of groups.
Norm- referenced tests continue to play an important role in current
psychometrics. Ronald K. Hambleton estimates that approximately 95% of
the tests reviewed in the eighth edition (1978) of Oscar Buros ' Mental
Measurements Yearbook are norm- referenced. It is interesting to note
that Oscar Buros observed that relatively little of significance had
been contributed to normative psychometrics since their heyday in the
1920 's and 1930 's. Normative psychometrics does have a role in .\nisa
practice; therefore, some of the more specific problems of the growing
anti-normative test movement will be .discussed. Three new approaches
that are more consistent with Anisa practices will be presented in the
following pages. IVhile these approaches do not convert the problem of
longitudinal change into solvable puzzle form, they represent testing
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technologies that point in the right direction and are immediately
available for application.
Constructive alternative to norm- referenced tests
. The first approach
is represented by Feuerstein et al. (1979) in his psychometric assess-
ment of educability with his "Learning Potential Assessment Device" in-
volving theory, instruments, and technicjues
. The second is concerned
with criterion- referenced tests first introduced by Glaser (1963) and
Popham and Husek (1969). The third is represented by the initial efforts
of Hambleton et al. (1974) in developing instruments for measuring as-
pects of the Anisa process curriculum.
Reuven Feuerstein, who studied in Geneva under the direction of
Jean Piaget, over a period of twenty-eight years used his clinical ob-
servations as the basis for developing the "Learning Potential Assess-
ment Device" (LPAD) which is a radical modification of conventional
psychometric theory. He provides an innovative approach to the assess-
ment of educability based on his work with low functioning children and
adolescents migrating to Israel. On conventional intelligence tests,
the children generally lagged from three to six years behind the norms
of middle class children. A review of a wide range of "non-verbal",
"culture- free", and "developmental" tests supported the diagnosis of
cognitive deficits. Feuerstein’ s approach, however, was not only to
identi:fy the deficits but to determine if they could be reversed. The
influence of Piaget and the Geneva group put Feuerstein on the path to
a solution with a hierarchical conception of knowledge and skills. His
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approach reverses a number of honored presuppositions of norm- referenced
psychometric theory and practice.
The empirical evidence in support of his theory, instruments, and
technique employed over a twenty-year period are documented in elaborate
case studies. J. McVicker Hunt, who observed Feuerstein using the LPAD
with adolescents with conventional IQ's in the sixties, reported a
dramatic case involving a boy aged thirteen with a conventional IQ of
70 who later earned a Ph.D. in psychology from the Sorbonne in Paris.
Feuerstein 's cases demonstrate that a large degree of plasticity and
modifiability (through appropriately "mediated experiences) exists, even
at adolescence. This is consistent with the Anisa philosophical view
that human potential is unlimited, given no excessive organic damage
to nerve tissue.
Conventional, norm- referenced intelligence tests measure intellec-
tual abilities operative at the time of testing, which are then used to
predict future achievement. Feuerstein' s approach considered that the
development- fostering quality of past experiences had great effects on
cognitive processes that make up intelligence test items. What he
attempts to determine is the degree to which the effects of cultural
deprivation can be reversed by providing the necessary and sufficient
experiences. Again, the Anisa view holds that the performance on any
test primarily samples the "immanence" of the individual being tested.
He can't produce a response if the stimulus doesn't connect with
some
past experience stored in memory. The LPAD is used to assess
how much
an individual's cognitive functioning can be modified.
Its focus dif-
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fers radically from conventional psychometrics whose concern is with
the products of cognitive functioning toward predicting future perform-
ance. The LPAD shifts the focus from product to process and to modifia-
bility of the process of cognitive functioning with the goal of deter-
mining ways it can be improved. When interpreting results, the "product
orientation" of conventional psychometrics ignores the infrequent, high
quality response as representing an error, whereas the "process orien-
tation" uses such high quality responses to identify strengths and re-
mediation and education.
The second major modification of psychometric practice, as adopted
by Feuerstein, is the shift in the examiner/ examinee interaction — one
that is totally consistent with the Anisa theory of teaching and epito-
mizes Gadlin's prototype of the experimenter-subject interaction as the
basis for a new experimental research methodology. In contrast to the
objective, neutral role of the examiner giving standardized instructions,
we have a shift to one of teacher-pupil or examiner-teacher guiding the
interaction in the "testing" situation. Feuerstein observes that the
examiner-teacher "constantly intervenes, makes remarks, requires and
gives explanations whenever and whereever they are necessary, sums up
experience, anticipates difficulties and warns the child about them,
and creates reflective insightful thinking in the child not only con-
cerning the task but also regarding the examinee's reactions to it".
The relationship of the examiner and examinee for Feuerstein contrasts
dramatically with the traditional psychometric approach: the examiner
and examinee are "engaged in a common quest for mastery of the mater-
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ials". The examiner's role is fully analogous with the Anisa theory of
teaching applied to the assessment process — a teaching-training re-
lationship. Feuerstein states that this teaching "is not merely orient-
ed toward a specific content, but includes the establishment of the pre-
requisites of cognitive functioning for a wide array of problem-solving
behavior." Feuerstein 's approach is a major revision of conventional
psychometric practice. His concept of "mediated experience" as differ-
ent from "direct experience" of the environment also parallels the
Anisa concept of "leaming-to-leam.
"
J. McVicker Hunt, an outstanding psychologist, makes the following
observation about Feuerstein 's (1979) work:
Even though conventionally objective psychometricians may
still have qualms about the clinical ingenuity required of
the examiner- teacher and about the subjectivity still in-
volved in quantifying the amount of effort the examiner-
teacher must invest in getting examinees to appreciate the
cognitive and motivational schemata required of them, psy-
chometric assessment of educability should never again be
the same... Other investigators can build upon the very sub-
stantial foundations that Feuerstein has constructed (p. xi)
.
His theory, instruments, and technique are fully consistent with the
Anisa paradigm and represent an important empirical base for solving
some of the instrumentation puzzles encountered by the organismic
paradigm. His LPAD is not only a battery of tests but a model for the
construction of "dynamic tests" that could represent the first signifi-
cant step in the development of a testing technology that is necessary
for implementing Anisa theory. Since the implications are potentially
very significant, a further elaboration of these problems, i.e., pre-
dictability vs. change, product vs. process, examiner/examinee inter-
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action, mediated learning, and the LPAD battery, will be presented and
related to Anisa practice.
The development of norm- referenced psychometric measurement has
relied upon mechanistic research procedures using the conventional sta-
tistical approach. The statistical concerns are generally related to
reliability and validity. According to the organismic view, the primary
issue of education cannot be solved by improved levels of test reliabil-
ity and validity for education is concerned with changing the individ-
ual's cognitive functioning and not stabilizing it. Bereiter (1962)
makes the observation: "...the only reasonable evaluation of an educa-
tional practice is one that measures ... changeable traits. But the tests
available for use in such evaluations are designed as predictors of fu-
ture status, and in order to be good predictors they must be insensitive
to the very changes the educator is trying to produce and measure."
Mechanistic thinking with its goal of prediction and control, reflected
in striving for increased reliability and validity, has dominated psych-
ometric practice. As a consequence, there has been very little concern
for the development of instruments for measuring change. The "predic-
tion" approach, nevertheless, has attained scientific legitimacy; the
"educational" approach, however, remains questionable and risky. The
paradigm shift to organismic thinking is the key to legitimizing the
latter.
There is growing evidence within the field of psychometric measure-
ment that the underlying assumptions of measuring procedures are highly
suspect. The assumption, for example, that intelligence is randomly
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distributed, based on a mathematical (statistical) assumption concerning
the nature of reality is now suspect. As previously discussed, this
assumption is challenged by the shift in assumption from entropy to neg-
ative entropy. At a more operational level, conventional psychometric
methods estimate the intelligence of individuals by measurement rela-
tive to age norms. Individuals are compared with respect to their rela-
tive mastery of the products of prior learning. This makes the patently
erroneous assumption that the individuals being compared have had an
equal opportunity to learn. The empirical evidence does not support
such an assumption.
The evidence, in fact, is to the contrary in that scores on both
group and individual intelligence tests vary according to membership
in a particular socioeconomic class, years of schooling, and level of
education of parent (Karp and Sigel, 1965). Variations on these factors
aren't viewed as counter- instances but rather as variations in the in-
dividual's potential which represent stable differences in the individ-
ual's course of development. In addition, the stable differences are
then ascribed to one or a combination of the following: (1) genetic
factors which are immutable; (2) organic factors which are also hypothe-
sized as irreversible; or (3) experiential background that adversely
effects intelligence and is irreversible after certain critical
periods.
The observed performance differences, therefore, maintain their
pre-
dictive value under all of these conditions.
There still remins a great deal of interest in research
concern-
ing performance on an IQ test and its relationship
to genetic factors
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(Jensen, 1973; Herrnstein, 1973; Eysenck, 1971). The data and their in-
terpretation are varied depending on methodological issues. The argu-
ment based on the available data suggests that there is inadequate sup-
port for genetic endowment differences in intelligence or that the en-
vironment is the major determinant. Kamin (1977) reanalyzed these data
and concludes that there are no reliable scientific data to support a
purely genetic view of intelligence. A related issue is concerned with
the nature of the IQ test itself. This is Feuerstein’s major concern
regarding the meaning of an IQ score. Feuerstein (1979) states,
Beyond providing a measurement of manifest performance
at a given time and within a given context of past ex-
perience and opportunities to learn and benefit from
such experience, there is little reason to assume or
accept that performance on IQ tests provides a stable
or reliable measure of future performance (p. 5).
Evidence from a variety of studies indicate that situational variables
have a significant effect on test performance (Cronback, 1975; Hunt,
1975). IVhile acknowledging that genetic (digital) determinants are
less accessible to change, other components (analogic) have a much heav-
ier impact on overt behavior and make predictability from intelligence
test scores even less reliable. Feuerstein questions the degree to
which genetic or organic determinants should be considered unchangeable
under all possible conditions.
The entire field of psychodiagnosis and particularly measurement
of cognitive functioning has come under serious question even by many
who were initially very supportive (Cronbach, 1975; Anastasi, 1976;
Thorndike, 1971). The disenchantment, however, is primarily related to
existing norm- referenced techniques for measurement. Nevertheless,
r/
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there is growing concern for gaining knowledge about cognitive functions.
Problems of adapting to our cultural environment with its discontinu-
ities are creating stresses that require new adaptation to changing sit-
uations. In order to cope with new conditions, each individual needs to
develop the ability to modify himself — to leam-to-leam. However,
the increased importance of measuring cognitive functioning appears to
be inversely related to the ability of norm- referenced procedures to
fulfill this need. Very little progress has been made in this direction;
however, it is of primary importance for implementing the Anisa process
curriculum.
Beyond the concern of the IQ test score itself is the underlying
assumption of the conventional psychometric approach that intelligence
is a substance. This assumption of the immutability of cognitive capac-
ity represents a view of intelligence as a fixed entity that can be eval-
uated relatively accurately even at early stages of development. It
follows, therefore, that measuring devices can penetrate layers that
constitute the natural endowment. This is analogous to treating intel-
ligence as an object whose mass can be measured reliably and whose per-
manence is maintained in spite of external changes. E. L. Thorndike
observed that if something exists, it exists in some amount and, there-
fore, should be able to be measured. However, as Wesman (1968) points
out, we need not hold the converse notion that if something can be
measured it has existence as a substance. Wesman (1968) states;
So preoccupied have we been with reifying intelligence as
some mystical substance that we have too often neglected
to take a common- sense look at what intelligence tests
We find ourselves distressed at our failure tomeasure.
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predict with satisfactory accuracy the intelligence
test scores of a teenager from his intelligence test
scores as an infant. Vihy should this occasion sur-
prise, let alone distress? If we look inside the
tests, it should be obvious that the kinds of learn-
ing we typically appraise at the earlier ages bear
little resemblance and may have little relevance, to
the kinds of learnings we appraise later (p. 271).
The solution to the problem by conventional psychometric methods
is to increase the reliability and validity of the tests which results
in the solution becoming the problem. For example, stable character-
istics are selected; items that do not show reliability (ones too sensi-
tive to environmental factors and modifiability of the individual) are
rejected in favor of those that do not show this sensitivity. Thios
,
functions that reflect adaptability of the individual are considered
unreliable and nondiscriminatory among individuals and are, therefore,
not considered for measurement. Modifiability is not considered a rele-
vant dimension of the organism and is not worthy itself of becoming an
object of psychometric measurement. The negative consequence of this
thinking leads to the belief that what is not measured does not exist;
Watzlawick et al. (1974) observe that some problems are solved by
providing ’’more of the same” as when the temperature falls in a room one
can provide more heat or warm clothing until the desired effect is ach-
ieved. However, this "logical” type of problem solving does not apply
to many situations ; for some, the solution becomes the problem. For
example, the insomniac's solution to the problem of falling asleep is
to achieve sleep by an act of will power (e.g., thinking about not
thinking) only to find that doing this is actually what keeps him
awake. Since sleep by its very nature can occur only spontaneously,
it cannot occur spontaneously when it is willed. Thus, the attempted
"solution” of "more of the same” intensifies rather than solves the
prob lem.
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thus, modifiability of the individual is not assessed because such mod-
ifiability does not exist. Feuerstein believes (fully consistent with
Anisa) change should be introduced as the central goal of assessment,
and situations should be created in which change can be elicited and
then measured for it is change (growth) educators seek to provide.
Feuerstein seriously questions the predictive (stable) approach
which holds that data collected at any point along the individual's
development can then be used to predict the development to be expected
in the future. Adherence to prediction as a major goal of mechanistic
science often precipitates immediate institutionalized custodial care
when applied to the assessment of an individual that may eventually
require lifelong custodial care. Psychologists and pediatricians fre-
quently prefer immediately placing a child, who may later need ciistod-
ial care, in such a facility to avoid prolonging the uneconomical and
emotionally stressful relationship with such a child. Acting on such a
recommendation leads to the fulfillment of a child's predicted devel-
opment because the custodial conditions serve to perpetuate the very
conditions that were the basis for the initial prediction.
Feuerstein cites hundreds of custodial cases in his files who
were referred to custodial care but not placed. Instead they were
reared in stimulating environments by parents and educators. Using the
Learning Potential Assessment Device, he found generally high modifia-
bility on many of these children which resulted in significantly higher
levels of functioning. His case studies offer a substantial empirical
base in support of the educational (modifiable) approach. These are
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coupled with Cobb's (1972) observations concerning cognitive capacity
...the hundreds of investigations
.. .have made it quite
clear that intellectual capacity is not a unitaiy functionbut a complex of overlapping, partially independent functions.
'Various test instruments measure various facets of these com-plex variables. The functions themselves are subject to modi-
fiability by other internal development factors and by ex-
ternal influences
...The interactions of cognitive with non-
cognitive functions in adaptive behavior are extraordinarily
complex, especially as learning accumulates over time (p. 144)
.
Problems of labeling
. Since I perceive my role as a loving critic
vis a vis conventional psychometric procedures, it is desirable to put
the use of intelligence testing in a larger sociological context. With
respect to the technical and empirical issues, the Anisa paradigm sub-
sumes their use as a special case with the associated limitations al-
ready discussed. Economic, political, and social issues are involved
in psycho- diagnoses particularly through pupil placement laws which use
tests to fortify an existing social system. Problems of disadvantaged
and frequently exceptional children are related to power; power struc-
tures representing these groups are often in a powerless position.
Thus, psychometric procedures discriminate in many ways that are at
odds with stated societal values, resulting in a loss of human poten-
tial from those cut off from the mainstream culture — the culturally
different, minorities and, particularly the low functioning ("retard-
ed") groups. Disproportionate numbers from these groups have been di-
agnosed, classified, and treated as educable mentally retarded (EMR)
based on standard psychometric procedures. Havighurst (1964) and Mercer
(1973) demonstrate that 80% of children classified as EMR come from
particular socio-economic and ethnic subgroups. These findings have
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surfaced outside of the professional educational community, raising
serious questions concerning validity of diagnostic tests and resulting
in court rulings against psychometric measurement. It is now an issue
in civil rights and the subject of congressional and state legislation.
The anti-test movement has been spurred by significant evidence
demonstrating the damaging effects the use of intelligence measures have
upon individual's prospects in life. The major negative aspect is the
offering of a diagnostic label, particularly "retardation." While only
specific aspects of the person's functioning may be involved in the
diagnosis, it is the total person who is labeled and reacted to, accord-
ingly. Retardation and delinquency, particularly, involve a formal diag-
nostic labeling process, but, as Goldstein (1975) observes, there is no
such process for the removal of a label.
Feuerstein focuses on the damaging effects of labels particularly
for "retarded" children. Mercer's (1975) study of the practice of
labeling persons as retarded in Riverside, California showed Mexican
Americans to be 300% and Blacks 50% over-represented in the groups la-
beled retarded. These practices are seen as violating the basic rights
of children by tracking children into what Feuerstein calls "educational
poverty.
"
Labels take on broad and diffuse meanings which, when institution-
alized, serve as devices people use to orient themselves with respect
to others. The effects of homogeneous grouping, which was initially
intended to allow teachers to address deficiencies and avoid having
children frustrated by difficult tasks, have raised serious doubts
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about this practice. Evidence has mounted showing that a low achieve-
ment label applied to a member of a homogeneous group carries a stigma
that is more damaging than a low achievement label attached to an indi-
vidual from a heterogeneous grouping. Special education classes design-
ed to remediate problems diagnosed in mainstream classes are frequently
one-way streets with no means of escaping the label. Some large cities
have less than ten percent of special education children returning to
the mainstream. Recent federal legislation (PL 94-142) mandating iden-
tification of all "exceptional children" and providing a free and appro-
priate education in the least restrictive environment supposedly addres-
ses this problem. The impact of this legislation will need to be eval-
uated.
When considering the current psycho- diagnostic procedures used in
identifying (labeling) the exceptional child, it appears the attempted
solution to the problem of the exceptional child may also prove to be
the problem. Feuerstein's dynamic assessment procedures used within
the Anisa framework may prove to be a constructive alternative to the
bourgeoning growth of special education with all the damaging effects
of labeling. The application of the Anisa paradigm supported by Fed-
eral and local funds to both the mainstream and special education in
five cooperating towns in Connecticut should provide empirical
evidence
in support of this hypothesis.
Predictability versus modifiability . Having presented some of
the
issues involved in conventional psychometrics related
to predictability
vs. change (modifiability), Feuerstein clarifies his
shift from a pro-
V
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duct to a process orientation. Standardized testing procedures can be
criticized because they are concerned with the end product and disregard
the process that produced it. Conventional testing has limited provi-
sion for recording and evaluating the process by which the examinee pro-
duced the final, recorded, and weighted answer. There is no attempt in
the design of the tests to elicit information concerning the process of
how the examinee arrived at an answer. The search for stable character-
istics of the conventional approach limits the interaction between the
examiner and examinee. Any deviation from the standardized directions
supposedly vitiate the results. This approach does not regard situa-
tional variables including sex, race, interactional style of the exam-
iner, familarity with tasks, time pressure, and anxiety have an effect
on test- taking performance.
The differential backgrounds of the examinees also influence the
test results. Feuerstein gives an example of evaluating the intelli-
gence of two dogs, one of which had been trained with a well established
conditioned reflex while the other had not. Obviously, this is an ab-
surd comparison for the real question would ask if the second dog, given
an appropriate investment of time, would be able to display the con-
ditioned reflex. This is analogous to humans; however, conventional
psychometrics regards intelligence as fixed and places emphasis on ed-
dogenous factors. Thus, conventional approaches largely disregard situ-
ational and environmental backgroimd variables. Their focus is on the
individual's capacity for functioning and the manifest level of funct-
ioning with disregard for his functional efficiency.
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Feuerstein makes an important distinction between manifest level of
functioning and capacity in relationship to functional efficiency. The
latter is concerned with such variables as fatigue, level of vigilance,
recency of task acquisition and speed of performance, anxiety, and lack
of maturation. It is an integral dimension of cognitive measurement
which needs to be considered, for errors in performance may reflect
problems of efficiency and not capacity. Conventional psychometric
tests, with their product- oriented approach, use an inventory of func-
tion held to be the individual's capacity. This product- oriented
approach, which measures only the end product and not the process, does
not consider the many sources of error. In addition to errors from
functional inefficiency, errors may result from inadequate or inappro-
priate input data, inappropriate data elaboration, or inappropriate
data output. The product orientation also uses the method of summariz-
ing sources in the form of the quotient, index, percentile, or an aver-
age. This sampling of products leading to quotients wipes out intra-
individual differences. A process orientation, however, looks for
uniqueness — the intimate structure of behavior, particularly peaks of
performance and deliberately searches for understanding of such peaks.
A product orientation in testing, therefore, fails to provide the
necessary data about each individual's specific strengths and diffi-
culties. Feuerstein maintains that the goal of assessment should be
understanding the process that brought about the particular level of
functioning and this should be the basis for intervention. The failure
— and even harm — of special education programs in their response to
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recommendations from norm- reference testing to bring about remediation-
al changes in children, is the result of not having such meaningful
data on each child.
Feuerstein reviews the attempted alternatives to conventional test-
ing which devised new instruments or modified existing ones. These were
based on essentially two concepts: the cultural difference model or the
deficit model. The cultural difference model explains gaps as an arti-
fact of testing. Thus, the overlap between different cultures in intel-
lectual functioning which can be measured is not large enough to assure
the relevance of a test for one cultural subgroup when the test was de-
signed for another. Attempts to deal with this involves maintaining the
conventional tests but constructing separate norms for the different
cultural groups, or translating tests into different languages for the
subgroups, or the development of separate tests for the different popu-
lations .
The deficit model, on the other hand, explains observed differences
as reflecting cognitive deficits which characterize individuals of low-
functioning groups. Culture has an impact on these differences but the
deficit model does not assume different cultures have inherently differ-
ent types of intellignece as in the cultural difference model. Jensen
(1969) proposed a deficit model that considers deficiencies as immutable
based primarily on genetic factors which would essentially preclude any
investment for intervention to close these gaps. Within the deficit
model, but in contrast with the Jensen view, is the position that
holds
that the observed deficits do not represent real incapacities
which are
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immutable but are determined by deficiencies in certain prerequisites of
cognitive functioning. The differential effects of nature and nurture
do not reflect stable conditions but are subject to change by appropri-
ate approaches and techniques within an investment/ learning ratio which
can be determined by assessment procedures. This view is consistent
with Piaget, Anisa, and represents Feuerstein's basic position.
A number of modifications and changes of conventional psychometric
procedures have been introduced to deal with the cultural difference and
deficit models. To cope with the problems raised by standard psycho-
metrics, culture- free or culture- fair tests, developmental tests, and
inventories of adaptive behavior have been tried. The results, however,
still fall under the static model of assessment which evaluates present
and manifest cognitive capacities. None of these instruments searches
for the child’s potential for being modified by learning. There is a
growing awareness of the limitations of conventional psychometrics and
an emerging need to focus efforts on the development of techniques and
instruments to evaluate changes in the individual (patterns of learning
disability and potential for learning) using, initially, a process of
qualitative analysis rather than quantitative assessment.
Dynamic assessment . In response to this formulation of the problem,
Feuerstein developed a dynamic approach for the assessment of modifia-
bility through focussed learning; thus, establishing the potential for
being modified by learning as the goal for psychometric assessment. It
represents a radical departure from conventional procedures, replacing
the static goal of assessing manifest capacities with a dynamic goal of
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assessing manifest capacities with a dynamic goal of measuring the
degree of the individual’s modifiability by providing him with a focus-
ed learning experience. Therefore, a measure of the individual's learn-
ing potential is obtained which, simply defined, is his capacity to
become modified by a learning process. For Feuerstein, the evaluation
of intelligence is a process of measuring modifiability during active
learning which diametrically differs with the view that intelligence is
determined by some unchangeable genetic and environmental factors. This
view of intelligence is a result of a complex interaction between organ-
ism and environment expressed as a capacity for modifiability through
learning. In Anisa terms, modifiability through learning means actual-
ization of potential.
Assessment procedures for educational purposes, therefore, should
not be primarily concerned with inter-individual differences. Instead,
there should be a detailed and thorough study of each individual that
will enable the educator to induce some modification in the speed and
accuracy with which learning takes place. No labels are then necessary
since high level detailing of each individual's functioning over-shad-
ows the need for general categories for describing the manifest behavi-
oral level. The manifest level — usually the goal of conventional
testing — is the beginning point for Feuerstein 's dynamic testing.
Labels are irrelevant and misleading regarding the careful assessment
of the individual's capacity to learn. This dynamic, interactional view
of intelligence reflected in assessment where the examiner and examinee
interact as teacher and student epitomizes the Anisa theory of pedagogy.
218
Whether the assessment procedure is conducted by differentiated staff,
(e.g., psychologist) or the Anisa Master Teacher, the goal of the diag-
nostic process and the educational intervention remains the same.
The dynamic assessment approach requires changes in the following
areas: (1) structure of the tests; (2) the examination situation; (3)
orientation of the tests, and (4) interpretation of results. The
Learning Potential Assessment Device (LPAD) incorporates these features.
Test structure
. The LPAD clinical battery includes the following
tests: Organization of Dots, Raven's Progressive Matrices (A-E, includ-
ing LPAD Variations), Plateaux Test I-II; Representational Stencil De-
sign; Numerical Progressions; Positional Learning Test, and Verbal and
Figural Analogy Test. These test instruments were selected and altered
in a way that provides the examiner and examinee with tasks involving
a teaching process that enables the examiner to progressively evaluate
the effect of the teaching on the capacity of the individual to deal
with new situations. Each test presents items that induce preparation
for subsequently more difficult items (e.g., Raven's Progressive Mat-
rices) . When test items are presented according to standardized in-
structions, the examinee is left with inadequate preparation and
feedback for dealing with the subsequent, more difficult items. For the
individual, exposure to each task modifies him in a way that permits
him to approach the more complex tasks more successfully. This approach
assesses the modifiability (learning ability) of the individual when
confronted with conditions aimed at producing a change in him. It is
possible to assess levels of modification attained in the hierarchy of
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cognitive operations (e.g., is the achieved modification limited to
elementary perceptual fxonctions or other higher level mental processes
such as abstract or logical operations). In addition, assessment is
made of the amount of teaching investment that will be required to
assist the modification as well as the preferred modalities, relative
strengths and weaknesses, etc. Feuerstein presents clinical and exper-
imental data obtained from the application of each test. He has also
adapted the tests used in the LPAD for group testing.
Examination situations
. Changes in the instruments, although they
are the most vital component, are not, by themselves, sufficiently
effective to assess the modifiability of the individual. The testing
situation is also changed in a way that parallels the changes in instru-
mentation. The shift is from a static to a dynamic goal in the test
situation that turns the examiner into a teacher- observer and the exam-
inee into a 1 earner- performer . This shift requires a number of changes
in the usual interaction with a particular emphasis on establishing a
two-way communication process. There is, therefore, a change in examin-
er-examinee interaction and the introduction of a training process as
an integral part of the LPAD measurement.
In assessing the cognitive functions of an individual, Feuerstein
asserts that deficient functions are not missing from the cognitive
repertoire but are functions that are underdeveloped, poorly developed,
and/or impaired. Under certain conditions, particularly where strong
need exists, appropriate functioning may emerge. It is helpful to
understand the nature of deficient functioning by identifying the lows
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of occurance in terms of the phases in which they occur. There are
three phases of the mental act: (1) the input phase, (2) the elabora-
tional phase, and (3) the output phase.
Input phase
. Problems occuring at the input phase include all the
impairments dealing with the quantity and quality of data the individual
gathers in understanding the nature of the problem as preparation for
attempting a solution. The following briefly illustrates some of these
impairments: (1) sweeping and blurred perception, (2) impulsive explora-
tory behavior, (3) impaired verbal labels that preclude differentiation
of objects, events, etc., (4) no sense of the need for accuracy in data
gathering, and (5) the inability to consider two or more sources of
information. The examiner may find that these impairments at the input
phase, operating alone or in combination, result in a deficiency in
"readiness for response." The response will be inadequate in terms of
the appropriate solution to the problem because the necessary data did
not become available to the examinee. These impairments at the input
phase may, but not necessarily, affect the functioning at the elabora-
tion and output phases.
Elaborational phase. The elaborational phase includes those
factors that impair the individual’s efficient use of data available to
him. Beyond the impairments of data- gathering at the input phase, the
following illustrate those deficiencies that operate to impede the ap-
propriate elaboration of the cues that do exist: (1) little or improper
differentiation of actual problem, not selecting relevant from non-
relevant cues, (2) no awareness of how data have to be integrated by
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pursuing logical evidence, (3) impaired inferential "iffy" thinking
and strategies for hypothesis testing, (4) impaired planning behavior,
and (5) non- elaboration because necessary verbal concepts are not in the
individual's repertoire, Feuerstein treats the elaboration of cues as
synonomous with the general meaning of the word "thinking." In Anisa
terms, elaboration would be equivalent to "cognitive processes."
Output phase
. Deficiencies at the output phase include those that
result in an inadequate communication of the final solution. Although
adequate input data and appropriate elaboration are present, difficul-
ties may result from inappropriate expression (i.e., the person may know
the solution, but can't articulate it). The following briefly illus-
trate specific deficiencies; (1) egocentric communicational modalities,
(2) blocking, (3) trial and error responses, (4) impaired verbal tools,
(5) lack of need for precision and accuracy in communicating, and (6)
impulsive, acting-out behavior.
In assessing performance, the examiner should not view any of the
preceding cognitive impairments as any real lack of capacity, but rather
ineffective attitudes, faulty work habits, and inadequate thinking modes
— all functions that can be improved through training. Feuerstein,
in fact, believes that impaired cognitive functioning is the result of
"inadequate and insufficiently mediated learning experience." He pos-
tulates that cognitive impairments are not directly related to poor
genetic or organic deficiencies but result from the "absence, paucity,
or ineffectiveness of adult-child interactions that produce in the
child an enhanced capacity to become modified, that is, to learn."
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A distinction is made between learning through direct exposure and
mediated learning. The two major learning modalities occur simultane-
ously but with different emphasis during different stages of development.
Direct exposure learning results in the modification of the developing
individual through direct contact with environmental stimulation (ob-
jects and experience of events) — analogous to Piaget’s process of
accommodation and assimilation. Feuerstein (1979), on the other hand,
conceives of mediated learning experience as
...the interactional processes between the developing human
organism and an experienced, intentioned adult who, by in-
terposing himself between the child and external sources of
stimulation "mediates” the world to the child by framing,
selecting, focussing, and feeding back environmental exper-
iences in such a way as to produce in him appropriate learn-
ing sets and habits (p. 71).
Thus, mediated learning, in contrast to direct exposure learning of
chance confrontation with objects, is the result of the adult's inter-
vention. What is most significant is the "intentionality" on the part
of the mediator who sets the meaning of the experience and makes the
learner aware that he is involved in a process of learning something
that transcends the immediate situation involved in the interaction.
The more an individual has benefited from mediated learning, the greater
will his capacity become to be modified through direct exposure learning.
Mediated learning is a prerequisite to effective, independent growth
which results in reflective thinking, inner representation, and emer-
gence of operational behavior. Feuerstein 's concept of "mediated
learning" parallel's directly Jordan's view of "learning competence"
through learning- to- learn where the learning- to-leam means the "con-
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scious ability to differentiate, integrate, and generalize experience”.
Conscious ability depends on the capacity to symbolize. The Anisa Model
sets forth three basic symbol systems: language, math, and the arts.
They function also as mediators. Teaching, according to the Anisa
Theory, is arranging environments (which regulates the quality of
direct-exposure learning) and guiding the child's interaction with the
environment (a form of intentional intervention that "mediates”). Much
of the mediation is accomplished by the teacher through the use of sym-
bols, which stand between (mediate) the objects in the environment and
the child.
Given the theoretical importance of mediated learning, Feuerstein
significantly alters the examiner- examinee relationship in order to
reach the dynamic goals set by the LPAD. However, conventional psycho-
metric tests are characterized by a uniform set of procedures with no
deviations. A neutral, even sympathetic but basically unresponsive
examiner limits his interaction with the examinee to dry, standardized
instructions. The examinee's limited grasp of the instructions coupled
with a possible lack of motivation toward difficult tasks may lead to a
tuning-out or to higher anxiety involving feelings of threat and expecta-
tions of lowered success. The examinee may interpret the first as not-
caring with the same not-caring of the examinee. The neutrality of the
examiner, however, may be interpreted as hostility and an expectation of
the examinee's failure which further reduces the examinee's efficiency
through lowered motivation and counter-hostility. The examinee's
attempts to lessen these effects by encouragement are quickly perceived
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as lip-service because these expressions prove false in his continued
experience of failure with the tasks presented.
The LPAD technique radically changes the roles of the examiner-
examinee to a teacher-pupil role. The neutral, indifferent role is
shifted to an actual, cooperative role of the teacher who is greatly
concerned with the success of his pupil. Feuerstein characterizes the
examiner as one who constantly intervenes, makes remarks, requires and
gives explanations, asks for repetitions, sums up, warns child about
difficulties, and promotes reflective, insightful thinking in the child
to the tasks and the examinee’s reaction to them. The examiner is act-
ive, involved, and gives examinee the feeling that the tasks are impor-
tant, difficult, but manageable. This change in role usually results
in a sharp increase in motivation which, of course, influences perfor-
mance. At first, it is extrinsic, with the examinee motivated to please
the examiner. There is a later shift to intrinsic motivation where the
examinee delights in the task itself, having grasped its deeper meaning
and no longer feeling overwhelmed by it.
This positive approach to problem-solving results in increased mas-
tery of tasks since the sequence of tasks on the LPAD progressively
increase in difficulty. Mastery raises the need in the child to respect
the experience; this, in turn, has functional value in consolidating a
successful pattern of behavior as Piaget describes. There is also an
increase in aspiration and motivation wherein the task becomes the cen-
ter of interest and motivational focus and the examinee is no longer
primarily motivated by the examiner. This change in roles and inter-
action on the LPAD by an examiner who now becomes a teacher-trainer
with
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an examinee (turned pupil-trainee) results in the pupil becoming aware
of the meaning of the task, the importance of mastering it, his ability
to do it, and using a feedback process, the ability to select behavior
leading to success. Feuerstein believes that in this kind of testing
the personal change in examiner- examinee relationship is a necessary
condition for the appropriate assessment of modifiability of, specif-
ically, culturally deprived children. This is also a prototype for the
necessary assessment of children by the Anisa Master Teacher and/or
differentiating staff.
Orientation of tests . The orientation of the tests, which repre-
sents a shift from product to process orientation, is the third major
change that is necessary to turn the static approach into a dynamic
one. Such a shift is an integral part of the LPAD. Conventional test
construction makes little provision for recording or evaluating how the
examinee arrived at the final product. The goal of many psychometric
tests is evaluation of the product for the purpose of selecting person-
nel. However, when the assessment goal is remediation and education, not
selection, the problem is understanding how an individual's functioning
can be modified. The process, therefore, becomes as important as the
product. Many of the clinical projective techniques have provisions
for evaluating process on a qualitative basis. Similar provisions are
made with the LPAD where each response of the examinee is recorded for
a thorough analysis. In the interaction, the child is asked to clarify
his responses which gives access to the processes underlying his cog-
nitive functioning.
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For his process-oriented approach, Feuerstein developed a cogni-
tive map which includes the following seven parameters by which a men-
tal act can be analyzed, categorized, and ordered: content, modality,
phase, operations, level of complexity, level of abstraction, and level
of efficiency. The use of such a cognitive map, obviously, requires a
clinical assessment situation.
Test interpretation
. The interpretation of test results is the
fourth area of difference from conventional psychometrics wherein peaks
in the pattern of performance are used as an indication of the cogni-
tive potential of the examinee. This change in approach to the inter-
pretation of the results may be possible while still conserving some of
the more conventional aspects of assessment. The primary concern in
interpreting results is the way the examiner handles the peak perform-
ance — a sharp, isolated, and unique departure from the established
pattern of poor responses made by the child. Such responses are gen-
erally ignored in conventional testing for selection purposes. However,
for purposes of assessing for education, these rare, high quality peak
performances are significant in understanding the individual more fully.
In Anisa terms, they may represent aptitudes and interests that reflect
subjective aims. To learn how subjective aim operates in the life of
a child is to have in hand a key that unlocks the door to understanding
the child in his specificity. The LPAD intervention procedures, with
their focus on the assessment of modifiability, frequently changes the
course of the results by an insight created in the examinee by the
tests and new interactive process. The single peak response, Feuer-
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stein has found, may serve as a more valid predictive criterion than
failure on a whole battery of tests. These responses become the point
of departure for probing the more hidden cognitive functioning of the
individual and for attempts to modify it. In Anisa terms, the peak
response is the expression of transcendence — a bursting forth of a
bit of actualizing potential. There is where the future of the child
is — where the well-springs of hope are — that is where teacher and
pupil should make their investment.
Summary
. The dynamic assessment of the LPAD, its philosophy, method,
instriaments
,
and techniques have significant implications for they are
fully consistent with the Anisa practices and can be immediately incor-
porated. The dynamic assessment procedures are analogous to the Anisa
theory of teaching; on most dimensions each could serve as a prototype
for the other. The LPAD, therefore, can be used by the Anisa Master
Teacher or differentiated staff (e.g., psychologist). It would be most
appropriate for the Master Teacher: the technique permits diagnosis as
the basis for prescriptions. It also makes a learning experience out
of the assessment process. Thus, the Master Teacher, as examiner, is
involved in the study and understanding of intimate cognitive processes,
their development, structure, and meaning, and the way in which they
merge into the end product. Assessment, then, is also primarily con-
cerned with the learning and training process. Beyond understanding
the student's cognitive structure and the changes occurring in the
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assessment process, the nature of the interaction epitomizes the Anisa
theory of teaching which involves guiding the quality of interaction
to sustain the release of potential at an optimum rate. The dynamic
assessment requires that the examiner create a rapport marked by per-
sonal warmth, sincere interest in the success of the examinee, a readi-
ness to communicate feelings of pleasure whenever the examinee succeeds.
Feedback and intervention are required to prevent failure and enhance
success. The fact that the examiner must interact by assuming the role
of teacher-trainer in order to produce the necessary changes in the
examinee has a profound effect on the examiner's attitude — his scien-
tific curiosity, clinical orientation and affective involvement. It
contrasts dramatically with the objective, neutral, and disinterested
manner of administering static conventional tests where the examinee
is frequently treated as an object. Since Anisa treats the student as
both object and subject, the quality of the interaction required by the
dynamic assessment is totally consistent. It is a means — often re-
quiring an appreciable investment on the part of the practictioner —
to revealing the often hidden potentialities of individuals and their
modifiability. For the Anisa practitioner, it becomes more evident
because the release of potential for each individual is the primary goal
Feuerstein observes : "The uniqueness of each individual turns his fate
into the fate of the world — his world." According to Sages:
Why was Adam created alone and lanique? To teach us that
he who brings about the loss of one soul is as if he has
annihilated a whole world; while he who saves a soul is
as if he has rescued a whole world.
— Talmud Sanhedrin
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In addition to its usefulness for the Anisa practitioner, its
theory, instruments, and techniques are based on over twenty- five years
of empirically based study. Largely influenced by Piaget et al., its
theoretical orientation places it within the organismic paradigm. The
theory and empirical base are a significant contribution to a testing
technology oriented to assessing change in the individual over time.
The organismic paradigm identified the problem. Dynamic assessment is
a significant step in converting the problem into a puzzle- form that,
to a much larger degree, can now be solved. Dynamic assessment provides
an excellent theoretical and empirical base for future study of problems
consistent with the "normal science" stage of the organismic paradigm.
Feuerstein identifies some of these problems: (1) establishing a base
line for qioantifying modifiability, an index of modifiability, (2) ex-
pansion of the test instruments for both individuals and groups, (3)
development of techniques for assessing potential modifiability in
specific learning disabilities, and (4) clarification of non-intellect-
ive factors important to specific and individual levels of modifiability.
For those who will be working within the Anisa paradigm, attacking these
problems, providing alternatives to conventional psychometric procedures,
will not only make a contribution to theory but result in immediate
benefits to children.
Criterion- referenced testing . Criterion-referenced testing was intro-
duced in the mid-sixties to provide test-score information for decision-
making, giving rise to objectives-based instructional programs. It was
felt that norm- referenced tests do not provide the desired kind of test
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score; they primarily facilitate the comparison of individioals (or
groups) with respect to a norm group. Criterion-referenced tests, how-
ever, are constructed to permit the interpretation of individual (and
group) test scores relative to a set of objectives. They are an altern-
ative to norm- referenced tests designed to meet the measurement require-
ments in ob j ectives-based instructional programs, competency-based
certification, and situations where the performance of an individual
relative to a set of competencies is the main concern (Hambleton and
Eignor, 1979) .
Glaser (1963) and Popham and Husek (1969), who are significant
contributors to this field, were interested in referencing examinee test
performance to a well defined domain of behaviors measuring an objective.
Thus, Popham (1978) provides a definition:
A criterion-referenced test is used to ascertain an
individual's status (referred to as a domain score)
with respect to a well-defined behavior domain (p. 4).
With respect to terms in current use, there is some confusion over
differences among four kinds of tests — criterion- referenced tests,
domain- referenced tests, ob jectives-referenced tests, and a minimum com-
petency test. There are, however, few significant differences among
these tests. Current usage treats all as equivalent to the term, cri-
terion-referenced tests. An important distinction, however, is made
between criterion- referenced and norm- referenced tests. Historically,
both tests were constructed in the same manner. Recent developments
in methodology now make the distinction between criterion- referenced
and norm- referenced as significant and unambigious; therefore, it is
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correct to refer to a test as either criterion-referenced or norm-
referenced (Hambleton and Eignor, 1979).
It would be helpful to summarize some of the similarities and
differences between norm- referenced tests. The purpose of norm- refer-
enced tests is to facilitate comparison among individuals on the abil-
ity being measured whereas criterion- referenced tests assess the indiv-
idual’s level of performance relative to a well-defined behavior domain.
With respect to the method of test development, the statistical proper-
ties of test item selection are most important for norm- referenced tests.
For criterion-referenced tests, domain specifications are prepared and
items written to measure the behaviors related to a particular compet-
ency. Quantification scales differ with norm-referenced scores anchor-
ed to the average level of the group while the anchor points for cri-
terion-referenced scores are at the ends of the scale — 0% and 100%.
It is evident from the use of test scores that this new testing
technology helps solve a major problem in implementing the Anisa para-
digm. Thus, norm- referenced scores are generally used to make compari-
sons among students to deal with selection problems (e.g., homogeneous
groups for reading and other educational "tracking") . Criterion- refer-
enced scores are used to make descriptive statements about what a stu-
dent can do. Students are judged on their own merits. They indicate
that things learned can be separated into specific competencies. They
can also be used to "sort" students as do norm- referenced scores, but
they are "c^uota free", with no limits placed on the number of students
receiving a passing score based on mastery or non-mastery of the skills
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measured. Scores can be used, therefore, to make instructional decis-
ions at the individual level or to evaluate total-program effectiveness.
Since Anisa is a prescriptive theory, it prescribes goals or ob-
jectives at individual and program levels. At the individual level,
the Master Teacher is concerned with the developing "learning compe-
tence" for each potentiality. The theory of teaching involves diagnos-
ing the student's developmental levels as a basis for making a prescrip-
tion. The Master Teacher then arranges the necessary environments and
guides the quality of interactions to accomplish specific instructional
objectives. It is within this instructional process that criterion-
referenced tests can play an important role. This new technology is
most congenial with Anisa practices when compared to the limited and,
generally, incompatible role that the norm- referenced technology plays.
Criterion- referenced tests can be used for on-going evaluation at two
levels — diagnostic and instructional outcomes. The teacher has a
testing technology that is responsive to her immediate instructional
practices, determining quite specifically, the mastery or non-mastery of
skills in a prescribed domain of behavior.
With respect to the use of criterion-referenced tests in program
evaluation, they also prove to be more appropriate than norm-referenced
tests. Program evaluators raise such questions as, "How much have the
six year olds learned from the Anisa learning competency programs?
Use of norm-referenced instruments could be used to answer this question
but it would also require additional considerations (e.g., a control
group experimental design) . A straight forward answer to the question
ferenced instruments because they were de-is not possible with norm-re
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signed only to permit comparisons of one individual with another on the
measured. Reporting is in the form of grade- ec^uival ents
,
per-
centile ranks, standard scores, etc. They provide, however, little or
no information relative to such questions, as "What can one individual
(or learning competency group) do?”
Nevertheless, norm- referenced tests are still the most frequently
used educational evaluation; their limitations need to be understood.
These will be discussed to demonstrate how criterion- referenced tests
can serve as a constructive alternative. First, norm- referenced tests
are designed to make comparisons of individual or some norm group. The
results are often used for selecting or placing individuals. In order
to make meaningful comparisons, there must be variability in individual
responses. In selecting test items from a pool, the ones selected are
those that maximize test score variability. This variability spreads
the examinees over a scale that allows the user to make comparisons of
an individual in terms of the group as a whole. The scores do not allow
inferences to be made as to what the student knows or does not know.
Criterion- referenced tests, on the other hand, are designed to answer
such questions with test items selected to evaluate specifically the do-
main of behaviors the evaluator wants to assess. This points out the
second major shortcoming of norm- referenced tests, that is, the mismatch
between content covered by the test and the content of the program being
evaluated. Hambleton et al. point out that norm- referenced tests are
usually based on an amalgamation of objectives of programs from a nation
wide sample. It is difficult, therefore, to find a standardized
achieve
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ment measure where the content covered closely matches the content goals
of the program being evaluated.
A third cause for a discrepancy between test content and program
objectives is the purpose of norm- referenced test, that is, comparison
with some reference group. Again, this is related to selecting test
items that contribute to score variability. Items which measure concepts
taught by many teachers and answered correctly by students will be elim-
inated. Achievement tests, therefore, are looking more like intelligence
or aptitude tests and are becoming less sensitive to the effects of in-
struction. As Feuerstein notes, standardized tests are not geared to an
educational approach concerned with modifiability. If an instrument is
to assess the learning process, its content must be carefully matched to
that of the program. Criterion- referenced tests fulfill this requirement
more appropriately.
A fourth area of discrepancy between norm- referenced tests and pro-
gram evalution is related to the degree that the program is innovative.
This is particularly true for Anisa which is a most innovative program.
The instructional methods and goals of the learning competency program
are different from the traditional program. As a consequence, it is an
error to judge the effectiveness of such a program by a tool that has
been designed to measure something else. It is notable, however, that
six years of research data from the field testing of Anisa in the Suf-
field School System in Connecticut demonstrated that Anisa children
ach-
ieved significantly (P>.05) better than children exposed to the tradi-
tional approaches as measured by the Metropolitan Achievement
Tests.
Criterion-referenced tests, however, are still more appropriate
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for program evaluation for they can be designed to tap specific pro-
gram obj ectives
.
After considering the limitations of norm- referenced tests, it is
evident that the new testing technology of criterion- referenced testing
can serve as a constructive alternative for many Anisa purposes, par-
ticularly instructional and program evaluation. This does not mean that
we should not use norm- referenced measures but that we should place them
in a different perspective that would call for a more limited use.
So far, we have two constructive alternatives to norm- referenced
tests — the Learning Potential Assessment Device and criterion- refer-
enced tests — that are immediately available for broadening use in im-
plementing and assessing Anisa practices. However, this is not suffi-
cient; the Anisa paradigm also identifies other measurement problems that
require solution. The most pressing problem that needs work is concern-
ed with the need to develop instruments to measure the process curricu-
lum.
Process measures and other instrumentation . The Anisa paradigm has its
philosophical roots in Alfred North IVhitehead’s process philosophy.
"The Anisa Model rests upon the premise that the reality of being is in
the process of becoming and that becoming is the translation of poten-
tiality into actuality." (Jordan, 1973). This is reflected in the Anisa
definition of development, which is the process of translating poten-
tiality into actuality. The translation of psychological potentialities
into actuality takes place through the conscious differentiation, inte-
gration and generalization of experience which constitutes learning com-
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petence. This is effected by the student's guided interactions with
the physical, human, and unknown environments. These environments, in
part, comprise the content curriculum which can be assessed using cri-
terion-referenced measures. The Anisa curriculum, however, also includes
all the psychological processes which must be mastered in the development
of learning competence. Tliese have been organized into five categories:
psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and volitional. The five
categories comprise the process curriculum, in part. The Anisa Model's
major student outcome is the development of learning competence. Learn-
ing competence is effected by mastering the psychological processes in
the process curriculum.
During the initial field testing of Anisa in Suffield, Connecticut
in 1973-74, Hambleton et al. constructed or selected tests to measure
five of the processes that underlie learning competence. These processes
were classification, seriation, verticality, attention, and figure-ground
perception. Classification and seriation are related to the cognitive
category of psychological potentiality while the remaining processes be-
long to the psychomotor, volitional, and perceptual categories, respect-
ively. Instruments were also constructed to measure a higher-order spec-
ification, cooperation, an aspect of moral competence.
Hambleton, Algina, Bourque, and Larrivee (1974) from the Laboratory
of Psychometric and Evaluative Research, University of Massachusetts
worked, in collaboration with the Anisa staff, on the development of
these measures. They conducted a review of the literature pertaining to
measurement of processes, collected available instruments, and construct-
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ed or selected instruments that measured these processes. These instru-
ments were developed and administered to Anisa students and a control
group. The results of these efforts provided the first empirical data
for test construction, administration, and use in implementing the Anisa
practices in the field. The results were encouraging, providing evalua-
tive data on the Anisa program that indicated students developed learn-
ing competency skills that were equal to or better than their counter-
parts in a neighboring school. The tests were constructed and adminis-
tered without the advantage of elaborate validation procedures. Never-
theless, significant experience and initial data were obtained in this
important area. The development of tests for seven of the processes
underlying learning competence was a beginning; there are many more pro-
cesses posited by the model. Some of the processes such as classification
and seriation have already stimulated a large amount of research along
the lines well documented by Inhelder and Piaget (1964). These research
data permit specification of these aspects in behavioral terms which
provide information about the development of the child. Other processes
such as attention and verticality, however, do not have a substantial
research base. Consequently, these will require a program of basic
research concerning the development of each process. The results of
this strategy will not be immediate; a great deal of mopping-up work
is still required in this ''normal science" phase of paradigm growth.
Since the Anisa Model deals with the student as both object and
subject, the use of the participant-observer is a legitimate source of
data in evaluation studies. A variety of observer rating scales for
systematic data gathering can be tailor-made. Hambleton et al. (1974),
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for example, developed the following instniments for Project Anisa-Suf-
field: Learning Environment Staff Perception Index (LESPI), Learner Per-
ception Interview Schedule (LPIS), and Learning Environment Observer
Rating Schedule (LEORS). Questionnaires, coupled with process observers,
are also effective means for obtaining data to provide systematic feed-
back to staff and students. The video taping of staff and students has
been effective in implementing Anisa in Suffield and the Cooperative
Special Services Center in Connecticut. Within the participant-observer,
operations
-research framework, a variety of tailor-made instrumentation
is possible.
Computer technology is highly desirable to assist the Master Anisa
Teacher in diagnosing the developmental level of each student for each
category of psychological potentiality. Project Anisa-Suffield initi-
ally developed teacher-observation schedules for recording, storing, and
retrieving information on each child. While this can be performed man-
ually, it is very cumbersome. This process, however, does not preclude
the implementation of the Model, but it limits its overall effectiveness.
Therefore, the use of computer technology is very necessary for effic-
ient operation. This is technically and operationally feasible at this
time. A prototypical system was created for implementing Project Anisa-
Suffield but not put into operation because of limited funds.
A vitally important area — but one largely untapped at this
time — is the identification and measurement of cognitive processes
in the brain. The paradigm clearly identifies the problem and sets the
stage for a great deal of creative work. Parallels with the physical
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sciences, as discussed in Chapter II, suggest the lengths to which
scientists will go in developing instrumentation if the paradigm poses
the puzzle (e.g., radiotelescopes, scintillation counter to identify
the neutrino, etc.)- The Sperry et al. (1977) studies on the split
brain are efforts in this direction whose findings are immediately
useful in diagnosing learning disabilities. Pribram's (1979) work
suggesting that the brain functions like a holograph also provides in-
teresting new leads. A creative multidisciplinary approach is most
probable if this important area is to be developed.
CHAPTER VII
METHODLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Methodology versus Method
Having discussed the problems of concepts and instrumentation in
the "normal science" stage of paradigm growth, methodological problems
will now be addressed. As a context for addressing these problems, it
will be helpful to clarify some terms within the theory of Logical
Types. Many things can be expressed in a language, except statements
referring to that language itself. To talk about a language, we
need a metalanguage for the expression of its structure. For example,
the term "method" denotes a scientific procedure; it determines the
rules and steps which must be followed to achieve a given end. Method-
ology, in contrast, is a concept of the variety of methods which can
be used in different paradigms or scientific disciplines. It is con-
cerned with the activity of acquiring knowledge generally and not with
a particular investigation. It is a "metamethod" and stands in the
same logical relation to method as a class to one of its members
(Watzlawick et al., 1974). Every effort will be made to avoid confusing
method with methodology and the philosophical difficulties that result.
The key to the growth of a new paradigm is in doing something
constructive about its concern with the activities of acquiring know-
ledge — in essence, methodological problems. My thesis rests on the
methodological base that the growth of scientific knowledge follows
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Kuhn's framework of paradigm development. Since Anisa represents a
shift from the mechanistic to an organismic paradigm, the methodological
problems will be viewed within this perspective. Related methodological
problems (e.g. self-referencing problems — strange loops — in ex-
plaining itself, Piaget's epistemology, and Ossorio's concern for
putting the person into scientific method) are considered within the
paradigm perspective.
Within this methodological framework, therefore, specific methods
that have been or need to be developed will be the focus of this
presentation. With respect to the former, while it may be redundant,
it is necessary to state that many of the methods developed under the
mechanistic paradigm remain appropriate for limited problems. Their
emphasis on rigor has provided experiments that are elegant in design
but frequently limited in scope and relevance. These methods, appli-
cable to the behavioral sciences, have been clearly explicated by
Campbell and Stanley (1966) in their work Experimental and Quasi-
Experimental Designs for Research . These represent the legitimate
methods — the "true" experimental designs — accepted by the commun-
ity of mechanistic scientists. My concern, however, is for the creation
of new methods — new rules and procedures for puzzle-solution — ident-
ified by the Anisa paradigm.
Field Testing the Anisa Model: Research Strategies
This task will be approached by first presenting the research
methods that were used in the initial field testing of the Anisa paradigm
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in Connecticut from 1973-1980. First, as Director of Research and
Principal Investigator of Project Anisa-Suffield and Project Inspire,
I shall present the experimental designs employed. Second, trans-
cending this empirical base, new methods will be explored consistent
with the Anisa paradigm. Seminal work in this area by Bronfenbrenner
and Bateson will be a primary source for developing new methods that
have implications for the Anisa theory of evaluation.
Transforming experiment. Bronfenbrenner (1977) quotes Professor A. N.
Leontiev of the University of Moscow concerning differences in assump-
tion underlying research in human development in the Soviet Union and
the United States:
It seems to me that American researchers are constantly
seeking to explain how the child came to be what he is;
we in the U.S.S.R. are striving to discover not how the
child came to be what he is, but how he can become what
he not yet is (p. 528).
Soviet psychologists have created what are "transforming experi-
ments" which radically restructure the environment, producing new
configurations that actuate previously unrealized behavioral poten-
tials of the subject. While they have been successful in designing
clever experiments, once they move out of the laboratory the "trans-
forming experiment" degenerates into a demonstration of prescribed
ideological processes. The central issue, however, is that "trans-
forming experiments" are rare in American research on human develop-
ment. Most "scientific" efforts into social reality perpetuate the
status quo. The mechanistic world view largely determines this approach
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which is reflected in even treating sociological systems as givens
rather than as evolving and susceptible to novel transformations.
There is a reluctance to experiment with new social forms for realizing
human potential.
Bronfenbrenner (1977) presents his most demanding proposition
from his ’’Toward an Experimental Ecology of Human Development” which
defines the nature and scope of ecological experiments:
Research on the ecology of human development should
include experiments involving the innovative restructuring
of prevailing ecological systems in ways that depart from
existing institutional ideologies and structures by re-
defining goals, roles, and activities and providing inter-
connections between systems previously isolated from each
other (p. 528).
Despite their scarcity in the published literature, some ex-
amples of transforming experiments can be cited: changes in hospital
practice of allowing mothers to have immediate contact with newborn
infants and the removal of retarded children from orphanages and
placement in the care of retarded adult females in a hospital ward.
In contrast to these relatively narrow experiments, the Anisa paradigm
represents an ecological innovation for American society that could
be carried out within the framework of a systematic research design.
Such a design would epitomize Bronfenbrenner ’ s most demanding prop-
osition concerning research on the ecology of human development. It
has the potential of being a ’’transforming experiment” par excellence.
Leontiev's concern for the child, ”...how he can become what he
not yet is.” is consistent with Anisa as a prescriptive theory
concerned with the future (transcendence). Anisa, however, maintains
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a dynamic balance between immanence and transcendence. Thus, immanence
is analogous to the mechanistic concerns for "what is", while trans-
cendence is concerned with "what might" to be. Another way of stating
this relationship is that means-ends are hypenated and cannot be
treated as entities. It would, therefore, be desirable in under-
standing the new directions, that the Anisa theory of evaluation may
take by presenting the research designs that were initially used in
field testing the Model at several sites.
Since the Anisa paradigm represents a comprehensive educational
system functionally defined by specifications, it presents an ideal
basis for a research design that can be deduced from theory. This
strategy, analogous to the design of new cities, is actively being
considered. The search for significant funds — literally millions
of dollars — continues to be a focus of effort. This would approx-
imate the ideal example of Bronfenbrenner ' s proposition for on the
American educational scene there is no other "transforming experiment"
with a scientific underpinning as elegant as Anisa. This is a bold
claim, but such a grand experiment now appears as feasible as a trip
to the moon. The cost/benefit factors to mankind may be significantly
greater.
The second strategy of introducing Anisa practices into existing
school system(s), however, is the more probable approach for initially
implementing Anisa. In fact, once the theoretical structure was
sufficiently formalized, it was introduced as several school sites
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in 1973 — Hampden, Maine and Suffield, Connecticut. It is notable
that these two strategies are not mutually exclusive for there is a
reciprocal relationship between them. The positive empirical data
from the less than ideal research conditions of field testing in
existing systems are creating the basis for the more probable realiza-
tion of the first strategy (search for large funds).
Initial research designs . After fourteen years of theory building,
the first efforts in 1972 of moving out of "theoretical hunch-land"
into the "land of verification" were launched in field-testing the
Anisa Model. Following the second strategy, Anisa was introduced
into the Suffield Public Schools, Connecticut. The intervention
began with the nursery and kindergarten levels with a programmatic
design of rolling up by levels; thus, in 1980 Anisa has been system-
atically expanded from Grades K-7.
As Director of Research for Project Anisa-Suffield (1973), I
had the responsibility for developing the evaluation design. Since
the Anisa theory defines "evaluation in terms of the purpose of the
activity or program being evaluated" (Jordan, 1973) , a goal evaluation
model emphasizing operations research within a general systems ap-
proach was used (Suchman, 1967). Anisa, as a prescriptive theory, also
seeks "to relate means to ends, distinguishing efficient from final
causes." Thus, the initial research design exemplified these two
critical Anisa concepts of evaluation.
Project goals, specified by theory, were established and evaluated
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by the degree to which they were achieved. Both formative and sum-
mat ive methods were used. Each goal was evaluated using the following
criteria: (1) effort; (2) effect; (3) impact; (4) efficiency; and (5)
process. Measures of effort involved numbers of staff and training
sessions, students served, meetings held, etc. The operations
research approach separates measures of effort from effect. These
measures are important not only for the on-going operations but for
dissemination and replication purposes. Replication, as a method,
will play an important role in establishing the reliability of pre-
vious findings of Anisa practices (Kratochwill
,
1979). While not
as simple as "intrasubject replication designs'* of operant conditioning
in various settings (Kazdin, 1978), this method should be employed.
It is notable that Project Anisa-Suffield was identified and validated
by the Department of Health Education and Welfare (1976) as an exemplary
program recommended for wider dissemination.
With the wider dissemination of Anisa, the research method of
"secondary evaluation" should be considered (Cook, 1973). This would
involve the systematic re-evaluation of the data reported in each of
the primary evaluations from each Anisa field-site. Secondary
evaluations re-examine the conclusions drawn by the primary evaluators
to determine, in fact, if they can be substantiated. For example, the
Coleman Report was critiqued by Bowles and Levin, and Cain and Watts
with the data reanalyzed by a Harvard group and published in a volume
edited by Mosteller and Moynihan. The primary evaluations from the
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field testing of Anisa in Suffield and the Cooperative Special Services
Center, Connecticut, Hamden, Maine and Ohio Valley Regional Development
Commission suggest the feasibility of this method in the near future
which would add to the growing body of empirical data supporting the
Anisa paradigm.
Each major goal was also evaluated by measures of effect. The
effect of the programs on the various systems, that is, individual,
group, school, and total system were obtained using varied instru-
mentation and research methods. A variety of instruments was used:
questionnaires; semantic differential; observation schedules;
process measures; and standardized tests. The research methods in-
volved a static group comparison design (Campbell and Stanley, 1966),
comparing students exposed to the Anisa program with a control group
in another community, using instruments to measure the process curric-
ulum. The results varied on some of the measures with Anisa students
doing slightly better than the controls.
Another research method used to evaluate the effects of the
Learning Competency Programs on the content curriculum involved in
matched (age, sex, intelligence) control group design using the norm-
referenced Metropolitan Achievement Tests (Bondra, 1977) . It was
hypothesized that students who participated in the Anisa Learning
Compentency Program would achieve as well as students in the tradi-
tional program. Measurements taken over a six year period demonstrate
that Anisa students at the kindergarten level achieve reading skills
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significantly (PX05) better than students in the traditional program.
The results were the same for the six- and eight-year-olds. Based
on the results of this six-year longitudinal study, all of the Anisa
students from Grades K-4 did as well as or significantly better than
students exposed to the traditional program.
The purpose for detailing these specific research findings is
to illustrate the integral relationship between the Anisa theories of
evaluation and administration. The evaluator and chief administrator
were fully aware that the matched control group method was an in-
appropriate (mechanistic) design using inappropriate norm-referenced
achievement measures for evaluating the content curriculum of the
Learning Competency Program. With respect to instruments, for example,
criterion-referenced tests would have been more appropriate. Instead
of a cross-sectional research design, it would have been more appro-
priate to have a longitudinal design involving growth in the same
students. These factors would have provided a more realistic eval-
uation of the effects of the Anisa practices. Nevertheless, the
effort and funds for this ’’legitimate" (mechanistic) scientific method
of matched control group were made more for administrative and political
reasons than scientific purposes.
The evaluator and administration were not deceiving themselves
that this method served to provide the relevant hard data regarding
the effectiveness of the Anisa theory and practices; it did not mea-
sure the complexity of reciprocal causality. Rather, it
provided
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scientifically" acceptable data to the decision-makers of their
own professional integrity and responsibility to students, parents,
and community; and further, that the introduction of the new, in-
novative program would not harm the students. That is, the respon-
sible decision-makers would have "hard data" for themselves and their
constituency that, in accepting the new program, the students would
at least do as well as or better than the program that was being re-
placed. If the results had shown that the students did not achieve
as well on this one criterion, the administration may, nevertheless,
have decided to continue if data from other more valued outcomes
justified continuation. This illustrates the integral relationship
of evaluation design providing relevant data for administrative
decision making; there is a reciprocal relationship between the two.
This relationship was not initially appreciated in the Suffield
operation. For example, under the pressure of using available funds
to provide services for children, monies were diverted from evaluation
(dropping the process measures and the "friendly critics" role of
Harvard University). The administration later acknowledged the error
which proved to be costly in reduced effectiveness and program accept-
ance (Lincoln, 1977). It is notable, again, that the use of the "hard
methodologies" of mechanistic science can serve an important, although
more limited, role when used in the larger circular, causal, and feed-
back processes of hierarchic structures of the organismic paradigm.
Measures, therefore, were obtained on the effects of the programs
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on the different systems involved (individual students. Learning
Competency Program for different age level groups, and individual
schools). All of these sub-systems, however, were within the total
Suffield school system. As part of the research design, it was
desirable for the decision-makers not to be blinded by their own
wishes and selective attention to data from within the system only;
therefore, efficiency factors of the innovation were addressed. It
was very helpful for the key decision makers to have knowledge re-
garding the efficiency of the Anisa Model by comparing it to other
available educational models on such factors as cost effectiveness
and internal consistency (data language, assumptions, and testable
hypothesis, etc.). This broader perspective would permit more in-
telligent decision-making by the administration by minimizing within
system (e.g. Hawthorne effect, ego involvement of participants. Univer-
sity bias, and other blind spots of the research design and Director
of Research)
.
The method used to address these factors involved engaging an in-
dependent university to provide experts who would serve as "friendly
critics." Dr. Robert Anderson, Professor, Harvard Graduate School
of Education served as senior consultant. He was assisted by Dr. Joan
Bissel, Assistant Professor, Harvard, and graduate assistants. They
used such means as review of the Anisa literature, interviews, on-site
observations of classrooms, etc. Dr. Bissel et al. (1975) states,
"...there is no question that Anisa offers unique attributes as an
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educational approach. Its attempt to deal with organizational and
administrative aspects of schools as well as aspects of classroom
methods on curriculum is extremely unique. Few other approaches to
early education are as broad in scope as is Anisa." (p. 1.6). They
further state:
In conclusion, Anisa possesses all the elements trad-
itionally found in a scientific or educational
theory. It has a number of explicit assumptions,
most of which provide an extremely idealistic basis
for educational planning. It has a comprehensive
and straightforward set of definitions of key
educational concepts. These definitions are broad
enough to be used in a wide range of educational
settings. Finally, Anisa specifies numerous test-
able hypotheses concerning relationships between
experiences in the model and student growth. It is
because of these fundamental elements of an adequate
theory is found in Anisa that it can provide the
basis for Suffield's educational planning and
practice. Because of the abstract and general nature
of the theory, specific applications in classroom
situations will have to be derived by Suffield staff
as the model is implemented. What is perhaps most
important is the fact that Anisa provides a highly
flexible theoretical umbrella which can be modified
as necessary during the process of implementation.
...We find that Anisa provides a strong framework
for Suffield' s making decisions about organization,
staffing, institutional renewal and related issues
of educational administration (pj 1.7).
It was helpful, as part of the research design, to engage an
independent and prestigious university to provide a wider perspective
on the Anisa Model for the staff and the lay.community . _..Whil,e...their
conclusions were primarily positive, this operations research method
provided a before the fact, built-in, self-corrective approach that
made the findings relevant and credible not only for the local but the
broader educational community.
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With respect to measures of process, the research design took into
account the fact that many innovative programs activate individual,
group and institutional behaviors which prevent evaluation and adoption
of the program on its own merits. The literature suggests that the
educational scene is littered with the skeletons of innovations which
collapsed due to inadequate attention to the totality of change
processes. Therefore, the evaluation design had as its second major
goal the demonstration of the application of a process model of planned
change.
A descriptive history of the development, growth — successes
and failures — was undertaken as part of a doctoral dissertation
by Richard Lincoln, A Case Study of the Implementation of the Anisa
Model of Education in Suffield Public Schools, Connecticut, 1978 .
His study used Havelock as the framework for evaluating the change
process. The systematic use of doctoral students as process observers
from the University of Massachusetts who worked with the administrative
and teacher teams proved very helpful in implementing the Model.
Richard Lincoln, who also served as Project Director, was a participant-
observer intimately involved in all administrative decisions. Using
the systematic feedback from other process observers and the operations
research design of the Project permitted evaluation as an on-going
process of every aspect of the program — both process and product.
The built-in process of immediate feedback allowed for necessary mod-
ifications of program and the research design itself — an organic
process.
253
Although the true objectivity of the mechanistic paradigm was not a
goal, the role of the University dissertation committee, coupled with
a specified theoretical framework, enhanced the reliability and
validity of Lincoln's case study based upon participant observation.
It is notable that the case study and participant-observation methods
have greater legitimacy and relevance under the organismic paradigm.
Conceptual and experiential basis for paradigm perspective . As Director
of Research, with a key role on the Leadership Team, my understanding
of the Anisa Model, at that point in time, was influenced by the
following theoretical concepts regarding change strategies. The
disciplinary matrix of these concepts — now seen as consistent with
the organismic paradigm — were used as the basis of new ideas that
differed from the mechanistic view of what constituted an acceptable
research design. My first-hand experience in field testing the Anisa
Model provided an empirical data base from which new ideas evolved. At
that point in time, attempts were made at reconciling theory differences;
these were generally unsuccessful or presented defensively. The
attempted resolution of some of these problems led to the formulation of
this dissertation. One consequence of this study was to clarify the
futility of those efforts. The awareness has now emerged that Anisa
offers a gestalt shift — a new world view — representing a new para-
digm which permits the reframing of the theoretical differences as with-
in theory but not between paradigm differences. The paradigm concept
has allowed me to sort out more clearly theoretical and
methodological
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issues VIS a vis the paradigm under which they are subsumed. Mech-
anistic research designs, therefore, dominated thinking and were large-
ly influenced by grant proposal requirements for Federal funding. Thus,
launching a major social change effort in the school system, which
was to be "scientifically” evaluated, posed significant theoretical
and methodological problems.
Again, at that time, my thinking was largely influenced by the
convergence of Anisa theories with a number of existing conceptual
schemes (e.g. General Systems Thoery and personality theories with
their related concepts of change for the individual, group, and
organization). With respect to General Systems Theory, with its
fountainhead resting upon cybernetics, information, and communications
theories, the basic shift in assumption from entropy to negative
entropy provided a new view of change. The concept of entropy,
as defined in the Second Law of Thermodynamics, was true in closed,
physical systems of thing-thing interaction. There was evidence, how-
ever, that this law did not apply in bio-psycho-social systems.
For these systems, rather than assuming a disorganized complexity or
a closed system where entropy is ultimately operative, an organized
and dynamic complexity was assumed; the concept of negative entropy
was thought to be operative. It assumed an open system wherein there
was a process that tends toward greater integration and organization.
Negative entropy assumes an organized complexity allowing for an open
system that permits the "emergence of originals" — a theory of im-
probability with the ultimate prediciton of one change in infinity.
255
The conception of psychological entropy as a degradation of
energy and negative entropy as a release of psychological energy
had great power and scope. It showed the functional relationship
that exists between organism-organism, organism-thing, and thing-
thing interaction. It holds for all ages and can be applied to varied
cultures. The system allowed for measurement in quantitative terms.
Normative statistics, applied to the assumption of a disorganized
complexity, could be useful in special cases. The need for new math-
ematical models which operate on the assumption of an organized com-
plexity were in the process of development (e.g. ipsative and non-
parametric statistics)
. Negative entropy, or degree of organization,
could best be conceptually mapped in such new mathematical terms.
There was considerable difficulty in the communication of the mean-
ing of terms; for example, one of the major paradoxes debated was the
relationship between ''information content" and "physical entropy." The
former could only be a special case of the latter, and there was no
necessary relationship between statistical entropy and physical entropy.
Within limits, however, these terms were treated as equivalent and
allowed translation from thermodynamics to the theory of computing
machines from brain models to social organization. In the physical
world of thing-thing interaction, these theories demonstrated their
usefulness and created a technological revolution with concomitant
implications for social change. At the physical level the bridge
from theory to practice was well girded.
Whether the pattern of "entropy" was the universal process with
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'•negative entropy" a temporary interlude as Toynbee's system would
suggest, or whether the concept of "negative entrophy" was the basic
one that always tends toward higher levels of integration and organ-
ization was the central issue (Bateson now integrates these two
processes, see page 184). The framework, however, treated the in-
dividual personality as no longer self-contained but open to the
world about him. He could be treated as an open system in an open
society. The circular, causal, and feedback process — self-correc-
tive basis of such a system — offered humility, but its optimism
offered much hope and faith — qualities of ideology.
It was still difficult to establish isomorphic relationships
between the assumptions of the Anisa Model and General Systems Theory.
While there were semantic issues involved, the areas in which the two
theories converged in describing and understanding processes in the
real world were far greater than areas of divergence. The concept of
translating potentiality into actuality — a process involving purpose
and based on subjective aim, tending toward higher levels of integra-
tion and organization. Just as some have viewed cybernetics as a
conceptual breakthough that gave rise to the "second industrial
revolution", the Anisa assumption regarding final cause and subjec-
tive aim appears to this author to have given rise to a conceptual
revolution with equivalent impact on educational practice.
In establishing linkage with the Anisa Model and other conceptual
models of personality and organization, there was an impressive con-
vergence in meaning when comparing their underlying assumptions
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concerning the nature of man. It was again notable that there was
virtually a Tower of Babel when comparing theoretical models because of
the theory builder's need to develop his own language and meanings.
The underlying structures — physical or behavioral — were frequent-
ly present and observable but differences resulted in the way in
which they were symbolically represented. Nevertheless, there were
commonalities among a variety of theorists who arrived at similar
assumptions about the nature of man. For example, Harry Stack
Sullivan's (1953) interpersonal theory of psychiatry, based on
participant clinical observations, operated on the explicit assumption
that the tendency toward health is greater than that toward disease.
Carl Rogers (1959), in his client-centered therapy, assumed that the
individual has inherent in him the necessary forces for self-
realization. Allport (1937) and, most notable, Maslow (1954) —
as a positive third force in psychology — operated on a similar
assumption. Karl Menninger (1963) developed a major theoretical
system and consequent clinical application based on an equivalent
assumption.
As a behavioral scientist, Harold Anderson (1957) was most lucid
in using such assumptions when applied to personality and social growth.
His propositions were supposedly valid at physiological, psychological,
and social levels. For the circular, causal, and feedback relation-
ships that exist between the organism and environment, Anderson stated
that there were two processes: (1) the "growth circle" and (2) the
"vicious circle" (comparable to Hersey and Blanchard's (1972) high
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expectation-low expectation cycle). The concept of self-stimulation,
or feedback, was extended to include the circular behavior that exists
in the interaction of human beings. The growth circle, or socially
integrative behavior, he stated, manifest high degrees of three
qualities: spontaneity and harmony, differentiation and integration,
self-expression and the expenditure of energy with others in a
common purpose. Problem-solving in social conflict was not a psychol-
ogy of adjustment, but a psychology of invention. In the circular
process of interacting and working together, the emergence of originals
represented an integration of differences. The free interaction of
minds-in-disagreement was creative. This was not viewed as a mech-
anistic stimulus-response sequence but as a process; the response was
not just to stimulus or challenge but a response to relating. Circular
behavior was creative, inventive; resulting in the term "growth
circle." Consistent with the basic assiimption, the dynamic, circular
behavior was in the direction of growth or health. Thus, Anderson pre-
sented a major hypothesis: socially integrative behavior in one person,
group or organization tends to induce socially integrative behavior in
others.
Anderson's vicious circle, on the other hand, consisted of behavior
wherein individuals cannot integrate their activities in a creative
direction. Domination, the use of power over others, was the central
characteristic. Thus, Anderson's major hypothesis for his second
process was: domination in one person, group or organization
tends to
incite domination (resistance) in others.
Resistance, as a consequence
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of domination, manifested itself in such behaviors as: submission,
aggression, frustration, rigidity, compensation, etc. These were
negative terms and generally applied to interpersonal conflict in
situations of stress. A content analysis of most psychological liter-
ature would indicate a greater number of references to aspects related
to the vicious circle. This was typical of the Freudian and many other
clinical approaches. The implications of this framework, however,
would change the emphasis. The vicious circle — psychopathology
and social pathology (the suppression of potentiality) — were view-
ed as special cases within a larger, more positive process that tend-
ed toward higher levels of growth, health, organization, or self-renewal.
The vicious circle could be cut by the intervention of a socially
integrated person, group, or organization. Psychotherapeutic inter-
vention was basically a socially integrative relationship; most psychol-
ogists regarded it as a speeded-up and assisted growth process. Therapy
releases the person for more rapid development of spontaneity, in-
tegration, and self-realization. These same principles, therefore,
were operative at the organizational level — only the strategies of
intervention differed.
Social psychological theory and research, whose units of study
were organism-organism interaction (e.g.,dyad, group, organization,
etc.), gave rise to theories based upon similar assumptions about the
nature of man and their implications for social organization.
With
respect to the application of such theories to formal
organizations,
Chris Argyris (1976) , Frederick Herzberg (1966) , Hersey and
Blanchard
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(1972), Rensis Likert (1967), Douglas McGregor (1960) and others had
programs in operation or were influencing organizational development
that promoted human growth and organizational self-renewal. When
applied, their theories provided evidence that greater individual
self-realization and organizational effectiveness was generated.
They offered the basis of a theory of self-determination, but also an
approach to a theory of renewed growth.
Since the Anisa Model, with respect to change, is primarily
evolutionary, the basic strategy to bring about social change could
be characterized as planned change (Lippitt et al. 1958) . This was
in contrast to change strategies involving revolutions or social
reforms (See Appendix A). Toynbee's hyperexis (civilizations follow
a pattern of three and a half beats); Marx's historicism; Plato's steady
state, etc. were different approaches to understanding change. Anisa
appeared to have similarities to John Gardner's (1963, p.5) concept
of social change. He indicated that the classic question of social
reform has been, "How can we cure this or that specifiable ill?" He
stated that we must now ask another kind of question: "How can we
design a system that will continuously reform (i.e., renew itself)
beginning with presently specifiable ills and moving on to ills
that we cannot now foresee?" This suggested, therefore, that the
basic assumptions about the nature of man when extended to psychologi-
cal and social systems, offered a theoretical basis for asking and
attempting to answer John Gardner's question. It was possible to
bridge from theory to practice and create a system that provided for
261
Its own continuous renewal — for the individual and organization.
It was notable, however, to add Gardner's caveat, "Knowledge will
be a sane weapon oi^ if it is linked to a deeply rooted conviction
that organizations are made for men and not men for organizations."
(1963, p.64)
In retrospect, these theories were part of a disciplinary matrix
consistent with the organismic paradigm. At that time, the Anisa
Model was not viewed as a paradigm, but it was beginning to give
conceptual order to diverse theories characteristic of Kuhn's pre-
paradigm stage of development. Eventually, Anisa emerged as a paradigm
with its presupposition concerning the nature of reality. The Anisa
theories are deduced from this first principle with each theory an
integral part of a comprehensive and coherent whole. As an emerging
new paradigm, the entire structure rests on the key role of the theory
of evaluation. There is, in turn, an integral relationship between
the theory of evaluation and the theory of administration, the latter
orchestrating the entire hierarchic structure based on feedback from
the evaluation design. It is beyond the scope of this study to de-
limit further this relationship but merely to point out its importance.
Administration and research strategies: integral systems . The integral
relationship between the Anisa theories of administration and evaluation
emerged very prominently in the Project Anisa-Suffield experience.
The Director of Research played an important leadership role. The
change strategy (i.e. planned change using a goal evaluation, operations-
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research design) was a key factor to be considered by the Superintend-
ent of Schools and the Board of Education in their decision to im-
plement the Anisa Model in Suffield. It became even more salient
when I became the Principal Investigator (i. e., Superintendent of
Schools) for Project Inspire (1978). This Project, the result of
planned change was to implement the Anisa Model, with an initial
focus on special education students, in the Cooperative Special
Services Center (CSSC) comprising five school systems in Connecticut:
East Granby, East Windsor, Granby, Suffield and Windsor Locks. Pro-
ject Inspire is supported by $500,000 of Federal Title IV-C and
local funds for a three-year period from 1978-1981. It is one of
the "ripple effects" of Project Anisa-Suffield and can be viewed
as another field-testing site for the Anisa Model. As the chief
administrator, responsible to the Board of Education and the commun-
ities, recommending a major change in organizational goals represent-
ed a significant leadership action. Since planning was based upon
Anisa theory, the key theoretical concept states that purpose gen-
erates structure which then serves as a guide to action. The admin-
istration of an Anisa educational system, therefore, serves the primary
purpose of actualizing the potentialities of human beings. Since man
has an infinitude of potentiality, the primary goal of the organiza-
tion is the release of human potential — for each student and the
collective potential of the organization (Walker, 1975). To accomplish
this, the leadership needs to articulate a clear vision of where the
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organization is going. While the final end-state in education is
frequently not clear, the direction can always be indicated.
Administration, in Anisa terms, means to serve. In accomplishing
this service function, there is a dynamic equilibrium between leader-
ship (change) and management (stability). Thus, it was a major
leadership function for me to recommend to the Board of Education
that we change our existing goals and move in the new direction of
implementing the Anisa Model as the primary organizational goal.
Central to the Board adopting this goal in 1977, was the explicit
change strategy of Anisa theory, i.e., leadership arises out of
immanence — man's capacity to use accumulated experience to negotiate
the present with an eye toward the future — to what he may want to
become (transcendence)
.
Four factors in the organizational history (its immanence) help-
ed to facilitate the Board's approval for implementing the Anisa Model.
First, the CSSC organization was created and developed, based on a
strategy of planned change. Second, the Anisa theory of administration
made explicit and operationally useful a management system based on
Situational Leadership developed by Mersey and Blanchard (1972) . There
is essential congruence on all major concepts — particularly the
nature of man — between Anisa principle and Situational Leadership
Theory. The latter is an integration of current theories of admin-
istration which serves as a synthesizing framework, emphasizing
compatabilities rather than differences. Situational Leadership
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established a positive integrating relationship among Maslow's hier-
archy of needs, Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory, Argysis' immat-
urity-maturity continuum, McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y, Likert's
management systems, Blake's two-dimensional leadership grid, and
the Ohio State behavioral categories of "Initiating Structure and
Consideration." Situational Leadership is further based on a curvi-
linear relationship between initiating structure and consideration
behavior of a leader and the task maturity level of the follower(s).
The theory, therefore, provides the teacher, administrator, and the
parent with some understanding of the relationship between an effective
style of teaching, administering, or parenting and the task maturity
level of his students, staff, or children. This theory made explicit
many of the assumptions and practices that were being used. It, there-
fore, facilitated the adoption of this new direction by the Board.
The third factor that facilitated the change effort was the
relatively successful implementation of the Anisa Model in Suffield.
The fact that the Project Anisa-Suffield was a validated Project by
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, largely based on
the results of the evaluation design, also influenced the decision-
makers. The fourth factor — in many ways the most important
— was
the organizational experience of basing professional practices on a
substantive body of theoretical knowledge. In collaboration with
staff
from the cooperating systems and Federal Title III funding,
their
current practices were based on the 3R Model (an ecectic
model based on
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the learning theory of B. F. Skinner, ecological theories of Nicholas
Hobbs and William Rhodes, Reality Therapy of William Glasser, and
rational emotive therapy of Albert Ellis). The 3R Program, also a
nationally validated Project by HEW in 1972, served as the theoretical
basis for diagnostic and special education practices in the cooperating
five towns. Thus, the organizational history, with the Board of
Education basing its professional practices on scientific theory,
facilitated the acceptance of the Anisa Model which was readily seen
as a much more elegant theory than the 3R Model. Being a comprehensive
and coherent scientific theory of education and integrated with a
theory of administration, the Anisa Model more adequately fulfilled
the administration's expectations.
These first-hand experiences with testing Anisa theory in the
"land of verification" have added to its accumulated history. Some
of the research methods that were successfully used can now be trans-
cended as we explore the implications that are indicated by the Anisa
paradigm. Transcending the fourth factor discussed above, i.e., the
willingness of the educational community to base its professional
practices on a scientific theory, has led to the possibility of using
even more sophisticated research methods in future undertakings.
Experimental Ecology of Human Development
Given the key role of the Anisa theory of development, it
is
entirely appropriate that evaluation should also emphasize
its importance.
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Chapter III discussed certain limitations of the mechanistic approach-
es to research on human development. Bronfenbrenner (1977) also ob-
serves that the emphasis on rigor has led to experiments that are
elegantly designed but frequently limited in scope. Many of these
experiments involve unfamiliar, artificial situations that are short-
lived, dealing with unusual behaviors that are difficult to generalize
to other settings. He further states:
...it can be said that much of contemporary develop-
mental psychology is the science of the strange be-
havior of .children in strange situations with strange
adults for the briefest possible periods of time (p. 513).
Bronfenbrenner notes that the reaction to these limitations has
resulted in concerns for the social relevance of research, often with
open rejection of the rigor of the "hard methodologies." One major
foundation, for example, will make grants only to persons who are
victims of social injustice. Less radical approaches involve reliance
on existential experience which takes the place of observation; analysis
gives way to the direct "understanding" gained through intimate in-
volvement in the field situation. Bronfenbrenner ’ s orientation rejects
both the implied dichotomy between rigor and relevance and the assumed
incompatibility between research in naturalistic situations and the
applicability of structured experiments. He proposes "...an expansion
and then a convergence of both the naturalistic and experimental
approaches — an expansion and convergence in the theoretical con-
that underlie each of them (p. 514).."ceptions of the environment
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He resolves this by using the perspective of the evolving science
of the ecology of human development.
Jordan, it is my thesis, resolves these issues by viewing them
as paradigm differences. Bronfenbrenner
' s science of the ecology
of human development, nevertheless, falls within a disciplinary
matrix that is consistent with the organismic paradigm. His work,
therefore, has implications for new methods — puzzle-forms with
new rules and procedures for solving them — subsumed under the
organismic methodology. While the paradigm perspective is more
comprehensive, much of Bronfenbrenner ' s work is most congenial to
the Anisa theory of evaluation and offers possible solutions to meth-
odological problems raised by the Anisa paradigm. Some of these new
methods are directly applicable; they can serve as a framework for
those implementing the Anisa Model. It is within this framework that
we can design a "transforming experiment." While some differences
do exist between Bronfenbrenner and Jordan, the areas of convergence
far outweigh the differences. Thus, Bronfenbrenner appears to make
a contribution to the "normal science" stage of Anisa development.
It is beyond the scope of this work to delimit fully his approach,
however, some of his definitions and propositions will illustrate the
areas of convergence and their implications for the Anisa theory of
evaluation. For example, Bronfenbrenner (1977) provides some basic
definitions of the ecology of human development.
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First, the ecology of human development is the scien-
tific study of the progressive, mutual accomodation,
throughout the life span, between a growing human
organism and the changing immediate environments in
which it lives, as this process is affected by re-
lations obtaining within and between these immediate
settings, as well as the larger social contexts, both
formal and informal, in which the settings are em-
bedded (p. 514).
This concept of environment more closely approximates the four Anisa
environments and is considerably broader than that found in psychology
in general. Second, he defines the ecological environment topologically
as a nested arrangement of structures, each contained within the nest.
He characterizes these successive levels in the following systems
terms: (l)microsystems
, (2) mesosystem, (3) exosystem, and(4) macro-
system. A microsystem, for example, is defined as "...the complex of
relations between the developing person and environment in an immediate
setting containing that person (e.g. home, school, workplace, etc.)
(p. 514)." In somewhat different terms, these parallel the systems
approach use in the Project Anisa-Suffield design.
The third definition is concerned with ecological validity which
"...refers to the extent to which the environment experienced by the
subjects in a scientific investigation has the properties it is supposed
or assumed to have by the investigation (p. 516.)" The most signficant
factor in this definition concerns the perceived aspects of the en-
vironment by the research subjects (their subjective aims) and not
merely the objective properties. Bronfenbrenner quotes W. I. Thomas’
dictum: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their
269
consequence (p. 516)." This concept has broad application in the
behavioral sciences, and it is particularly congenial with the Anisa
concept of subjective aim. The second notable factor in this defini-
tion concerns the research setting itself. The laboratory may be the
valid setting for a given problem while a real-life environment may be
valid for a different problem. For example, it has been demonstrated
that parent-child activity studied in the laboratory is systematically
different than those in the home. In general, research findings obtain-
ed in a laboratory setting should not prima facie be interpreted as
superior to evidence obtained in a real-life setting. The ecological
contexts of the laboratory and real-life settings have their special
properties in relation to the specific research question. Since many
of the Anisa developmental concepts are based upon empirical studies,
the application of these in field-testing may produce different re-
sults. Before discarding or revising the initial concepts, the
ecological contexts of the findings should be explored. This is an
important caution for Anisa practitioners. It is equally important
to take this factor into account before revising theory for it may
involve more than the inappropriate implementation of techniques by
the staff.
In any scientific undertaking, decisions on the research design
are determined by theory (paradigm) . Given the concept of ecological
environments as interdependent, nested systems, gives rise to the
research question of how these interdependencies can be empirically
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studied. For Bronfenbrenner (1977) — equally true for Anisa as a
prescriptive theory — it is a research strategy — an ecological
experiment — defined as follows:
An ecological experiment is an effort to investigate
the progressive accommodation between the growing
human organism and its environment through a
systematic control between two or more environmental
systems or their structural components, with a
careful attempt to control other sources of in-
fluence either by random assignment (contrived
experiment) or by matching (natural experiment) (p. 517).
Within this definition, therefore, the field testing of Anisa
can be viewed as an ecological experiment — a tranforming experiment.
The alternative use of Campbell and Stanley's (1966) "quasi-experi-
ment" is not applicable because it suggests a lower level of method-
ological rigor. The Anisa paradigm legitimizes both methods: an
experiment of nature or an elegantly contrived experiment, depending
on the purposes. Other methods are also useful, e.g., ethnographic
description, naturalistic observation, case studies, field surveys,
etc. Bronfenbrenner, however, emphasizes the critical role that the
experiment plays in ecological investigations which not only test
hypotheses but serve to detect systems-properties within and beyond
the immediate setting. Bronfenbrenner (1977) states: "If you wish to
understand the relation between the developing person and some aspect
of his or her environment, try to budge the one and see what happens
to the other (p.518)". This recognizes that the relation between per-
son and environment has the properties of a system with a momentum of
its own. In order to discover the inertia and interdependencies
of the
system, one can disturb the existing balance and see what transpires.
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Using this perspective, therefore, the primary purpose of an
ecological experiment, such as field-testing Anisa, is not "hypothesis
testing" but "discovery", i.e., identifying those system properties
that affect, and are affected by, the behavior and development of the
human being. Thus, it is essential to identify such systems properties
and include them in the research design before the fact. Since human
environments are so complex with human beings adapting to and restruct-
uring them, research models need to provide means for assessing and
understanding these ecological structures and variations. Most
mechanistic designs with their siinplistic, unidimensional methods
fail to capture and understand this complexity. In contrast, rather
than "controlling out" the single variables, ecological research
seeks to "control in" as many theoretically relevant ecological con-
trasts as is feasible within the design requirements. This permits
greater generalizability beyond the specific situation and helps to
identify the interactions of mutual accomodation between the growing
child and its changing environments.
In Bronfenbrenner ' s judgment, the most demanding requirements of
a research model for investigating the ecology of human development
involve "...environmental structures, and the processes taking place
within and between them" and, which he claims, "must be viewed as
interdependent and must be analyzed in systems terms." Understanding
these inderdependencies is the major goal of the ecological and/or
organismic approach. Bronfenbrenner ' s efforts in this direction are
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reflected in a series of nine propositions outlining the requirements
for an ecological model for research at each of the four successive
levels (microsystem, mesosystem, etc.). These research methods, again,
have important implications for the Anisa theory of evaluation; any
differences are within theory and not paradigm differences. While
Bronfenbrenner presents his ecological model as an improvement over
the traditional (mechanistic) methods, he does not use the "paradigm"
persepctive. It is my judgment that his work falls within the dis-
ciplinary matrix of the organismic paradigm comparable to Werner,
Piaget, Bertalanffy and others. His work is most congenial and can
be generally integrated within the paradigm perspective.
Properties of the microsystem: reciprocity . In the classical research
model there are usually two participants — the experimenter, identified
as E, and the subject, identified as S. The interaction operating
between the E and S is viewed as unidirectional; the experimenter
presents the stimulus, and the subject gives a response. While
social behavior theory (organism-organism interaction) acknowledges
that the process goes both ways, i.e., the principle of reciprocity
is accepted, it is disregarded in research designs. Bronfenbrenner
(1977) presents this in the following propositional form:
In contrast to the traditional unidirectional
research model typically employed in the lab-
oratory, an ecological experiment must allow
for reciprocal processes; that is, not only
the effect of A on B, but also the effect of
B on A. This is the requirement of reciprocity (p. 519).
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As discussed in Chapters II and III, this research design deals
with the mechanistic anomaly of efficient causation being only linear
and unidirectional in a cause-and-effect relationship. A number of
ecological experiments (Rennell et al., 1974) have been conducted
based on the initial observations of animals and the mother-neonate
interaction patterns following birth. Klaus et al. (1972) invest-
igated hospital practices that resulted in minimal opportunity for
contact between mother and her newborn child. Procedures were modified
to permit mothers to have their infants with them for an hour after
birth and for several hours daily. Using a randomly assigned control
group design, the results were outstanding. The mothers in the ex-
perimental group were more attentive, affectionate, and concerned with
their children's welfare. A two year follow-up and cross cultural
replication gave similar results that were unequivocal.
The principle of reciprocity in these experiments was not fully
investigated for the scientific focus was on the mothers. The results
may well have occurred as a response by the developing infant and re-
ciprocated by the mother, in a progressively working pattern of inter-
action. The omission in the research design was the failure to take
into account the total social system operating in the situation.
Bronfenbrenner ' s second proposition deals with this issue;
An ecological experiment requires recongniton of the
social system actually operative in the research
setting. This system will typically involve all the
participants present, not excluding the experimenter.
This is the requirement of recognizing the totality of
the functional social system in the setting (p. 520)
.
I
274
This proposition becomes significant when considering systems
involving more than two persons. This method, therefore, is appro-
priate for the experimental designs called for by Gad 1 in and Bandura,
which were discussed in Chapter III. Again, the Anisa theory of
pedagogy epitomizes this experimental method, wherein the teacher
arranges the environments and guides the interaction in order to
release the child’s potentialities at an optimum rate. This inter-
action provides the necessary efficient and reciprocal causation.
Since Anisa is a prescriptive theory, the teacher, following the
diagnosis of the child's developmental level, uses the theory of
teaching to accomplish the goals of the content and process curriculum.
This provides not only the necessary but the sufficient conditions for
development — final causation. This latter condition, however, is
not considered in Bronfenbrenner ' s proposition. The use of Feuer-
stein's instrumentation (LPAD) in a teaching-learning -process' "with
Piaget's "clinical method" integrates the design issues of reciprocal
causation and instrumentation. Within the microsystem of a classroom
Anisa practices can, in fact, serve as a prototypical ecological
experiment including the emphasis on "discovery" and not on "hypothesis
testing.
"
Classical psychological experiments usually allow for two partici-
pants — E and S. Where the investigators do take into account
the
activities of others in different roles, the behaviors of
each are
frequently treated separately and interpreted as independent
effects.
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For example, it has been demonstrated that the father-infant inter-
action alone may be quite different in the presence of the mother.
This kind of indirect influence is regarded as a second-order effect.
Seaver (1973) presents an outstanding study of a second-order effect
in a classroom setting. He used an ’’experiment of nature” to study
the questionable effects of induced teacher expectancies. He evaluated
*ii^f6rences in achievement of pupils with older siblings who had the
same teacher and achieved well or poorly. Seaver ’s ’’natural experi-
ment” gave strong support to the teacher expectancy hypothesis.
Bronfenbrenner (1977) addresses this issue in the following prop-
ositional form:
In contrast to the conventional dyadic research model,
which is limited to assessing the direct effect of two
agents on each other, the design of an ecological ex-
periment must take into account the existence in the
setting of systems that include more than two persons
(N + 2 systems) . Such larger systems must be analyzed
in terms of all possible subsystems (i.e., dyads, triads,
etc.) and the potential second — and higher order
effects associated with them (p. 520).
Anisa practices offer possibilities for such ecological experiments,
for an N + 3 system within a single context such as home or school is
extremely rare in the literature. The Very Early Anisa Program (1979)
provides teachers (Developmental Specialists) who work with pre-school
children and parents in the home. This represents a typical N + 3
system that can be investigated. The extensive use of volunteer
parents in the regular school setting (intermediaries in the teaching
process) escalates the system from a triad to a quintet or, more
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generally, an N + 3 system and also represent appropriate systems for
investigation.
Anisa practices are concerned with the quality of the interactions
between and among three hierarchically classified environments: physical,
human, unknown, and one that is the composite of the others the Self.
In many respects the easiest to arrange in order to accomplish the
purposes of the curriculum is the physical environment. The impact
of physical factors operating indirectly as higher order effects,
however, have been frequently overlooked. For example, an ecological
study of the effects of apartment noise on development (Cohen, Glass,
and Singer 1973)
,
found that children living on the lower floors of
32-story buildings near noisy traffic showed greater impairment of
auditory discrimination and reading achievement than a matched group
living in higher floor apartments. With respect to studies on the
effects of television, most have been concerned with effects on the
child concerning knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. The indirect
effects on patterns of family life, let alone the physical effects
on vision, etc., have not been investigated.
The most obvious effect in observing an Anisa setting is the
physical environment. It is designed to accomplish specified purposes.
Investigations of systems properties in the immediate setting are
related to Bronfenbrenner ' s (1977) following proposition: ’’Ecological
experiments must take into account aspects of the physical environments
as possible indirect influences on social processes taking place within
the setting.”
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Mesosystem: relations between settings
. Research is generally carried
out in the laboratory, the school, or the home but infrequently in
more than one context at a time. The implications of an ecological
approach allows for investigations of the same persons being in
different settings. Thus, the experience of a child in day care, in
the class, or peer group can change his interaction with parents with
implications for learning. Bronfenbrenner (1977), in order to investi-
gate the joint effects of more than one setting, provides the following
proposition:
In the traditional research model, behavior and develop-
ment are investigated in one setting at a time without
regard to possible interdependencies between settings.
An ecological approach invites consideration of the
joint impact of two or more settings or their elements.
This is the requirement, wherever possible, of analyzing
interactions between settings (p. 523).
Current Anisa practices offer many opportunities for investigating
such second-order effects across both time and space. The implications
of the propositions are to capitalize on those aspects that lend them-
selves to systematic investigation within the usual operations of
a school system.
Since Anisa is primarily concerned with the release of both bio-
logical and psychological potentialities at an optimum rate, we are
concerned with developmental changes throughout the life span. Much
of the focus of past research in developmental psychology has been
on aspects of the developing individual with little reference to con-
text. Thus, development is frequently viewed as instigated by events
within the organism. Although many events in the life cycle have been
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scientifically studied, few have been conducted, according to Bron-
fenbrenner, with the explicit purpose of assessing the impact of the
experience upon the processes of development. There is the need,
therefore, to study the successive shifts in role and setting that
every person undergoes in his life span — ecological transitions.
These transitions involve all of the settings and systems-properties
already discussed. They entail changes over time in role, activity,
and place (e.g., child at home to student in school, wife to mother,
student to worker). The microsystem changes with marriages, births,
graduations, work opportunities, promotions, divorces, and deaths.
Since every transition involves multiple settings, reciprocal processes
occur within and across settings involving higher order effects.
When a child enters day care, family activities change; a divorce
changes the student's behavior in school; dropping out of schools
impacts on the family; a move to a new school affects every environment
of developmental significance. The impact of an ecological transition
on the development of the individual as well as other people in his
life (e. g., family, peer group, etc.) is an unexplored but scientifically
promising area of research. The reader may easily recall a number of
such transitions and their resulting impact; it would be more difficult
to find scientific studies in the professional literature that could
prove relevant and helpful. My major transition occurred at age thir-
teen when my family moved from a small rural community to a major city.
This single event had a significant impact on the course of my total
development. Thus, Bronfenbrenner handles the developmental impact
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of ecological transitions in the following proposition which deals more
with substance and scope than theory and method:
A fruitful context for developmental research is
provided by the ecological transitions that period-
ically occur in a person' s life. These transitions
include changes in role and setting as a function of
the person's maturation or of events in the life
cycle of others responsible for his or her care
and development. Such shifts are to be conceived
and analyzed as changes in ecological systems rather
than solely within individuals. These transitions
are not limited to the early years but recur in
various forms, throughout the life of the person.
Hence, the ecology of human development must in-
corporate a life-span perspective if it is to do
justice to the phenomena within its purview (p. 526).
Some of these ecological transitons are being investigated and
easier transitions planned in Anisa-Suffield, Connecticut. For
example, the two private nursery schools were included in all of
the Anisa training; the change from a private nursery school to the
public kindergarten (which is also based on Anisa), therefore, is
a relatively smooth transition. The Very Early Anisa Program, which
provides services to high risk pre-school children in their homes,
also addresses the transition problem. Findings over the last seven
years show marked improvement over previous practices that were quite
dysfunctional. Multi-age grouping of children in school with teaching
staff involved with the same children over a two to three year period
is providing evidence that these practices are more satisfactory than
the usual abrupt transitions from grade to grade with new teachers each
year.
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Exosystem: developmental settings in context
. The immediate settings
in which the developing individual is functioning are also influenced
by the external contexts in which they are embedded. For example, the
nature of the parent’s work, health and welfare services, government
policies, relations between school and community and law enforcement
practices are all circumstances that impact on the developing person.
The difference in the ecological approach from the usual developmental
research is that the latter, for example, treats social class as a
linear variable rather than conceived in systems terms in which a
person is a participant. Thus, the properties of the research model
for investigating relations at this level represent sources of higher
order effects from more remote area of the environment. They do not
require any new principles; they are primarily heuristic by making
researchers aware that the larger environment may be critical for
understanding the process of human development. This is summarized
in the following proposition (Bronfenbrenner , 1977):
Research on the ecology of human development requires
investigations that go beyond the immediate setting
containing the person to examine the larger contexts,
both formal and informal, that affect events within
the immediate setting (p. 527)
.
While the impact of Federal legislation (PL 94-142) on special
education, for example, is both positive and negative, the long-term
negative effects may predominate if the mandated diagnostic and inter-
vention procedures are followed. Project Inspire, which is applying
Anisa to special education students in five communities in
Connecticut
is experiencing the higher-order effects of this federal
legislation.
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The diagnostic procedures which result in labeling the child based on
norm-referenced tests may well have long-term negative effects on the
development of the child. Although many of the Anisa practices of
diagnosing developmental levels and prescribing interventions without
the formal medical model labels, (e.g., "learning disabled", "emotion-
ally disturbed", etc.) are being implemented, the higher-order effects
of this federal legislation frequently precludes such practices. Re-
search on the ecology of development should investigate these higher-
order effects.
Bronfenbrenner ' s broader approach to research on human development
makes a contribution that is congenial to the Anisa paradigm. In fact,
many of his propositions can be immediately applied in field-testing
Anisa; their elaboration in this presentation underscores this fact.
While his major contributions to research methods are his systems
approach and dealing with reciprocal causation, he fails to deal with
change over time that involves hierarchic structures. It is in
these areas that Bateson et al. make a contribution that deals with
methods involving first-order and second-order change based on the
Theory of Logical Typing.
First-order and second-order change . Watzlawick, Weakland, Fish et al.
(1974) at Stamford University have used Bateson's ideas in their
practices praticularly dealing with change related to psychotherapy.
They operationalize Bateson's insights concerning hierarchic structures
based on the Theory of Groups (Galois, 1832) and Russell and Whitehead's
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Theory of Logical Types. It is beyond the scope of this study to
fully delimit their work. Nevertheless, it is helpful to point out
important segments that have already been empirically tested that
contribute solutions to this major problem identified by the Anisa
paradigm. Their work is an important step in providing a method
with rules and procedures for solving one of the puzzle-forms re-
lated to change and hierarchic structures.
Their method has very significant implications for the Anisa
theories of administration and evaluation. They focus on problem
formation; that is, knowing the problem in order to do — or not
do — something that will create change to get rid of the problem.
They rely on the Theory of Groups which deals with the relationship
of the parts and the whole to which they belong. Thus, members of a
group are determined by any one characteristic. A group may combine
members with change occurring but invariant in outcome (e.g., change
spending activities regarding one's budget but total spent is the
same) . A group may have an identity member that can combine with any
other member and the outcome is no different than the efforts of
other member (e.g., 5 X 1 = 5; thus, a member can act without making
a difference). A member may also have a reciprocal (e.g., -5 = -5,
which also has an invariant outcome). Changes that occur within the
system are changes that do not change the system as a whole. Such
changes are referred to as "first-order change." Thus, if the problem
is with the system as a whole, the attempted solutions will not solve
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the problem. The problem, therefore, has been wrongly formulated.
If you don't know what your problem is, you can become confused.
Using Basteson's adaptation of Russell and Whitehead's Theory
of Logical Types, one can transcend the system by making the distinc-
tion between the member and the class. (See pages 152-160). Bateson
deals with the change of the change. Thus, using the Theory of
Logical Types, there is a change from the member to the class; this
change of change is referred to as "second-order change." First order
change operates on principles applicable to members and not to the
class. It is usually based on common sense (e.g., use more of the same
to solve the problem. It is possible to get into a game-without-end
where the system cannot produce the rules to get out of the rule system
(e.g.. Senate filabuster). Second-order change, however, is frequent-
ly characterized as unpredictable and even illogical. The principles
for determining second-order change are difficult to formulate,
frequently appearing to be intuitive. Nevertheless, once the new
perspective has been understood, from the second-order change, it
appears simple and lucid. Applying second-order techniques for the
"solution" means that the techniques deal with effects and not pre-
sumed causes; the questions are what and not why . In addition,
second-order change techniques lift the situation out of the paradox-
engenering trap created by the self-reflexiveness of the attempted
solution and puts it in a different framework.
The use of first-order and second-order change techniques provide
an important method in problem- formation and problem-resolution that
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should be systematically incorporated and applied within the Anisa
theories of evaluation and administration. For example, there are
many educational practices where first-order change efforts are
attempted with "more of the same" resulting in the solution to the
problem becoming the problem (See page 208) . The current (dictated
by state legislatures) educational approach to dealing with account-
ability is to attempt to solve a problem by norm-referenced achieve-
ment testing of students at selected grade levels. Those identified
below given percentile ranks are provided with essentially more of the
same. This mechanistic, industrial conveyor-belt analog that school
systems are using is largely the problem.
The Anisa Model with its emphasis on the unique ability of the
individual and not the "normal curve" may offer a second-order change.
This new perspective is concerned with establishing a bond with the
child (mediated learning) where the concern is with modifiability,
uniqueness of the child, and his capacity to create possibility. The
whole system operates on new principles. The focus of this study is
how to (1) evaluate that uniqueness; (2) find the unique strengths; :.and
(3) develop a "transforming experiment" where the quality of the
inter-
actions with the new enviroments will also release uncommitted potentials
in the genotype. The focus is on the individual's subjective aim, pur-
poses, and aspirations.
In general, I am suggesting that the Anisa paradigm
with its new
perspective — new world view — may represent an out-of-system
(second-
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order change) solution to many of the existing educational problems
that are dominated by mechanistic first-order change efforts.
Idiographic versus nomothetic methods . The idiographic-nomothetic
issue has a long hisotry, but serious consideration in psychology
began with Gordon Allport (1937). His efforts were to make psychol-
ogists aware of the effects that models of human behavior have on the
type of scientific evidence subsequently gathered. He introduced the
germs idiographic and nomothetic. Allport (1937 states:
The former (nomothetic methods) ... seek only general
laws and employ only those procedures admitted by
the exact sciences. Psychology in the main has been
striving to make of itself a completely nomothetic
discipline. The idiographic sciences, such as history,
biography and literature, on the other hand, endeavor
to understand some particular event in nature or society.
A psychology of individuality would be essentially
idiographic (p. 22).
Marceil (1977) suggests that this terminology alerted psychol-
ogists to the ’’slavish subservience to these (mechanistic, nomothetic,
operational) presuppositions (p. 1047).” By using ’’idiography” he
suggested other possibilities that psychology could take about the
nature of man. Allport’s image of man, Marceil (1977) indicates, is
suggestive of a telic theory of man. His statement, ’’Let us simply
define intention as what the individual is tying to do.” This is
analogous to ’’subjective aim.” Allport’s (1937) later concept of
’’functional autonomy”, which he described as the ’’declaration of
independence for the psychology of personality” (p. 156), also
establishes his telic image of man.
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Allport faced the same problem we have today: nearly all psycho-
logical research advances a mechanistic view of man with the most
sophisticated methods designed to fit this view. He suggested the
development of idiographic methods that would highlight uniqueness,
identity, will, and other humanistic concepts. Nevertheless, Allport
(1946) states:
I try in my book to offer nomothetic constructs that
improve upon those traditionally employed. While they
are nomothetic in nature, many of them have an id
graphic intent (p. 133).
Regardless of whether he was confusing "theory" with "method"
issues by not being able to sort them out, the debate over the
idiographic-nomothetic methods has persisted. Attempts at resolution
have been made, but the most promising reformulation is made by
Marceil (1977). Drawing on Rychlak's definitions of theory and method,
Marceil makes a distinction between the two that leads him to formulate
his "theory versus method matrix." Rychlak (1968) defines method:
A method is the means or manner of determining whether
a theoretical construct of proposition is true or
false. Methods follow theories, though one can work
back from a method to a new or modified theory (p. 43).
The distinction between theory and method is important for it
can create confusion. For example, the terms "stimulus" (S) and
"response" (R) are theoretical constructs because they have a hy-
pothesized relationship to one another. In contrast, however, the
terms "independent variable (IV) and "dependent variable" (DV) belong
to the realm of method favoring no theoretical prediction. By making
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this distinction, Marceil develops a classification system to order
the theory and method dimensions of the issue.
Using a concept from Kluckholm and Murray (1949) which states
that every man is "like all other men, like some other men, and like
no other men" there was an attempt to sort out the styles of research
in these three categories. Thus, we can make our choice of method the
selective examination of many subjects or the intensive examination of
a few subjects. There are two analogous theoretical positions taken
with regard to the nature of man: man is more similar than different
from his fellow; or, man is more different than like his fellows.
The theory and method assumptions are brought together to form a
matrix as shown on Table 1.
Table 1
A Theory Versus Method Matrix
Method assumptions Theory assumptions
A. Man is more
alike
B. Man is more
unique
A. Selective examinations
of many subjects AA AB
B. Intensive examination
of few subjects BA BB
The "AA" theory-method combination shows how the two fit together.
Thus, in strictly mechanistic science, it is assumed that all subjects
within a class are homogeneous in structure; eliminating the need to
test more than a few subjects. The factor analytic school characterizes
AA position.
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The true idiographic” apprach is BB. As examples, the research-
er can use the ipsative approach (which assumes that the individual
is a self-contained universe within which variations occur) or
Stephenson's (1953) Q sort to see how an individual's scores vary
from his own mean in a unique pattern. The "N = 1" research legiti-
mizes the use of single subjects. In addition, many true idiographic
studies are case studies (e.g. Allport's (1965) Letters from Jenny
and White's (1975) Lives in Progress)
.
The "BA" assumption holds that there is some degree of species
homogeneity of processes. Therefore, it is not necessary to study
large numbers. The use of extensive and intensive designs can be
selectively used. Thus, in an intensive design (those with an N of 1
or a few), the subject serves as his own "control"; the background
variables such as sex, age, socio-economic status are kept constant.
Hard statistical relationships found in extensive designs are not
the goal, but, once a reliable relationship is found in a single
subject, other subjects can be studied to see if the relationship
obtains from subject to subject. Ebinghaus used this strategy when
he used himself as subject in the study verbal learning.
Marceil's theory-method matrix expands the debate beyond
positions of the "purist", "true idiographic", and "true nomothetic"
who have been debating for the last forty years. The issues, never-
theless, will persist. They are not defined within a given paradigm,
but they do offer a further clarification of some of the problems
raised by the Anisa paradigm.
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Of the variety of meanings that Kuhn (1970) attributes to the
term paradigm, two meanings seem basic and complementary. First, a
paradigm denotes "...one sort of element in that constellation (of
beliefs, values, techniques shared by the community), the concrete
puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace
explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles
of normal science (p. 175)."
Anisa, now in the "normal science" stage, is concerned with
the solutions to these remaining puzzles. This is related to Kuhn's
second meaning of paradigm which is the "entire constellation of
beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a
given community." The emerging community of Anisa scientists, therefore,
have a great deal of mopping up work to do in solving the many re-
maining puzzles.
CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND PROJECTIONS
My professional career has been guided by attempts at answering
the following questions:
1. What does it mean to be intelligent with respect to personal
and social change?
2. How can I and the school foster that intelligence and change?
The answer to the first question was largely determined by my profes-
sional training as a psychologist. The field of psychology, in its
desire to base its practices on scientific theory, defined "intelli-
gence" as rooted in a substantive body of scientific knowledge. The
mechanistic paradigm was and remains the dominant science; mastery of
its rules and procedures was necessary as a legitimizing process for
entry into the profession. Since training has a controlling effect on
the developing mind, "intelligence" was therefore defined as scientific
in contrast to philosophical or theological knowledge. As a teacher
(professor), psychologist, director of research, and superintendent of
schools, I attempted to foster that "intelligence." The answers to
personal and social change were implicitly subsumed under the mechan-
istic view of the world. Developmental psychology answered questions
of personal change; social psychology offered the empirical basis for
social change. In general, the latter defined strategies of change as
revolutionary, reform, or planned change.
The terms of "intelligence" and "change" have, however, remained
"weasel words" when operationally defined within mechanistic science.
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Initial attempts at basing professional practice on these concepts pro-
vided many first-hand experiences documenting great gaps between theory
and practice. While "scientific methods" were applied, they dealt with
a very narrow spectrum of phenomena. It was emerging, in fact, that
"method" determined what problems would be attacked. The usual caveat
found in most research reports that more research is required before...
also illustrates the frustration that practitioners face in decision-
making. The implicit assumption holds that the "scientific method" —
given sufficient resources and time — will solve the problem. This
internalized trust in the proper application of the "scientific method"
frequently created a sense of guilt in that I blamed myself for not
using the "methods" properly — it is a poor carpenter who blames his
tools. Counter-instances and anomalies based on first-hand experiences
were seen as personal failures and not the consequences of inadequate
"methods .
"
These were symptoms — not recognized at the time — of the crisis
faced by the mechanistic paradigm. There was a blurring of the para-
digm and the loosening of the rules of normal research. Many of the
practices (e.g., research in the field) paralleled research character-
istic of a pre-paradigm period. This dissertation has provided me, and
hopefully, the reader, with a more satisfactory answer to these ques-
tions by redefining both "intelligence" and "change." In fact, the
Anisa Model offers the most elegant answer by not only defining intel-
ligence as a new scientific (organismic) paradigm but also by inte-
grating an answer to the more profound question of "change." It has
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and continues to provide me with an answer to how I and the school can
foster that ’’intelligence" and "change." Thus, my professional prac-
tice, simply defined, is practice based on a substantive body of
empirical knowledge. In current educational practices — it is diffi-
cult to characterize education as a profession by the above definition
espoused theories and theories-in-use leave much to be desired.
The formerly espoused mechanistic theory with its anomalies and counter-
instances leads to theories-in-use that create a sense of guilt. To
remain committed to the paradigm one had to blame one's self rather than
the tools — the "methods" of the science. A consequence of this study
was to show that the methods of mechanistic science were, in fact,
inadequate, creating a crisis of confidence. The study demonstrates how
the Anisa Model deals with the crisis by creating a new scientific
paradigm for education; therefore, providing the most elegant answer to
my basic questions.
Criteria for Assessing Scientific Theories Re: The Anisa Model
This dissertation establishes criteria for addressing empirically
based scientific theories. These criteria are then applied to the Anisa
Model to determine if it qualifies as a scientific theory. In brief,
the scientific process involves three interrelated steps: (1) observa-
tion; (2) model building (i.e., data language, assumptions, and test-
able hypotheses); and (3) empirical verification in the real world.
It is demonstrated how Anisa fulfills the first observational
step by documenting the units of study upon which the Anisa Model is
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based. Jordan initially took man as his basic unit of study. Since
Whitehead's organismic perspective was finally selected, man was
viewed as being at the apex of a hierarchically organized universe.
Within this organismic view, the primary unit of study is "change",
the most pervasive characteristic of the universe. Change also means
process and process presupposes potentiality. At the most general
level, therefore, the units of study are those patterns of energy
transformations involved in the process of translating potentiality
into actuality. In a hierarchically organized universe, this involves
general systems that can be abstracted for study involving the tradi-
tional thing-thing, organism-thing, organism-organism, and organiza-
tion-organization interactions. Theories of these interactions,
therefore, involve the physical, biological, psychological, and social
sciences. In addition, the Anisa Model deals with the spiritual
nature of man. Thus, the Anisa Model provides a total cosmology con-
sistent with the "big bang" theory that deals with the reductionist
issue within a general theory of organization. It qualifies as a
metaphysical system that handles the whole of the proverbial elephant.
The second step in the scientific process is model building.
This involves data language, assumptions, and the ability of the
theory to generate testable hypotheses. It is demonstrated how the
Anisa Model fulfills these criteria. It is notable that Jordan makes
explicit the underlying assumption of the Model: the first principle
is the concept of process as the translation of potentiality into
actuality. This is also a fundamental definition of creativity. This
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underlying assumption of the Anisa Model sets forth the proposition
that evolution is an expression of this process and man is at the fore-
front of evolutionary development. The Model further assumes that the
purpose of education is the release of human potential in constructive
directions at an optimum rate. A further implication of this assump-
tion is that education is a part of the conscious and intentional
effort to guide the future direction of evolution.
From this basic assumption, Jordan derived a coherent body of
theory deductively generated from this first principle and inductively
validated by empirical research, where possible. Jordan then formu-
lated a comprehensive theory of human development. Development is
defined in terms of the first principle — the translation of poten-
tiality into actuality. The theory defines two types of potentiality:
biological and psychological. Nutrition is the key factor in the
actualization of biological potentialities. Learning, defined as the
capacity to differentiate, integrate and generalize, is the key to the
release of the five basic psychological potentialities — psychomotor,
perceptual, cognitive, affective, and volitional. The terms compre-
hensive and coherent are applicable to the Anisa Model for the Theory
of Pedagogy and the Theory of Curriculum are interrelated with the
Theory of Development and the Theory of Administration. This study's
main thrust is a further articulation of the Theory of Evaluation.
In general, the data language of Anisa — its definitional terms —
are coherent and straightforward. While they are precise, there is an
abstract quality that contributes to Anisa as a generative theory which
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permits the practitioner to apply concepts to a wide range of
learning situations.
The third and very significant step in assessing a scientific
theory is its ability to generate testable hypotheses. Since the Anisa
Model has been field-tested at several sites beginning in 1973, there
is a growing body of empirical evidence supporting its effectiveness.
The Model has generated hypotheses concerning the relationships between
educational experiences and outcomes for both students and staff. In
general, all of the "hard methodologies" explicated by Campbell and
Stanley (1966) for hypothesis-testing are applicable. Traditional
research designs using control groups, norm-references instruments, and
statistical procedures have been used demonstrating positive findings.
Anisa is concerned with longitudinal change in the student and organiza-
tion, few of these type of hypotheses have been tested. Although pro-
posals have been developed for creating the necessary instruments for
measurement, the needed funding is not yet available. In addition, new
research methods specifying testable hypotheses are required to deal
with new phenomena (e.g., reciprocal causation, emerging hierarchic
structures, etc.). Nevertheless, the Anisa Model viewed from this
essentially mechanistic framework, fulfills the criteria of a scienti-
fic theory. It is notable that Anisa as a theory can be evaluated
separately from the characteristics of implementing Anisa in the field.
However, the bridge from theoretical hunch-land to the land-of-verifi-
cation is a crucial process in the view of many scientists. This view
essentially holds that experiments can be designed to test the theory
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empirically. Differences between competing theories are ultimately
to be resolved by empirical testing. Thus, scientific knowledge fol-
lows a logical and rational process frequently characterized as the
building-block or accretion process of scientific development.
Growth of Scientific Knowledge: Paradigm Perspectives
Many historians of science question the concept of development-by-
accumulation. Thomas S. Kuhn, for example, takes a significantly dif-
ferent approach to the growth of scientific knowledge. The Kuhnian
perspective is used to evaluate the Anisa Model and its role in the
growth of scientific knowledge. Illustrations from the mature physical
sciences are used to demonstrate parallels with the development of
Anisa as a major shift from the mechanistic to an organismic paradigm.
Scheme of scientific revolutions . According to Kuhn, therefore, a
scientific paradigm begins with a great discovery, frequently announced
in a book. Underlying this grand discovery is a presupposition (s)
,
sometimes explicitly stated; often it is implicit until the paradigm
as a whole is challenged. A consequence of the paradigmatic discovery
is the development of a general theoretical matrix; this, in turn,
gives rise to a method that is the basis for further discovery and
articulation of theory into new areas. The paradigm defines its own
data and legitimizes some data that were not previously acceptable for
"scientific" study. The method generates new applications that, in
turn, will solve new puzzles. This process of puzzle-solving continues
until a number of unsolved puzzles or theoretical anomalies are dis-
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covered that then creates a crisis for the scientists working within
the paradigm. This gives rise to "extraordinary science" where a
scientist will make a new discovery that resolves the crisis, creating
a new paradigm. The resulting paradigm represents what Kuhn calls a
scientific revolution.
Anomalies of mechanistic paradigm . This study identifies the
following anomalies of mechanistic science. First, mechanistic science
is primarily concerned with efficient causation; it does not deal with
formal or final causes. In addition, efficient causation is viewed as
linear or unidirectional with effect dependent upon cause. It cannot
deal with reciprocal causes. Second, mechanistic science holds to the
reductionist position; it cannot deal with emergent qualities of an
organized whole. Third, the mechanistic view holds to antecedent-
consequent relations as contrasted with structure- function which
involves the attribution of purpose to man as an inherent function.
Fourth, the mechanistic view of reactive man holds that all change is
continuous and predictable from previous states — continuity. It
cannot deal with discontinuity (but connected) where new properties
are emergent, resulting in a whole which cannot be predicted from the
parts. Fifth, the mechanistic view holds time is an absolute con-
sistent with the universe as a machine where cause-and-effect relation-
ships hold for past, present and future. This has served as the "time
independent" criterion for science which is one basis for the crisis
in social psychology. Other evidence from neurological studies (e.g.,
EEC) indicate that in this frequency domain time and space collapse
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and everything happens at once. The organismic view, in contrast to
the mechanistic view, holds that time is a measure of motion rather
than motion being a measure of time. Sixth, the experimental methods
of mechanistic science deal with the subject-experimenter as a person-
thing relationship. It does not deal, as is required in education,
with the student as both object and subject. The introduction of sub-
jective aim more adequately deals with this issue. Seventh, mechanistic
science is amoral or neutral — it states "what is." It does not deal
with the axiological concerns of values, ethics, and morals. It cannot
answer the "ought" questions; it deals with means and not ends. The
organismic approach finds these issues viable.
Paradigm shift: mechanistic to organismic . This study demonstrates
how the Anisa Model, viewed within the Kuhnian perspective, deals
theoretically with these anomalies. The Anisa Model represents extra-
ordinary science by the way in which it deals with these anomalies.
The Anisa presuppositions concerning the nature of reality as expressed
in its first principle — change — answers the basic questions that a
scientific group requires for scientific research. What are the funda-
mental entities of which the universe is composed? What questions may
legitimately be asked about such entities and what techniques employed
in seeking solutions? The basic metaphor of Anisa is the living
organism, an organized whole. In contrast to the machine metaphor of
the mechanistic paradigm, the organismic paradigm views the whole as
organic and is equal to more than the sum of its parts. The whole is
in continuous transition from one state to another through differen-
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tiation, integration, and generalization. The progressive change is
not the result of only efficient cause-and-effect but involves subject-
ive aim and final cause. The introduction of subjective aim and final
cause are the key factors in Anisa representing a shift from the mech-
anistic to an organismic paradigm.
A paradigm is, however, more than a scientific group’s shared
commitments; it is based on shared examples — the "exemplar.” Force
is equal to mass times acceleration (f = m x a) served as the exemplar
for Newton's paradigm. The exemplar for the Anisa paradigm is learning.
Jordan defines learning as the conscious ability to differentiate
aspects of experience, integrate them into novel patterns, and general-
ize them to new situations. It seems intrinsically appropriate that
"learning" should be the exemplar for a paradigm for education.
The Anisa Model, in Kuhn’s framework, could be viewed as represent-
ing "extraordinary science" by the way in which it theoretically
assimilates the anomalies leading to a paradigm shift. While the field
of education could be considered at the philosophical or pre-paradigm
stage, according to Kuhn, the Anisa Model appears to qualify for para-
digm status. The mechanistic paradigm has been primarily evident in
educational research with small islands of educational practice based
on mechanistic theory (e.g., Skinner’s learning theory). While Anisa
does not bring education to a dual paradigm science, nevertheless, it
qualifies as a scientific paradigm for education.
300
Anisa Paradigm; Normal Science Stage
Qualifying as a new paradigm, Anisa, therefore, moves into the
"normal science" stage of paradigm development. If it is to prove
viable as a paradigm, it must determine the legitimate research
approaches to be used. This is the mopping-up work of solving those
legitimate problems posed by the paradigm by essentially organizing
ideas about nature into the new boxes that the paradigm supplies.
This involves converting problems into puzzle form so that they can
be solved by rules and procedures acceptable to the cohort of scient-
ists committed to the paradigm. These scientists have a commitment to
understand the world and extend the precision and scope with which it
has been ordered. There is a network of commitments — conceptual,
instrumental, and methodological — that relate normal science to
puzzle-solving. It provides the rules that tell the practitioner
what both the world and his science are like. This dissertation
explores the implications of these conceptual, instrumental, and
methodological commitments.
Conceptual problems . The Conceptual problems are addressed first for
they deal with the significant facts of the paradigm. Since the basic
presupposition of Anisa is change, the basic facts concerning change
are explored. Jordan, drawing heavily on Whitehead, gives ec[ual
importance to change and stability — a dynamic balance exists between
the two. Jordan's first principle adopts the concept of process as the
translation of potentiality into actuality. Learning serves as the key
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concept of man's ability to consciously learn-to-leam and take
charge of his own ontological and phylogenetic destiny. Learning,
therefore, plays a key role in the process of change; it is the degree
to which man is freed from efficient cause.
Jordan further operationalizes this into a comprehensive theory
of human development which, in terms of the first principle, is the
translation of potentiality into actuality. Two basic types of poten-
tiality — biological and psychological — are actualized, based on
the quality of interaction between the organism and specific environ-
ments, and resulting in structures that form character, identity, and
personality. Thus, Jordan develops the theories of pedagogy, curric-
ulum, administration, and evaluation as a further definition of his
presupposition concerning change.
There are, nevertheless, conceptual problems related to change
that still need to be solved. Consistent with the Anisa theory of
evaluation, which has as its primary goal the continuing evaluation of
its first principles, some of these problems need to be converted into
puzzle form for which there is a possible solution. Gregory Bateson
makes just such a contribution to this "normal science" stage of Anisa
development
.
beaming and evolution: a single unity . Bateson integrates evo-
lution (genetics) and learning (epigenesis) into a single unity.
While learning for Jordan is the key to the release of psychological
potentialities, there are problems of applying the concept at the
genetic and biological levels. For Jordan, differentiation and inte-
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gration operate at these levels with generalization operative at the
psychological level. Bateson, however, further articulates a process
that appears to solve the problem of the Weissmannian barrier between
somatic and genetic change. Jordan does not specifically deal with
the problem. Bateson solves the problem by showing how two stochastic
systems, working at different levels of logical typing, fit together
into a necessary unity that combines the stochastic system within the
individual (learning) with the other stochastic system in heredity
(evolution)
.
Hierarchic structures
. Since Anisa holds that the universe is
hierarchically organized with man (mind) at the apex of evolutionary
development, understanding these basic phenomena are the primary puz-
zles that the organismic paradigm needs to solve. One of the signifi-
cant problems that is converted into puzzle form for which Bateson
offers a solution is explaining hierarchic organization. While Jordan
deals with this in a general way, Bateson offers a solution to this
puzzle by applying Russell and Whitehead's theory of logical typing to
real world phenomena of biology and mind. He takes the concept of
"logical typing" out of abstract mathematical logic and uses it to map
real biological and psychological events onto hieiarchies we encounter
in these real world systems. Bateson provides examples illustrating
how hierarchic structures emerge; there is a zigzag ladder of form
(calibration) and process (feedback) that operate at different levels
of logical typing. Such an alternating ladder may help to solve a
number of puzzles in the field of ethics, education, and evaluation.
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Bateson's concepts of "calibration" and "feedback" help to clarify
the relationship that exists between Jordan's concept of "leadership"
and "management"; an analogous zigzag process operates which handles
the discontinuity as change leads to a higher hierarchic level of
organization (logical typing)
.
Reciprocal causation
. Reciprocal causation — a circular, causal
and feedback process — is operative rather than simple linear, uni-
directional, efficient causation of the mechanistic paradigm. Bateson
suggests that the central problem of Greek philosophy — teleology —
is within possible solution using cybernetics and systems theory where
self-corrective circuits provide the basis for adaptation of organisms.
The problems of change, hierarchic organization, reciprocal causation,
emergent phenomena, discontinuity, and time are all interrelated; they
are discussed, with particular focus on each phenomenon. Bateson
illustrates this by understanding self-correcting circuits used in
designing the governor for a steam engine. Even at this physical level
of thing-thing interaction, Clark Maxwell demonstrated that every
system has relations to time; these time constants are determined by
the whole and are emergent properties of the system. In describing
events as though one were inside the circuit, it would be described in
cause-and-effect terms (e.g., a change in A determines a change in B,
etc.). However, when dealing with the circuit as a whole instead of
relations between individual variables, we are comparing change with
change involving a change in discourse — a change in logical typing.
What is needed is an explanation in terms of the time constants of the
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total circuit. The variables at the stage of one level of discourse
disappear at the next higher or lower level. Bateson (1979) observes:
The truth of the matter is that every circuit of causation
in the whole of biology, in our physiology, in our thinking,
our neural processes, our homeostasis, and in the ecological
and cultural systems of which we are parts — every such
circuit conceals or proposes those paradoxes and confusions
that accompany errors and distortions in logical typing
(p. 109).
It is notable that systems — physical, psychological, or social
— involving circular causation are capable of positive gain resulting
in a runaway or escalating, vicious circle. There is no systematic
knowledge of the dynamics of these processes. Ecology, as an emerging
science, however, is a beginning. Bronfenbrenner ' s ecological approach
is, therefore, quite consistent with Bateson's views. Many of Bronfen-
brenner 's ecological propositions presented in this work, however, are
merely a step in this direction with the greatest emphasis on reciprocal
causation, system's properties, and discovery of emergent phenomena.
Bateson makes his greatest contribution by dealing with the larger spec-
trum, particularly hierarchic organization, logical typing, discontin-
uity, and time.
Bateson provides some helpful insights in understanding reciprocal
causation and runaway systems. He observes that neither random genetic
change and natural selection nor trial-and-error learning (thought) and
selective reinforcement will necessarily work for the good of either
the species or the individual . Man is capable of making choices that
could lead to a runaway or escalating vicious circles that could be
disastrous for the system. Choices could have short-term advantage for
/
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the individual but long-term disaster for the group when viewed at a
different level of logical typing. To improve the probability of sur-
vival, therefore, an organismic theory of evaluation needs to map pro-
cesses that the mechanistic theories with efficient, linear cause-and-
effect relations cannot. On-going and long-term data from various
hierarchic levels within a system and related interdependent systems
need to be systematically obtained to permit the best decision-making
for both the individual and the group.
Final cause . The organismic paradigm subsumes efficient causation
and conceptually deals with phenomena involving reciprocal causation.
Anisa holds to the active organism — contrasted with reactive man —
which has subjective aim and final cause as inherent givens. Man is
freed to some degree from efficient cause (instinct); therefore, he is
able, through learning, to take greater charge of determining his own
destiny. Anisa also holds that there is purpose or final cause regard-
ing the direction of that destiny. Bateson may provide a resolution
to the central problem of purpose (teleology) and consistent with Anisa
but extending its scope. Translated into other terms, the concept of
negative entropy is analogous to final cause, the universe can be
viewed as an open system with process that tends toward an organized
complexity. This indicates purpose, reflects an optimistic view, and
represents Anderson's growth circle. However, it does not deal with
vicious circles or degradation of energy — energy without a purpose.
Bateson, in unifying epigenesis (learning) and evolution
(genetics)
,
shows how they are related to the twin components of the
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second law of thermodynamics. He maintains that the random workings
of probability always eat up order (negative entropy). However, to
create a new pattern (workings of the random), a large number of uncom-
mited alternatives (entropy) are necessary. Combining the two sto-
chastic systems of epigenesis and evolution, which also follow an
alternation of two species of steps (logical typing), Bateson is also
able to deal with the related problems of change, hierarchic organiza-
tion, emergent phenomena, discontinuity, and time. This concept
expands the Anisa view of man: freed from efficient causation but is
able, through learning, to make conscious choices within these stochas-
tic processes where choice (selection) is made from the random. It
places the concept of final cause in a different perspective; it allows
for direction and purpose but warns against an oversimplified view of
some ultimate goal of perfection. Again, a systematic theory of eval-
uation can play a crucial role in avoiding errors in decision-making
concerning logical typing that could lead to runaway or escalating
vicious circles.
Problems of self-reference: object-subject . Bateson draws upon
Russell and Whitehead, who in their Principia Mathematica attempted to
derive all of mathematics from logic without contradiction (i.e., elim-
inate paradox from logic, set, and number theory) . Their Theory of
Logical Types was to rid set-theory of its paradox. This was accom-
plished by introducing a hierarchy which prevented looping back inside
language. For example, in a hierarchy we go from ’’class” to ’’class of
classes”, etc. Bateson's insight was to use the theory of ’’logical
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types" to deal with hierarchic organizations which, he maintains,
are central to living systems.
The common element in paradoxes is "self-reference" or "strange
loops" as illustrated in the paradox of Epimenides. Kurt Godel's
Incompleteness Theorem raised questions concerning Russell and White-
head's work in showing the limitations of formal logic. However, it
also focused attention on problems of understanding our own minds —
consciousness. Since Anisa is concerned with these problems —
problems of explaining itself — (Jo’del's theorem was explored. It
suggests certain limitations in our ability to represent our own struc-
ture and the degree to which science in its demonstrative version of
object and subject can use self-application of science (i.e., science
studying itself as an object). It raises questions concerning Anisa,
Kuhn, and Piaget.
Hofstadter, however, shows how Godel's proof has implications for
understanding consciousness. He holds that "strange loops" can serve
as the explanation of emergent phenomena in our brains (e.g., ideas,
hopes, free will, and consciousness). They result from the interaction
(a self-reinforcing resonance) between different levels. The self
comes into being at the moment it has the power to reflect itself.
This self-reference appears to be the heart of all artificial intelli-
gence and is significant in our attempts to understand how the human
mind works. Gb'del's and Hofstadter' s works have important implications
for solving some of the problems of self-reference. Since Anisa is not
limited to the demonstrative third person approach of mechanistic
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science, the problems of object-subject need to be worked through.
Anisa does introduce the person into its methodology and is concerned
with explaining itself. While Piaget's epistemology and Kuhn's growth
of knowledge are consistent with Anisa, Godel's work offers additional
insights into the limitation of such self-reference.
Instrumentation . To quantitatively and qualitatively measure the facts
concerning change, hierarchic structures, time, etc., there is the con-
comitant need to develop appropriate instruments. Existing instrument-
ation, particularly norm-referenced measures, are critically reviewed
and their role is redefined to more limited application. Promising
alternatives are suggested (e.g.. The Learning Potential Assessment
Device, criterion-referenced tests, and process measures). Other areas
of needed work are identified.
Norm-referenced tests . The development, uses, and abuses of norm-
referenced tests are presented. Their development represents an
example of how the mechanistic paradigm was able to convert the problem
of measurement into puzzle form involving specific rules and procedures
representing an outstanding puzzle solution. In fact, it provides a
possible model to be followed by those who will be working within the
organismic paradigm who need to convert into puzzle form the problem of
measuring change in the individual (or group) over time. Norm-refer-
enced tests are based on the assumption that given traits (e.g., intel-
ligence, achievement, etc.) are randomly distributed. Procedures for
test construction, administration, and interpretation were developed
and refined. In order to quantify the measurement, an appropriate
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mathematics (e.g., Fisher's statistical Unit Normal Curve) developed.
The rules and procedures have been highly developed creating an
effective testing technology.
As a product of mechanistic science, normative statistics have
been applied by psychologists and educators. The tests as "objective
measures" have been used for evaluation purposes within the traditional
research designs. Their use in these designs is largely limited to
cross-sectional measures involving individuals or groups. They are
also relatively effective for selection purposes (e.g., recruiting,
student placement, etc.). They do not, however, effectively measure
"modifiability", the uniqueness of the individual, nor changes in the
individual or group over time. Their primary goals have been object-
ivity and prediction. While these have solved some limited problems,
they have created a number of moral and ethical problems involved in
the misuse of the technology and its theoretical underpinnings. Theo-
retical, technical, and ethical issues are discussed.
As a product of mechanistic science, normative measures largely
achieve the scientific goals of objectivity, prediction, control, and
quantification. They cannot, however, deal with the anomalies of
mechanistic science, (e.g., means-ends, reciprocal and final causes,
emergent hierarchic structures, etc.). Since the organismic paradigm
subsumes the mechanistic as a special case, we do not have to throw
the baby out with the bath water. Thus, norm-referenced tests have a
more limited use particularly for short-term, cross-sectional measures
involving traditional research designs. Norm-referenced theory is
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analogous to Newton's view based upon Euclidean geometry while
Einstein's view is based on Reimman's mathematics. Einstein's general
theory of relativity made Newton's terrestrial and celestial laws
special cases but gave us a very different view of reality quite anal-
ogous to the view that Anisa offers. Thus, what is highly desirable
is a mathematical system comparable to Reimman's that would enable
measurement of uniqueness and individual development over time. While
quantification is desirable in the further articulation of a paradigm,
it is not a prerequisite; quantification may follow the intuitive
solutions the new paradigm identifies.
Dynamic assessment: The Learning Potential Assessment Device (LPAD).
Reuven Feuerstein, who studied with Piaget, developed the LPAD which is
a radical modification of conventional norm-referenced psychometrics.
Its philosophy, method, instruments, and techniques have significant
implications for Anisa practices that can be immediately incorporated.
Based on twenty- five years of empirical study, its theoretical orienta-
tion places it within the organismic paradigm. It makes a significant
contribution to the testing technology oriented to assessing change in
the individual over time. The dynamic assessment is a major step in
converting the problem identified by the Anisa paradigm into a puzzle
form which can now be solved with specified rules and procedures.
Feuerstein believes, fully consistent with Anisa, that change
should be introduced as the central goal of assessment; situations
should be created in which change can be elicited and then measured.
It is change (growth) that Anisa seeks to provide. This "educational
«
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approach" (i.e., concern for modifiability) contrasts with the "pre-
diction approach" which attained scientific legitimacy under mechanis-
tic science. The paradigm shift to organismic thinking is the key to
legitimizing the former. Feuerstein, while not consciously working
within the organismic perspective, nevertheless, has taken steps in
solving a major puzzle. His rules and procedures contrast sharply
with conventional psychometrics. For example, he places major empha-
sis on change (modifiability) rather than predictability — focuses
more on process than product. He dramatically changes the concep-
tion of the examiner- examinee interaction from an objective, neutral
role to a reciprocal interaction which he calls "mediated learning."
This parallels Anisa's view of "learning competence" through leaming-
to- learn. The assessment procedures are also analogous to the Anisa
theory of teaching; on most dimensions each could serve as a prototype
for the other.
J. McVicker Hunt makes the following observation, "...psycho-
metric assessment of educability should never again be the same...
Other investigators can build upon the very substantial foundation
that Feuerstein has constructed." That "substantial foundation"
represents a technology that can be immediately used by Anisa practi-
tioners and the basis for refining the rules and procedures for
solving the puzzles of measuring change central to the Anisa paradigm.
Criterion-referenced tests . Since Anisa is a prescriptive theory,
many of its goals and specific objectives can be appropriately measured
by criterion-referenced tests. Introduced in the 1960 ’s, this testing
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technology has already developed to the level that criterion-
referenced tests can now be considered as a constructive alternative
to norm-referenced tests. They are particularly congenial to Anisa
practices and can be used for on-going evaluation at two levels —
diagnostic and instructional outcomes. They can ascertain an individ-
ual’s status with respect to well-defined behavioral domains specified
by Anisa theory. The advantages over norm-referenced tests are dis-
cussed. In general, criterion-referenced technology can be immediately
used for evaluating aspects of the Anisa content curriculum.
Process measures . Since Anisa is equally concerned with the pro-
cess curriculum as well as the content curriculum, it needs instrument-
ation to measure the processes which must be mastered in the develop-
ment of learning competence in each of the major psychological poten-
tialities: psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective, and volitional.
Hambleton et al. (1974) from the Laboratory of Psychometric and Evalua-
tive Research, University of Massachusetts, in collaboration with the
Anisa staff, conducted a review of the literature pertaining to process
measures, collected available instruments, and developed measures for
seven of the processes underlying learning competence. These involved
the following: classification, seriation, verticality, attention,
figure-ground perception, and cooperation. A great deal of effort is
still required in this area. It will entail a strategy of basic
research on the development of each process. It is notable that
several proposals have been recently submitted by Jordan to the
National
Institute of Education for funding.
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Other techniques and measures
. A variety of observer rating
scales have been developed. Working within an operations research
framework, tailor-made instnoments involving the participant-observer
are quite appropriate for many Anisa practices. The systematic use of
video-tape for immediate feedback and modeling have proved effective in
practice to date and this procedure for pre- and post-observations is
very promising. Initial exploration for using computer technology to
assist the Master Teacher in recording, storing, and retrieving inform-
ation on each child make this a feasible approach in the neighboring
future.
In contrast to the normative strategy of measurement, the ipsative
approach can be used. In essence, it assimies that the individual is a
self-contained universe within which variations in behavior occur. For
instance, Stephenson's (1953) Q Sort technique can be used by the
teacher to determine how a given student's scores deviate from his or
her own mean in a unique pattern — a true "idiographic" approach and
fully appropriate for Anisa 's view of man. While quantification for
the idiographic approach is difficult, some statistical techniques have
been developed. For example, Baldwin (1942) developed a personal
structure analysis to study the unique pattern of the individual per-
sonality; Luborsky (1953) used factor analysis for his P technique
which uses correlations between batteries of tests taken by one person
over several occasions (If two symptoms fluctuate together from day-
to-day, a high correlation will be obtained) . In addition to these
quantitative efforts, case studies of one form or another are also
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appropriate. White's (1975) Lives in Progress and Allport's (1965)
letters From Jenny are examples of the idiographic approach that could
be used to illustrate the effects of Anisa practices.
Cognitive processes
. This important but largely untapped area is
central to the long-term implementation of Anisa. Cognitive processes
operative in the brain are clearly identified by the Anisa paradigm.
Interest in cognitive processes have taken on a new importance in the
behavioral sciences. A creative multidisciplinary approach is most
probable. Work on the split brain (Sperry, et al.) has produced
results that are useful in diagnosing learning disabilities. Pribram's
(1979) innovative work, suggesting that the brain may function like a
holograph, shows much promise. While very complex technology may be
involved, experience with the physical sciences suggests the length to
which scientists will go in developing instrumentation if the paradigm
poses the puzzle (e.g., radiotelescopes, holographs, etc.).
Methodological implications . Methodology is defined as the study of
the variety of methods which can be used in different paradigms con-
cerned with acquiring knowledge. The term "method" denotes a given
scientific procedure specifying the rules and procedures which must be
followed to achieve a given end. Based on the theory of logical types,
methodology stands in the same relation to method as a class to one of
its members. This study attempts to avoid this error of logical
typing. The methodology underpinning the Anisa theory of evaluation
is rooted in the methods of acquiring knowledge based upon Kuhn's con-
cept of a scientific paradigm. Within this methodological framework.
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therefore, specific methods of investigation with their rules and
procedures for solving defined puzzles are presented.
Mechanistic methods . Since the Anisa (organismic) paradigm sub-
sumes the mechanistic, essentially all of the research designs already
explicated by Campbell and Stanley (1966) are applicable for limited
purposes. Thus, a variety of control group designs using statistical
procedures (e.g., t-tests, analysis of covariance, etc.), are appro-
priate. These are useful in establishing efficient cause-and-effect
relationships particularly with systems at the thing-thing and organism-
thing levels of interaction. They are not as appropriate for systems
involving organism-organism interaction where reciprocal and final
causes are more operative. At this level, organismic methods are more
adequate for they deal with the anomalies of mechanistic science (e.g.,
reciprocal and final causes, means -ends, hierarchic and emergent struc-
tures, etc.).
Organismic methods . The entire Anisa structure rests on the
empirical base of its theory of evaluation. While there is a relation-
ship among all of the Anisa theories, there is an integral relation-
ship between the theories of administration and evaluation. The former
orchestrates the total implementation of the Anisa Model guided by the
data provided by the theory of evaluation. This is exemplified by
Bronfenbrenner ' s concept of a "transforming experiment" — Anisa can
be an example par excellence. As a transforming experiment, adminis-
trative decisions are guided by the prescriptive nature of Anisa
theory with a reciprocal relationship between administrative decision-
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making and the data obtained from the research methods determined by
the theory of evaluation. This study presents some of these methods
and identifies problems that need to be converted into puzzle form for
possible solution.
The initial research designs in field-testing the Anisa Model at
two sites used a goal-evaluation model, emphasizing operations
research within a general systems framework. The quality of the pro-
grams was evaluated in terms of the defined goals — both formative
and summative. For future field tests, however, Bronfenbrenner
'
s
experimental ecological approach shows much promise. It incorporates
in a much more comprehensive manner the initial designs, and is gener-
ally congenial with the Anisa paradigm. Based upon nine propositions,
Bronfenbrenner deals with a number of problems that are converted into
solvable puzzle form. Specifically, he offers experimental designs
that more adequately deal with reciprocal causation. These are con-
sistent with designs suggested by Bandura, Gadlin, and Piaget. His
propositions also effectively handle the object-subject relationships
in experimental designs. These are consistent with the Anisa theory
of teaching and applicable in the context of the classroom. In general,
the developing field of ecological science is making a contribution to
the "normal science" stage of the development of the Anisa paradigm.
Bronfenbrenner ’ s approach, however, does not adequately deal with
a number of conceptual problems identified by Bateson, namely, change,
hierarchic organization, discontinuity, and time. It is in these areas
that Bateson et al. make a contribution using the theory of groups and
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the theory of logical types to account for first-order and second-
order change. By analogy, many of the changes within the mechanistic
paradigm represent first-order change where considerable activity is
manifest but the outcome is invariant. The Anisa paradigm, however,
represents a second-order change at a different level of logical
typing. This perspective on change regarding problem formation and
problem resolution provides a very promising approach to Anisa practi-
tioners .
The Anisa paradigm, now emerging to the "normal science" stage,
is concerned with certain ways of doing things that will be accepted
as a matter of course. Much mopping up work is still required before
both the mechanistic and organismic scientists will accept the same
procedural evidence, implicitly or explicitly, as support for the
paradigm. Since the Anisa paradigm subsumes the mechanistic, such
procedural evidence will be required. The well developed, mature
sciences have passed through stages where a chaos of disagreeing
schools has been narrowed down to one major school with one unifying
paradigm. It is my thesis that the Anisa presuppositions, exemplar,
developing research methods, and theories move education to paradigm
status. This dissertation has given it a name and a location for the
expanding community of scientists committed to its constellation of
beliefs, values, and techniques.
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APPENDIX A
HYPOTHESES ON THE NATURAL HISTORY OF REFORM MOVEMENTS
As a graduate student I had the opportunity to collaborate with
the late Professor Goodwin Watson of Columbia University in studying
reform movements in history. As a result of this research, he formed
a set of hypotheses on the natural history of reform movements. These
are presented in their most general form. Although Anisa theory relies
on a strategy of planned change, the use of these hypotheses may pro-
vide perspective and insight for administrators implementing the Anisa
paradigm. In addition, the Anisa paradigm as a "transforming experi-
ment" in education will be disseminated with ripple effects that could
be studied using these stages of development. It provides a broad,
long-term, out-of-system perspective that should prove helpful for
future Anisa practitioners.
1 . Stages of Development . If the progress of a successful reform be
graphed, with time on the abscissa and percent of acceptance along
the ordinates, the ogive curve will rise slowly at first, more
rapidly for its mid-section, and more slowly again approaching its
ceiling as an asympotote. The Early Stage extends from the begin-
ning to the first point of inflection; the Expansion Stage covers
the period of rapid rise between the points of inflection; the
Late Stage carries on to the end.
Percent
of
Acceptance
Figure 7.
EARLY STAGE
2. Comolacency Disturbed. A reform movement begins with felt
needs^
(vectors) which disturb the complacency (Quasi -stationary
equilib-
rium) of one or more especially sensitive persons; attempte
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extension of this disturbance to others arouses defensive resent-
ment. One of the defenses is rejection of the pioneer proponents
as "cranks."
Timeliness
. The timeliness of a movement is inversely proportional
to the length of the Early Stage. Timeliness is indicated by: (a)
increased dissatisfaction with the situation to be changed; (b)
weakened strength or prestige of the opposition; (c) facilitating
discoveries or inventions; (d) support being given to similar or
related endeavors; and (e) some striking incident or crisis.
4. Salience
. The more deeply members are ego-involved and the more
they feel their most vital interests to be bound up in a movement,
the more ready they will be to sacrifice for it. Greater salience
usually means more time devoted to the movement, more aspects of
life penetrated by its influence. Salience is greater for pioneers
and for top leadership.
5. Simultaneous Beginnings
. Urgent social need often brings several
independent organizations with similar goals into being at about
the same time; rivalry ensues; some beginnings merge; others lose
out
.
6. Exaggerated Expectations . Proposed reforms lie at the fantasy
level, less reality-bound and more subjectively perceived; hence,
advocates anticipate more benefits than actually occur; opponents
anticipate difficulties more dire than reality brings.
7. Unclarified Objectives . The supporters of a reform movement in its
Early Stage have differing conceptions of the movement and are
moved by a variety of conscious and unconscious motives. Unclari-
fied purposes foreshadow later misunderstandings and schisms.
8. Urban Nurture. In larger cities, social movements can more easily
find the necessary number of supporters; moreover, citizens are
freer to adopt innovations than in closely supervised small towns.
9. Privilege and Progress . Reforms and innovations which improve com-
munity life without threatening the continued power of the ruling
group are more readily accepted in communities where educational
level is high, where economic conditions allow time and money for
leisure, where there is tax leeway, where salaries attract profes-
sional leaders, and where there is energy for experimentation.
Reforms which are perceived as directly or indirectly a threat to
the ruling group and the values they support (and which in turn
support them) can progress only by: (a) some conflict in the value
systems with corresponding rifts in the unity of the ruling class,
(b) perception by the ruling group of this reform as an acceptable
concession or "token-solution" (See #18 below) warding off more
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serious threats; (c) growing power of another class to enforceIts interests despite opposition of rulers.
Training Increases Demand
. Social demand for a service leads toimproved training of personnel which in turn increases the demand.
Preliminary Defeats. After some growth, leaders of a movement are
tempted to a premature trial of strength. They are misled by
their own especially keen sense of the urgency, their encourage-
ment by some progress after so long an effort, and their associa-
tion with an unrepresentative sample of the population. The
challenge of early defeat is critical for the future progress of
the movement. Weak leaders give up; strong leaders learn more
realistic methods.
EXPANSION STAGE
12. Climbers on the Bandwagon
. As a reform movement enters the Expan-
sion Stage, it attracts new types of support; (a) more "realistic”,
(b) more prestige, (c) more opportunistic, (d) more timid. This
dilutes the salience concentration.
13. Redefinition . New personnel and leadership bring about redefini-
tion of objective in a more conservative or compromising form.
14. Simplification . If a movement engages mass support, its appeal
becomes oversimplified essentially to Right vs. Wrong; debate
becomes stereotyped.
15. Half-way Dangers . A danger point in reform lies half-way between
the old order and the new, when traditional patterns have been
weakened but the new are not yet strong.
16. Competition and Consolidation . Rapid expansion fosters a pro-
liferation of agencies competing for support and for control; at
the same time, independent movements grow in relative power by
merging with others.
17. Pass a Law . Reform laws passed too early in the development of a
movement prove unenforceable by democratic consent; after the
Expansion Stage is well along, legal sanctions hasten acceptance
by the reluctant minority.
18. Token Solution . When a ruling group is under pressure to move
but is reluctant to do so, attempt is made to offer a "token
solution" which will seem enough to give some satisfaction to
forces urging action but which will be only nominal and not real
movement. Frequent devices are the appointment of a committee,
institution of a survey, or passing a favorable (but implemented)
resolution.
335
19. Concessions
.
(G-x) . When a movement nears a goal, (G), opposi-
tion forces wishing to avert the worst, offer a concession
amounting to (G-x)
.
LATE STAGE
20. Diminishing Returns . After the second point of inflection of the
growth curve, each new member or dollar becomes harder and harder
to get and drop-outs offset gains.
21. Bureaucracy . When enough has been won, the crusading spirit ebbs,
leaving bureaucrats to operate the movement.
22. Opponents Reconciled . When a reform has become well established,
conservative groups conveniently forget their one-time opposition,
and may even become defenders of the social arrangement, prefer-
ring it to still more radical proposals.
23. Glorious Past . Celebration of glorious past achievements replaces
creative attack on present problems; methods once successful con-
tinue even if no longer so effective (Functional autonomy)
.
24. Last Gasps . In dying movements, desperate measures are spasmodic-
cally tried, but in vain; dwindling support is further reduced by
factional hostility arising from continued frustration.

